

Volume 64 • Number 2 • Fall/Winter 2012

Saskatchewan HISTORY



Diefenbaker *and the
Cuban missile crisis*

Anglicans *on the
homefront*

**Remembering
Cut Knife Hill**

The Saskatchewan Archives Board



Provincial Archivist Linda McIntyre holds a reproduction of a war sketch drawn by Lieutenant C.H. Barraud, entitled The Ramparts, Ypres, at a special Remembrance Day event held by the Saskatchewan Archives in November, 2010. The drawing is part of the Canadian War Memorial Prints series; 22 war prints were purchased by the Government of Saskatchewan in July, 1920 and it is believed they once hung in the Saskatchewan Legislature.

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World War II era recruitment poster, exhorting
recruits to apply as air crew at the "New Regina
Trading Co. Building" to be part of "a new generation
of Fighting Canadians." SAB R-A22938

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The Victoria Cross in Saskatchewan

The Victoria Cross (VC) is the highest military decoration awarded for valour “in the face of the enemy” to members of the armed forces of various Commonwealth countries, and previous British Empire territories. Awarded since 1856, it takes precedence over all other orders, decorations and medals. It may be awarded to a person of any rank in any service and to civilians under military command.

The first Saskatchewan residents to be awarded the VC served in the South African or Boer War of 1899 – 1902, wherein the descendants of Dutch colonists fought against British Imperial forces; in fact, Canadians comprised an entire mounted regiment, the Lord

Strathcona’s Horse. Then, in World War I, Saskatchewan VC recipients fought as members of the British Empire against German forces, in Belgium and north-east France. Years later, during World War II, Saskatchewan VC recipients served as Allied troops opposing Germany at Dieppe and in Normandy; one recipient was stationed in Hong Kong during the conflict between Commonwealth and Japanese forces.

In 1993, Canada introduced its own Victoria Cross award, which, like its British predecessor, is recognized as the highest in the Canadian honours system. Tradition dictates that, as an expression of respect, all military personnel stand whenever a VC recipient enters a room.

The VC at SAB

Historical researchers will find a plethora of historical items at SAB. In fact, in addition to photos, biographical information, and more about Saskatchewan VC winners, SAB is proud to house the actual Victoria Cross medal of Robert Grierson Combe. Combe was killed by a sniper near Vimy

Ridge: his award citation, found in SAB file R-E3899, reads, “for most conspicuous bravery and example. He steadied his company under intense fire, and led them through the enemy barrage, reaching the objective with only five men.” Combe’s posthumously awarded VC was donated to SAB by his widow.

Information is from “For Valour:” Saskatchewan Victoria Cross Recipients, Saskatchewan Heritage Foundation pamphlet, 1995.

Saskatchewan VC recipients

Of the 93 Canadian recipients of the VC, sixteen have lived in Saskatchewan:

- Harry Churchill Beet for his 1900 service in Wakkerstroom, South Africa.
- Arthur Herbert Lindsey Richardson for his 1900 service in Wolve Spruit.
- Michael O’Leary for his 1915 service in Cuinchy, France.
- William Johnstone Milne for his 1917 service at Vimy Ridge, France.
- Robert Grierson Combe for his 1917 service at Acheville, France.
- George Randolph Pearkes for his 1917 service at Passchendaele, Belgium.
- George Harry Mullin for his 1917 service at Passchendaele, Belgium.
- Edmund De Wind for his 1918 service near Grougie, France.
- Gordon Muriel Flowerdew for his 1918 service in the Bois de Moreuil, France.
- Raphael Louis Zengel for his 1918 service at Amiens, France.
- Arthur George Knight for his 1918 service at Villers-lez-Cagnicourt, France.
- Hugh Cairns for his 1918 service at Valenciennes, France.
- John Robert Osborn for his 1941 service at Hong Kong.
- Charles Cecil Ingersoll Merritt for his 1942 service at Dieppe, France.
- David Vivian Currie for his 1944 service at St. Lambert sur Dives, France.
- Campbell Mellis Douglas for his 1867 service at Little Andaman Island in the Indian Ocean; while Dr Douglas never actually lived in Saskatchewan, he had served here during the Northwest Resistance, paddling 200 miles in a collapsible boat from Saskatchewan Landing to Saskatoon, where he treated the wounded from the battles of Fish Creek and Batoche in the medical facility.



The widow of Robert Grierson Combe receives his posthumous VC from HRH Prince of Wales, 1919. SAB R-E388

THE


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SECTION

FIRST MEAL 8.00 a.m.

SECOND MEAL 5.00 p.m.

SASKATCHEWAN MILITARY MUSEUM

The Saskatchewan Military Museum's mission is to collect, preserve and display artifacts, documents, records and material relating to the military history of Saskatchewan's units, its people and its communities.



WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/SASKMILITARYMUSEUM



306-347-9349
(MUSEUM OFFICE)

If you are interested in visiting or making a donation to the Saskatchewan Military Museum please contact us:

SASKATCHEWAN MILITARY MUSEUM AT THE ARMORIES

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On the battleground and on the homefront: wartime in Saskatchewan

Welcome to our special military issue! We are proud to present a variety of articles that look at Saskatchewan in wartime.

When we think of war, we tend to focus on the two world wars; however, Saskatchewan was embroiled in battles long before either of those wars. In fact, did you know that post-Confederation Canada's first 'naval battle' was actually fought in land-locked Saskatchewan? It's true: in 1885, a steamship engaged with the Métis at Batoche during the Northwest Resistance - a good reminder that the Northwest Resistance was a hard-fought war held right here in what is now the province of Saskatchewan.

It's interesting to note that in the mid-1800s, coloured lithographs were used to relay the stories of the resistance - just like TV news today. The Toronto (Ontario) Lithographing Company printed

and distributed detailed coloured lithographs, including the one we feature of the 1885 battle at Cut Knife Hill. The original was done by their chief illustrator, one of Canada's leading artists of the time, William D. Blatchly (1838 - 1903), who used the battlefield sketches of military men as the basis for his panoramic paintings.

Less than two decades later, in 1904, Canada passed a new *Militia Act* that authorized a new militia unit in the Assiniboia and Saskatchewan districts of the North-West Territories. This prompted the organization of Saskatchewan's first military regiment - and SAB archivist Christine Charmbury's great-grandfather was there to photograph its training manoeuvres. All these years later, Christine has created a fascinating photo essay on the 95th Regiment, showcasing a selection of professional



"95th Saskatchewan Rifles." Enlisted men and officers of the 95th Saskatchewan Rifles marching in formation.
SAB S-B/2010

photographs from her ancestor's fonds, which are housed at SAB. The 95th Regiment was redesignated the 95th Saskatchewan Rifles in September 1913, and was mobilized for home service with the 1914 outbreak of World War I.

Canada's action in World War I is today considered to have been our 'coming of age' as a nation. We are delighted to publish former provincial archivist (and current Board Chair for SAB) Trevor Powell's article that examines the vital role played by the Diocese of Qu'Appelle during the war years, both on the homefront and in service overseas. Indeed, it was Trevor's article that inspired us to create this military-themed edition.

From WWI, we skip to the Cold War of the Fifties and Sixties, with a glimpse of the launch of the *HMCS Saskatchewan*, and a scholarly study of Canada's only Saskatchewan-born prime minister's reaction to the Cuban Missile Crisis. SAB executive director Lenora Toth studies the reaction from newspapers across Canada to Diefenbaker's response to the crisis

- one is reminded of the American and British cry of 'weapons of mass destruction' as they rallied allies to fight in Iraq just a few years ago. It is true: history repeats itself, and the more things change, the more they stay the same! Special thanks to the University of Saskatchewan Archives for sharing its photo collection of JFK and Diefenbaker's visits to each other's nation capitals as illustration for the article.

Our military theme also provides an opportunity to boast the SAB holdings with respect to the Victoria Cross: did you know that 16 men with Saskatchewan connections have won the VC? Or that SAB houses a VC in its permanent collection?

The sources at SAB for studying wartimes are varied and interesting. From war diaries of soldiers and nursing sisters, to letters to and from home, to photographs, paintings, personal and public papers: anyone interested in military history will find researching at SAB to be fruitful and fascinating.

Myrna Williams

Editor, Saskatchewan History



The Battle of Cut Knife Hill: Harriet Yellowmud remembers

In the 1870s, the Canadian government signed treaties with prairie First Nations, and also battled the Manitoba Métis through the Red River Resistance. Nevertheless, the Canadian government in the early 1880s refused to hear Métis' grievances regarding land-use issues. And so in 1885, Louis Riel led his people in the Northwest Resistance and declared a provisional government -- most people know how that ended for Louis Riel.*

Amongst the many bloody battles of the resistance, including the Battle of Duck Lake and the Frog Lake Massacre, the Battle of Cut Knife Hill occurred on May 2, 1885. Joining the Métis were nine bands of Cree and three of Assiniboine, numbering some 1500 men, women, and children. They were attacked by a 'flying column'** of mounted police, militia, and Canadian army regulars, as the Canadian government was determined to crush the resistance before it spread. However, the Crown troops made several grave strategic errors, and the warriors defeated the Canadian forces, with losses on both sides.

Harriet Yellowmud was only 14 years old when she witnessed - and survived - the bloody battle at Cut Knife Hill. Harriet is here seen in 1947 describing her vivid memories of the battle to a group of government




SAB R-A 22000-3

Harriet describes what happened at the site of Cut Knife Hill Battle, which took place May 3, 1885. She also witnessed the Frog Lake Massacre that same year.

representatives. The group includes historians Campbell and Verna Innes, there to undertake research for the restoration of Fort Battleford, which opened in 1948.


Several battles of the Northwest Resistance were depicted in full-colour paintings-cum-lithographs, published in *Canadian Pictorial and Illustrated War News Souvenir* contemporaneously in 1885. Several of these lithographs form part of the SAB permanent collection.



* Louis Riel was captured, charged with treason, and hanged in Regina.

** A flying column is a small, independent, military land unit capable of rapid mobility and usually composed of all arms. It is often an ad hoc unit, formed during the course of operations. (from the Wikipedia entry for "flying column.")

This depiction of the Battle of Cut Knife Hill was originally featured as part of a series to illustrate the Northwest Resistance published in Canadian Pictorial and Illustrated War News Souvenir, 1885. Original art attributed to W.D. Blatchly, SAB R-D 285



The Church on the Home Front: The Church of England in the Diocese of Qu'Appelle and the Great War

By Trevor Powell

When Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914, Canadian society was immediately placed on a war footing. Shocked by the German invasion of France through neutral Belgium, the mass execution of Belgian and French civilians, the aerial bombardment of cities and their civilians and the destruction of cultural monuments such as the university library of Louvain and Rheims cathedral, an intense patriotism “rooted in the complacent assumption that imperial forces would quickly prevail,”¹ grabbed the newspaper headlines and prompted thousands of Canadians to volunteer for military service overseas. As citizens of the British Empire, Canadians were more than willing to sacrifice their lives for the ideals and institutions that governed their way of life.

Like the rest of the nation, Canada’s religious institutions were caught up in the patriotic fervour which swept the country. While all denominations would feel the effect of the European conflict sooner or later, the Church of England in the Dominion of Canada was hurt immediately. Large numbers of its members were English-born, had recently arrived from England or were reservists, and therefore quickly responded to the patriotic call by returning home to join a regiment or enlisting in the First Canadian Contingent of which it was estimated that more than 60 percent were of British birth.²

The year 1914 had begun with every hope of peace and prosperity. The greatest Anglican missionary offensive to date was well underway and beginning to show results in reaching the large influx of immigrants across southern Saskatchewan. The clergy and laity of the Diocese of Qu’Appelle were occupied with building churches and expanding its missionary work. In June, Diocesan Synod had met with 120 clergy including the bishop and 125 lay delegates in attendance.³ At that time, the newly-constructed St. Chad’s Theological College was opened by the Primate of All Canada and the Lieutenant Governor of Saskatchewan.⁴ A special door-to-door appeal for the General Diocesan Fund had netted \$8000.⁵ There were over 250 churches active in the diocese. Saskatchewan was beginning to feel the effects of a nationwide recession and was experiencing a crop failure in the western part of the province, but the economy remained buoyant.

The first signs of war in Europe appeared during late July. In the days leading up to the declaration of war, special services were held in Regina parishes with attendance much larger than usual. At St. Paul’s and the catholic St. Peter’s, intercessions for peace and the safety of the Empire were said and hymns sung while at the evangelical St. Mary’s, the Reverend William Simpson⁶ preached a sermon about the value of prayer in times of distress and uncertainty.⁷

*Soldiers of 210th Battalion leaving Moose Jaw train station for overseas, 1915.
SAB R-A12,794*



Among diocesan clergy in general, however, it was thought to be a time for prayer rather than for preaching.

It is generally accepted that Britain went to war in order to defend her strategic interests as well as to honour treaty obligations as a member of the Triple Entente. However, Germany's attack on France through neutral Belgium allowed Britain and her Empire to prosecute the war on a higher moral plane. In a recent publication, historian Alan Kramer states that Britain's leaders successfully portrayed her intervention as defending the rights of smaller nations.⁸ For them and for others across the Empire, going to war was clearly for "a morally just cause."

For the first three years of the war in Canada, recruitment was voluntary so it became necessary to "moralize" and "ideologize" the war as well as "whip up patriotic feelings."⁹ All of these approaches were used by Canadian religious leaders to justify the war. Coupled with allied propaganda that often differed from reality at the front, an intense anti-German hatred was gradually created domestically which in turn generated hostility towards those suspected of not being wholeheartedly in support of the war, doing their part or sharing in the suffering.

The Anglican clergy in the Diocese of Qu'Appelle, like that of other denominations, certainly played their part in contributing to that environment. In a pastoral letter to his people, the Right Reverend Malcolm Taylor McAdam Harding¹⁰ wrote:

If ever there was a time when the call to pray and to fight sounded loud in the ears of the citizens of the British Empire, it is now. Never did a nation go to war with cleaner hands. Never did men train and arm themselves in a more sacred cause than has been the case with ourselves.... We firmly believe that our sailors and soldiers are watching and fighting to vindicate those principles which Christendom has ever held to be the most sacred and in opposition to a power which seeks universal dominion in the blind following of history for empire.¹¹

On Sundays following the declaration of war, congregations or audiences, depending on the venue, were treated to a variety of patriotic sermons. Preaching at St. Paul's Church, the Reverend Walter Western¹² said that war was contrary to the teaching of Christ to "love your enemies."¹³ What was the international community to do, however, when another nation without provocation invades a neighbour? The young curate thought that "God had always had a way ... of bringing good out of evil and from this war would emanate acts of heroism from some men who previously had been little better than street corner loafers with less backbone than a caterpillar."¹⁴ He ended his sermon by thanking "Providence that he was looking at men before him who were ready to go out and fight for their country's glory, men who had counted the cost and were making sacrifices undreamed of, to help in the nation's defence. It was this spirit that kept the empire intact."¹⁵





DQA, R705 VII.125 Parish histories

St. Mary's Church, - Maple Creek
**Mission of Repentance
 and Hope**

December 3 to 17

The Sunday Services will be held at the usual times.
 The Week-day Services will be as follows :

Holy Communion - - - **7.30 A.M.**

Meditations - - - **3 - 4 P.M.**

Children's Service - - - **4 - 4.30 P.M.**

*Evensong and Sermon with Special
 Intercession 7.30 P.M.*

*Poster advertising Mission of Hope and Repentance and
 Hope at Church of St. Mary the Virgin, Maple Creek, 1916.*

Addressing 250 officers and men of the 60th Rifles on 16 August at St. John's in Moose Jaw, the visiting Bishop of Toronto, the Right Reverend J.M. Sweeney, spoke of Canada's place within the Empire. He believed the outward display of militarism and patriotism seen right across the country was largely due to the fact that "the cause of the Dominion was the cause of the Empire - one indivisible and insoluble."¹⁶ For Sweeney, the conflict was "a most righteous war against one filled with the mad spirit of lust and conquest," likening the Kaiser to a second Napoleon, "who was going to march through the world, take possession over all and claim a universal lordship."¹⁷

The Reverend John Swalwell¹⁸ looked at the conflict from another perspective. In his sermon to troopers of the 27th Light

Horse at St. Stephen's, Swift Current, he talked about the destructiveness and cruelty of war, yet was of the view that most of the nations now embroiled in it desired peace. Swalwell said that he was all in favour of peace "but not peace with dishonour. This war is waged in the cause of honour, justice and righteousness therefore we enter upon it with no misgivings."¹⁹

On 20 August at the Yorkton Armory, the Reverend Canon Francis Cole Cornish²⁰ of Holy Trinity Church presided at a drum head service assisted by the Methodist and Presbyterian ministers.²¹ Addressing troopers of the 16th Light Horse, Cornish lamented the fact that he was not wearing their uniform and not going with them. To those remaining at home, he asked them:

*to do their part and ... to appeal to the
 God of battles to bring the war to a
 speedy conclusion and pray for the
 forgiveness of their individual sins
 and of the sins of the nation. Let it be a
 lesson to us that the destiny of war is
 not in the hands of statesmen, but in the
 hands of God.*²²

Cornish's exhortation to those on the home front echoed words spoken earlier by Bishop Harding: "The Empire calls to war - the Church to prayer."²³ Harding had no fear that the men who were going to fight would carry out their duty to God and Empire, but he had concerns of those left behind that they would fail in their duty of prayer and support of the church. The stability and security of the Dominion and the Empire did not rest solely on its soldiers and sailors, but also "upon the characters of the citizens engaged in performing the duties of life far away from the awful scenes of bloodshed."²⁴

In the weeks and months that followed, churches throughout the diocese offered a variety of weekday services in addition to regular Sunday worship. Forms of prayer such as litanies were conducted in rural parishes as far away as Christ Church, Gainsborough,²⁵ St. Andrew's, Rosetown,²⁶

Holy Trinity, Vanguard²⁷ and St. George's, Imperial²⁸ and in Regina city churches such as St. Alkmund's²⁹ and St. Peter's.³⁰ In all districts served by the English (later Canadian) Church Railway Mission,³¹ priests held a weekday service of intercessions for the war. While such services were particularly welcome, one missionary reported that "in no case have they failed to meet with appreciation, yet in some places they ceased to be attended by any, but the priest in charge."³² In the Parish of Imperial and Simpson, prayer cards were printed for use before and after services in order "to prepare ourselves for worship, to be reverent and, while helping us usefully to occupy any time of waiting, they will help us to express out halting thoughts of prayer."³³ Beginning in 1915, the Reverend Charles Harrington of St. Luke's in Broadview held without fail "Intercessions for the Troops" every Friday evening until the war ended.³⁴ The Rector of St. John the Baptist in Gull Lake, Charles Wright, kept a list of men who had gone to war from his parish for whom "they pray for by name at the altar of this church."³⁵ The Venerable Frederick Wells Johnson³⁶ reported that the Church of St. John the Baptist, Moose Jaw, has "a daily celebration during Lent with special intercessions ... and day by day we read out the names of some of those who left here, and once a week we remember especially those who have fallen."³⁷ Father Frederic Stanford of St. Peter's took issue with a *Regina Morning Leader* article that claimed St. Paul's was the first Anglican church in Regina to institute daily services in support of the war effort.³⁸ He pointed out in a letter to its readers that daily Matins and Evensong had been said there for years. Moreover,

"Holy Communion with special intercession for those engaged in warfare has been held daily" since the outbreak of war.³⁹ In January 1917, St. Peter's also introduced a "Military Matins" prior to the 11 a.m. Choral Eucharist each Sunday.⁴⁰

In supporting the war effort, Bishop Harding led from the front. As well as conducting services for soldiers heading off to war or blessing the colours of new battalions, he personally saw the troops off at the train station, no matter the place or hour. This gesture was not lost on the men. A member of the First Canadian Contingent, Sergeant E.R. Gill of the Canadian Field Artillery, in a letter to Harding two years later recalled his experience. Gill wrote:

Perhaps you will remember that early Sunday morning August 30, 1914 when on our way to Valcartier Camp we stopped at Winnipeg for a short time, and a few of us were privileged to shake hands with you and receive your blessing. We were very grateful for your kind words, and it is nice to look back to that time of leaving our Canadian homes, the happy coincidence it was that our bishop should give us the final farewell handshake before we left the prairie country.⁴¹

Harding's pastoral care extended to troops at home and overseas. In August of 1915, the bishop visited soldiers training at Camp Sewell near Dundurn.⁴² In England the following spring and summer, he met and addressed Canadian troops training at Bramshott, Shorncliffe and Sandling during Holy Week and Easter, as well as visiting the wounded at Taplow hospital in Yorkshire later in July.⁴³ While the Bishop of Qu'Appelle visited troops and the wounded,

he was not prepared to recruit publicly or to allow his clergy to become chaplains without making a good case.

From the outset of the conflict, Harding opposed the requests of diocesan clergy who wished to serve God and the Empire as chaplains in the army or navy and even, in some cases, as combatants. While he understood the temptation to put aside their priestly duties and enlist, in his mind, the clergy were needed at home.

If there were any possible way of providing the means of Grace with fewer clergy, or if more chaplains were required by our soldiers or sailors, I would gladly commend them for that appointment, but I cannot persuade myself it is justifiable for those who are called to serve at the altar, are also called to serve as combatants, nor that the promotion of religion and morality is not as necessary to the Dominion now as in times of peace.⁴⁴

Harding also realized the pressure that his clergy were under from members of the local community who felt that men of the cloth were avoiding the trials and sacrifices being made by their sons and friends. The bishop likened the priest to a physician and argued that "to forsake the cure of souls and the many other duties of his calling for which he has been trained and divinely called and ordained, to take up arms, is as wrong as to ask our doctors to leave off ministering to the sick and the wounded."⁴⁵ As bishop of a missionary diocese, Harding was loathe to put forward clergy as chaplains in the hope that eastern Canadian dioceses would supply the necessary recruits. He wrote:

I fear, however, the sacrifices of the Clergy in the pioneer and scattered missions of this Diocese demand every atom of time, energy and self-sacrifice that any clergyman possesses. The duties required of them touch the vitals of the life of the people dwelling in this Province, and I believe at this present time especially make, not only for the triumph of the Kingdom of God, but also for the stability of the British Empire.... In the midst of much excitement, great suffering and anxiety, it is exceedingly different for every one of us to do the right thing quietly, silent and unseen amid humdrum chores in this far-off corner of the Empire. Such sacrifices as these entail, while they may lack the attraction that actions of romantic heroism present, yet constantly contribute to the causes which make for the final triumph of the Empire.⁴⁶

Should the recruitment of chaplains from eastern Canada not prove adequate, then he said that Qu'Appelle was prepared to make greater sacrifices.⁴⁷

While Bishop Harding was not sympathetic to requests from clergy to become chaplains, at the same time, he did accept that some of his clergy could join the military ranks. In some cases, clergy such as the Reverend Alfred Beauchamp Payne of St. Michael and All Angels' in Moose Jaw or the Reverend Carless A. Barber of St. Mark's, Outlook, had previous military experience.⁴⁸ In other cases, missionaries⁴⁹ such as Mr. Oliver Wakefield, the Reverends Thomas Robert Scott, Richard E. Young and Arnold John Bennett, were under contract to the English Church Railway Mission and therefore not under the direct

supervision of the Bishop of Qu'Appelle. During 1914-1915, a total of twenty-two resident and prospective theological students of St. Chad's Theological College joined the ranks of the university corps, the medical corps or the 28th Battalion being formed in Regina as part of the Second Canadian Contingent.⁵⁰ A former student, Albert Laban, in his reminiscences gives the reader a brief insight into the atmosphere of the time. Before leaving the mission field that summer, he wrote: "I had already found it necessary to have the RNWMP ... intern a militant German named Berg who was causing trouble at Coleville."⁵¹ Upon Laban's return to college, the war was on everyone's lips:

Several of us asked permission to volunteer, and I shall never forget the uneasiness with which the request was made. It was left to us to do as we thought best. Allen, Cripps, Williams, Haylock and myself I think were first to go. We joined the 28th Bn., then in course of organization. I borrowed rifles and trained any who wished, behind the college in their spare time, and we drilled with the Bn. on Broad Street Park in the evening. We left Regina, October 1914.⁵²

As well as theological students enlisting, the ready supply of clergy from overseas which existed before the war was being gradually curtailed by a British government worried about finding sufficient volunteers.

Bishop Harding feared that such losses would put the entire missionary effort in serious jeopardy and naturally made him more reluctant than ever to part with clergy. He was of the view that "the true priest, from the very

moment of his Ordination submits himself to the discipline, training and obedience, and offers himself his soul and body in a holy and living sacrifice to God in the service of man."⁵³ Not only was the priest required to face the dangers of the frontier, but he was sorely needed when more and more families were losing their loved ones on the battlefield. On his return from England, the Reverend W.B. Parrott of St. John the Divine, Indian Head, in an address to a rural deanery chapter meeting in May 1915 endorsed Harding's stance in saying, "that the place of the clergy was at home where they could be of the greatest service to the sorrow-stricken and those in trouble."⁵⁴ The editor of the *Bishop's Leaflet*, the Reverend Arthur Edward Burgett,⁵⁵ in an article stated that there were more than enough chaplains to minister to the troops in military camps or on the field of battle. If such were not the case, Burgett was of the opinion that "the Bishop would be the first to say to any of the Clergy 'Go' and 'God Bless You'. Indeed there is nothing that the Bishop would desire more than to be privileged to serve God and the Empire as a Chaplain in the Canadian Contingent, but duty forbids."⁵⁶

Despite such assurances, requests in even greater numbers from clergy with no military experience ended up on Harding's desk. The Reverend Ernest Charles Earp⁵⁷ of Grace Church (later St. Matthew) in Regina was undoubtedly the highest-profile member of the Anglican clergy to enlist when he became Chaplain of the 68th Battalion in 1916.⁵⁸ Others such as the Reverend Hugh James Allen of Outlook, with the support of vestry, resigned his position to become a member of the Quartermaster

staff of the 128th Battalion.⁵⁹ The Reverend Herbert Hinton East, an itinerant missionary in the Yorkton district, joined the 1st Medical Field Brigade as a chaplain and was killed in action.⁶⁰ The Reverend Fred Wilfred Hicks of St. George's, Arcola, was to be appointed to a hospital chaplaincy in Boulogne, but instead joined the Royal Garrison Artillery as a gunner.⁶¹ It is not surprising that Anglican clergy wanted to participate actively in the war by volunteering for a chaplaincy or even becoming a combatant. An analysis by this author of the background of the 120 clergy attending the 1914 Diocesan Synod reveals that close to 75 percent of them had been born and educated in the British Isles and had parents or families living there. The remaining clergy were

Canadian-born and educated or, in a few instances, from other parts of the Empire and were equally ready when later called upon to serve King and Country.

Those clergy who stayed at home ministered to the bereaved and to the wounded. In communities where battalions or units were quartered, clergy offered services and pastoral care to soldiers in training or preparing to leave for overseas on troop trains. Church parades were a common feature of Sunday worship in cities and towns where troops were stationed. At St. John the Baptist, Moose Jaw, with its interior "decorated with large and small flags and patriotic bunting, the setting in the chancel being particularly impressive," a special service of Holy Communion was held on Sunday, 23 August 1914,

for departing members of the First Canadian Contingent.⁶² A year later, Bishop Harding confirmed ten members of the 46th Battalion prepared by Archdeacon F. Wells Johnson before they left for the front.⁶³

It was from the pulpit, however, that Anglican clergy made their greatest contribution to the war effort; namely that of recruitment. Regina clergy such as the Reverend Walter Western of St. Paul's Church and the Reverend E.C. Earp of Grace Church were already known for their enthusiastic support of the cause. Initially both men sought to justify war in light of Christian teaching. How could peace with honour be achieved, Western asked, if a strong nation is allowed to crush a weaker neighbour? In his mind, God would grant his



Wounded soldiers convalescing at St. Chad's Military Hospital, May, 1917.
SAB R-B9299

people the power and strength to help the oppressed and bring good out of evil.⁶⁴ As the demand for more volunteers grew, Western and Earp issued calls from their respective pulpits for more recruits to join the Canadian contingents going overseas. Taking as his topic, "Why Should I Enlist?" and his text, "Be Strong; Show Thyself a Man," Earp said it was the duty of all "to enlist and fight for the holiest things entrusted to us" and hoped "that as a result of his sermon, an atmosphere would be created which would make it uncomfortable for those in the community who were shirking their real duty."⁶⁵ In one of the strongest pleas yet from the pulpit of St. Paul's, Western used atrocities committed by German soldiers in the first few months of the war to stir up his listeners. He said the call for more men came not only from King and Country, "but from the comrades already in the field, from the tortured women of Belgium, the little children mutilated on their way to school, from the graves of the helpless men shot as hostages, and from the love of the right."⁶⁶ In another sermon, the young curate called the conflict "a war to the death. The deliberate object of Germany is the subjugation of the British Empire."⁶⁷

Western's most pointed remarks from the pulpit were reserved for the wives of Canadian-born men. In August 1915, the regulations were about to be changed so that men no longer needed their wife's consent to enlist. Western was concerned that even if the regulations made it easier for men to join, wives could still influence their husband's decision. He went on to say:

A woman could make a man forget his duty, but love was not true love if it had not first consideration for the honour of the man loved Many women could say the word, which would make a man face duty, see it and do it. Looking into the faces of the women of the congregation, he asked directly, "When are you going to say the word?"⁶⁸


Inevitably the same question was thrown back at both men, "Should ministers of the Gospel enlist for active service?" Earp joined with a view of serving in the ranks of the 68th battalion, but ended up being one of the few chaplains to qualify for the rank of captain.⁶⁹ Western responded that he had seriously considered the issue and had concluded that:

even though a small band of ministers in this land were to

throw their lot with the forces of the Empire, it would be but a handful while on the other hand the work of the Church must be carried on at home. While the minister could do the work of the soldier, the great majority of soldiers could not fill the position of a minister. The clergyman, however, could be of great assistance in encouraging recruiting.⁷⁰

Like Earp and Western, other clergy felt their calling went beyond that of leading public worship and providing pastoral care. The Reverend John Swalwell of St. Stephen's, Swift Current, collected funds on behalf of the Overseas Club to purchase an aeroplane for the War Office.⁷¹ In helping to raise a half-battalion of men from Yorkton and district, the patriotic enthusiasm of Canon Cornish seemingly knew no bounds. The Rector of Holy Trinity declared himself ready to serve as its chaplain and, if successful, recruit as many men as possible, including his own son, to avenge the "foul murder of the heroic nurse, the martyred Edith Cavell."⁷² Known for "his appeals from the pulpit and the public platform for men and money," the Reverend Canon Francis Pratt of St. Matthew's, Estevan,

*Blessing of Colours by Bishop Harding in Wascana Park, 1917.
DQA, Occasional Paper No. 124, Spring 1918, 6*



campaigned tirelessly for the Canadian Patriotic Fund serving as “an inspiration to many who perhaps did not take the issue as seriously as they ought to.”⁷³ As well as serving as a chaplain to the militia, the Reverend Canon George Charles Hill⁷⁴ of St. Paul’s, Regina, was in constant demand as a speaker, whether it was to raise money for the Canadian Patriotic Fund or to recruit men for military service. During intermission at the Rex Theatre, Hill called upon men “whether English, Irish, Scotch, Welsh, Scandinavian, Russian or Serbian” to enlist: “If this country is good enough for you to live in and to work in, it is good enough for you to fight for.”⁷⁵

The call to arms impacted parish life in a variety of ways. All parishes reported the loss of men who joined the ranks of the army or navy. Swift Current, which had suddenly taken on the air of an armed camp, had lost 38 men from its congregation of St. Stephen.⁷⁶ The Reverend Guy Pearson Terry reported that the Parish of Holy Trinity, Kamsack, dropped to half of its size due to recruitment as well as “some not fit to take up arms are working in munition factories in the East.”⁷⁷ Eleven men from the small rural mission of St. Margaret’s, Eagle Butte, had “joined the Colours and several more are trying their utmost to join.”⁷⁸ Of ministry in the rural areas, the Head of the Railway Mission summed up the situation best:

We have noticed, sometimes with dismay, but always with pride, the diminishing size of our Congregations as a Warden, a Choirman, or other worshipper has left his home and office to join the colours. In some of our districts where the

*Congregation is small, the loss of one has been like the loss of many.*⁷⁹

The Rector of St. Paul’s, Regina, told a newspaper reporter that no less than 150 of his congregation were serving with the first and second contingents at the front. Of the Brotherhood of St. Andrew, 2 out of 15 remained and 15 members of the Young Men’s Bible Class had enlisted. In comparison to other denominations, the newspaper headline declared that “St. Paul’s has Record that is Hard to Beat.”⁸⁰

The loss of such numbers should have crippled parishes and congregations. The Parish of St. Paul, Margo, reported financial hardship as a result of losing a churchwarden and almost the entire vestry, all of whom were strong financial supporters.⁸¹ Those left behind not only shouldered the additional financial burden, but made several improvements to the church fabric. In December 1916, the Rector of Swift Current and Rural Dean, John Swalwell, reported to a rural decanal conference that the war, coupled with a crop failure, had created hardship throughout the deanery, yet its congregations had held their own and furthermore, “the erection of new churches and vicarages at Piapot, Tompkins and Empress under such conditions is a proof that both clergy and laity are not at all discouraged.”⁸² Optimism so permeated parish life in Swift Current that Swalwell was able to boast that “our diocesan offering has exceeded that of poor years, when prosperity was at its zenith.”⁸³ St. Mary the Virgin in Maple Creek, “which had been under a dark financial cloud for many years past, was now bathed in sunshine,” having paid off its

church debt.⁸⁴ The loss of so many strong givers from St. Mark’s, Outlook, meant that the parish could no longer afford a resident priest, yet still felt “something over and above the expenses of a Priest periodically visiting Outlook could be arranged for.”⁸⁵ Adversity brought parishioners together who were prepared to make the sacrifice just as the men fighting overseas were doing.

In the early summer of 1915 the Secretary of Synod had expected the diocese itself to have a deficit of \$15,000 by year end, but the amount turned out to be closer to \$2,500.⁸⁶ He attributed the much-lower figure to the introduction of the duplex envelope system the previous year, whereby members gave a certain amount of money week by week. Special offerings at Harvest and Ascensiontide, as well as house-to-house canvassing, helped the diocese to reduce its deficit.⁸⁷ As a result, it had only been necessary to withdraw resident clergy from Ituna, Bengough, Togo, Bangor, Lampman and Webb.⁸⁸ These missions would be served by regular or occasional visits from neighbouring priests. By 1917, Bishop Harding reported to the Qu’Appelle Association that 12 missions had to be closed.⁸⁹ At the same time, he was pleased to announce that the church now served most of the area occupied before the war by linking up vacant missions with existing missions. To cover the longer distances, motor cars had been bought for some of the clergy in order that they could make their rounds.

All Anglican parishes made sacrifices, numerically and financially, but some played a greater role in supporting the war effort than others. Organizations within many parishes, such as the

Mothers' Union and the Women's Auxiliary, raised money for the Canadian Patriotic Fund and the Red Cross and sent food parcels and cigarettes for distribution to troops overseas. Sunday School children in a number of parishes across the diocese raised money to help children through the Belgian Relief Fund. The Boys' Cadet Corps of Canon Hill's parish recruited and trained boys from 14 years of age to serve in the bugle band, ambulance corps or the ranks.⁹⁰ Wearing their own distinctive khaki uniform, the boys were taught parade drill, rifle practice and other military skills in order to prepare them for service when they were of age. St. Paul's went so far as to announce in the Regina newspapers that its regular Sunday worship on 26 March 1916 would be used to boost recruitment for the 195th City of Regina Battalion being formed in the Queen City.⁹¹ During 1916 and 1917, more city pulpits were opened up to recruitment officers as the demand for more volunteers grew louder.

Anglicans in the Diocese of Qu'Appelle demonstrated a strong and united commitment to the conflict raging overseas, yet they were less than enthusiastic and, at times, divided in their support of the moral and social issues of the day. Reform had been in the air prior to the war particularly among the evangelical Protestant churches in tackling the liquor problem and what many felt was the growing need to "Canadianize" and "Christianize" the 'foreigner'.⁹² These measures, mixed with broader reform movements such as the granting of women's suffrage and the replacement of the traditional party system with an alternative, brought immense pressure on those in authority within governments

and churches. For a nation at war, the need for reform not only took on greater urgency, but also led to more extreme measures being advocated. A good example was the matter of temperance.

Before being confirmed in the Anglican church, every child was instructed and in turn acknowledged that it was the duty of a Christian "to keep its body in soberness, temperance and chastity."⁹³ For many Anglicans, that was as far as they were prepared to go when it came to temperance. Even Bishop Harding initially was not convinced that legislation would bring about universal sobriety.

*Speaking personally, I feel that Christian men should aim at eradicating, as far as possible, the abuse of the traffic, not the reasonable use of alcohol, and also recognize the sad fact that the primary cause of many of the existing abuses is gain and foolishness, not thirst.*⁹⁴

When the Saskatchewan government unveiled its new liquor policy in 1916, Harding sent a letter of endorsement to Premier Walter Scott.⁹⁵ The policy abolished all bar and club licenses and allowed the government to take control of the wholesale liquor business. However, for some of Harding's clergy, this moderate approach to eliminating the liquor problem was not enough. Wells Johnson of Moose Jaw and Hill, Earp and Simpson, all of Regina, from the beginning had embraced the aims of the 'Banish the Bar' crusade and some of them continued to push for all-out prohibition. In a time of national crisis, a temperance measure soon became a war measure. In their minds, liquor was "the greatest enemy of efficiency

and achievement" as well being "unpatriotic and the ablest ally of our nation's enemies."⁹⁶

The other reform issue that generated considerable debate among Anglicans was the role of women in the governance of church affairs. As early as 1914, delegates to diocesan synod had debated a revision to the canons that would extend the status of parishioner to female communicants in order that they might attend the annual Easter meeting of parishioners and vote for members of vestry, churchwardens and lay delegates to synod.⁹⁷ War simply accelerated the need for change. With more men leaving for the front, women took on more activities and assumed more responsibility. At Regina's St. Paul, women greeted "lady strangers" at services of worship⁹⁸ and young women filled most of the executive positions of the Anglican Young Peoples Association left vacant by the departing men.⁹⁹ At St. Luke's, Broadview, the Reverend Charles Harrington reported that more women were required to teach the 75-80 pupils now on the Sunday School rolls and "hoped shortly to commence training some boys' voices to help out the ladies."¹⁰⁰ In smaller parishes, women had to make decisions affecting the day-to-day operation of the church.

Carried for the first time by clergy and laity at the 1914 Diocesan Synod, the amendment did not receive the required majority at the 1916 Synod to confirm the change. Towards the end of the synod, a frustrated Harding asked clergy "to invite the female communicants of their parishes to be present at the upcoming Easter meeting of the Parishioners, and ... to ask for an expression of opinion concerning the proposed change in the

Canon.¹⁰¹ A positive response was received from most parishes, but the annual diocesan meeting of the Woman's Auxiliary in 1917 passed by a small majority the following motion: "This meeting is not in favour of woman suffrage."¹⁰²

Clearly Bishop Harding was annoyed that women were not legally receiving the recognition they so richly deserved. In his charge to the 1918 Synod, he spoke passionately of the ministries performed and the sacrifices made by women for the betterment of their church, their country, their community and their families:

The anxiety and sorrow of mothers, wives and sweethearts, the pain that comes from interrupted love, have often been harder to bear than the sufferings of the soldiers at the Front. Our choirs, our Women's Auxiliaries, our Missionary work, have received their wholehearted support, while many of our parishes have given of their best to serve as nurses in hospitals and camps.

*These things they have done in addition to their unceasing labour on behalf of the Red Cross, the Patriotic Societies, Military Hospital Commission and many other kindred societies.*¹⁰³

Despite Harding's intervention, a similar motion was lost, but delegates voted to strike a committee to review the canons and make recommendations with a view to their change.¹⁰⁴ In 1919, the Woman's Auxiliary reversed its earlier decision and called for women to be given the status of parishioners to vote on matters affecting their own parish.¹⁰⁵ The 1920 Synod passed motions to that effect.¹⁰⁶

War brought clergy into a closer relationship with the community around them. Some clergy had sons who had enlisted or had lost sons at the front. They came to share anxiety and bereavement in common with their parishioners. In trying to meet the spiritual needs of the community, clergy at times came in for criticism that the Christian church had

failed to instill Christian values in the hearts and minds of people. How else could this war have happened? Responding to such criticism, Harding stated that "the Church of Christ is not to blame for this terrible condition of things that exist today, but the corrupt nature, the deaf ears, the hard hearts and selfishness of men."¹⁰⁷ To those critics who were saying that the church was on trial before the world, Harding was quick to reply: "It is, I submit, fairer to blame the poor nature of the soil where the seed is sown, and truer to speak of the World as being on trial before the Church of God."¹⁰⁸ He told his clergy that they must not be disheartened as they never had a better opportunity to preach repentance and bring the good news of Jesus Christ to those in need. Already he had witnessed signs of greater faith, hope and charity among fellow Canadians.

The Church of England in the Dominion of Canada followed the Church of England in launching its version of the Mission of Repentance and Hope in late 1916.¹⁰⁹ The mission was designed

Reverend Charles Travers Melly of Imperial making the rounds of his parish on a motorcycle, 1917. SAB R-A9524



not only to meet the spiritual requirements of a people at war, but also to respond to the criticism being levelled at the Christian church that it had not done and was still not doing enough to meet those needs. On 3 December, a service at St. Paul's, Regina, attended by the Lieutenant Governor of Saskatchewan, opened a two-week mission in the Diocese of Qu'Appelle.¹¹⁰ With the carnage of the Somme clearly on his mind, Bishop Harding in a pastoral letter stated that Canadians needed "to learn afresh the lessons God is teaching the inhabitants of the earth by the judgments he has brought upon the world in this day of bloodshed, suffering and sorrow."¹¹¹ Archdeacon Wells Johnson echoed the words of his bishop in a Stir-Up Sunday sermon to his congregation by telling them that their lives needed to be aroused spiritually:

There must be the intention and the desire and the effort to live a true Christian life ourselves. A nation sunk in indifference to spiritual things, a nation rushing after the material must be stirred to regret and repentance by a vision of a man blood-stained and bruised upon the Cross of Calvary.¹¹²

Like Harding, Wells Johnson believed that people must throw off their complacency and bring greater spiritual discipline into their daily lives. For that to happen, the church must have witnesses to that faith, not just as individuals or as a congregation, but throughout the nation. No documentary evidence has survived to show how successful the mission actually was, but newspaper reports of good attendance at Regina and Moose

Jaw services suggest that it was meeting a spiritual need.¹¹³

The Somme... Vimy Ridge... Passchendaele: with each passing day the number of casualties grew. For many Canadians, pride and sadness were replaced by bitterness and horror. Others continued to use patriotism as a way of justifying the war. Whatever the case, their resolve to bring the war to a successful conclusion hardened. Five thousand Regina's gathered in Wascana Park on the third anniversary of the war and pledged themselves to continue the armed struggle until victory was assured.¹¹⁴ Replacing an ailing Canon Hill of St. Paul's, Bishop Harding joined Premier William Melville Martin, Professor E.W. Stapleford, Colonel Edgar and Major Ashton in addressing the crowd. Harding quickly got to the point:

The people of Regina had gathered in large numbers to say that since this country had entered the war it intended staying in it until peace with honour was obtained. Real greatness consisted in making sacrifices for one's country, and the people of Canada had already shown themselves great, but there was more to do and he was certain the people of this country would not hesitate to complete the task they had undertaken, that they would show as years went by, greater and greater capacity for the service which they were expected to render to humanity.¹¹⁵

Invalided home from the front in September 1917, the Reverend Captain Earp of Grace Church expressed similar sentiments from his pulpit. He said he was

impressed by the "indomitable spirit" of Canadian troops to see the war through to a victorious end. That same fighting spirit and grim determination on the battlefield he had come to witness on the home front. "There was necessary work to be done at home as well as abroad, and Anglicans at home, in church and in state would see to it, that there was no turning back."¹¹⁶

Hitherto, a voluntary system of recruitment had been used in which Anglican clergy, in particular, had helped to play a crucial role. This form of recruitment was no longer working. Conscription seemed the only way to keep overseas battalions up to full strength. During October of 1917, a Union government was formed and went to the electorate with a platform that included implementing conscription legislation passed earlier that summer by the Borden government. In his recently published book on Regina and the Great War, historian James Pitsula states that "most Protestant clergy were emphatically pro-conscription."¹¹⁷ Given their lead role in recruiting volunteers and raising funds for the war effort, Pitsula's description aptly fits most Anglican clergy in the Diocese of Qu'Appelle. In a letter to his Swift Current congregation, the Reverend Walter Western quotes from a pastoral letter sent by Bishop of Qu'Appelle to Anglicans across the diocese about the need to re-elect the Union government.

In view of the Dominion Elections and the momentous issues that must necessarily follow, it is, I feel, incumbent upon us all to make it clear to those with whom we have to do, that the return of a Union

*Government means the giving of all the assistance possible to our Soldiers and Sailors, in their efforts to overthrow the enemies of our liberty-loving Empire and civilization. A lack of men or money in the coming years will possibly mean the destruction of our hopes of winning the war and giving to the world an endearing peace and a secure freedom.*¹¹⁸

Conscription was enacted with some clergy serving on boards of appeal set up across the country. One clergyman, the Reverend N. Watson of Palmer, aired his views publicly when he wrote: "In a few days, I expect to be on the Board of Appeal representing the Military Authorities. My sentiments are well known and I am expecting a lively time."¹¹⁹

With the war drawing to a close, Anglicans gave greater thought to the returning wounded and demobilized soldier. As early as Easter 1915, Harding had stated that the war would require great sacrifice not just by those at the front, but by those at home. He warned that the greatest test for Canadians was not the prosecution of the war; it would be when peace was declared. The bishop made use of an old adage to illustrate his point: "God and soldiers men adore, in times of war, but not before; when peace returns and things are righted, God is forgot and soldiers slighted."¹²⁰ In his opinion, it was important for the church to be ready to support returning soldiers as well as families who might lose their chief breadwinner during the conflict.

The responsibility for caring for the returning wounded began in earnest during 1916. College and diocesan officials offered the Canadian Military Hospitals

Commission unused theological college space. With two-thirds of theological students having enlisted, space requirements for college activity were reduced to a minimum: the Warden's house, library and two or three other rooms.¹²¹ For the remainder of the war, the unused college space was turned over to the Commission to serve as a convalescent home for wounded and sick soldiers. Similar use was made of St. Paul's parish hall by the Commission to care for soldiers who could not be accommodated at the Exhibition Grounds or at St. Chad's.¹²² Hitherto, the hall had been used for "the meeting and amusement of our soldiers' wives and children week by week."¹²³ With respect to pastoral care, Archdeacon Gene Nelson Dobie ministered to sick and suffering soldiers at St. Chad's and at the General Hospital, Canon Cornish paid regular visits to the Earl Grey School Sanatorium, and Archdeacon Wells Johnson conducted a similar ministry at a convalescent home for soldiers in Moose Jaw.¹²⁴

Over the next couple of years, Harding often spoke about the heavy sacrifice being made by clergy and laity and their families during the war, but his mind was clearly on peace and what it would mean for the mission and ministry of the church. Of the returning soldiers, he said that it would be "our special privilege to assist them as we are able and help them feel they have won our gratitude and affection."¹²⁵ He encouraged the clergy, in particular, to be on the lookout for men who felt they might have a calling to the sacred ministry. He firmly believed that men who showed courage on the battlefield would be able to cope with the exacting work of the mission field. "I wish to say that no men will be more sympathetically

dealt with by the examiners, or more welcome in our College of St. Chad's than the officers and men of our communion who may have heard the call of God in this war."¹²⁶ At the local level, parishes were asked to welcome soldiers back into the community and the church. At the national level, the Venerable Arthur Burgett, newly appointed Archdeacon of Assiniboia, who had served in the military before entering the priesthood, was appointed to the Central Committee of the War Service Commission.¹²⁷ The Commission was established to help the returning soldier during the period of demobilization and reconstruction.

It was also a time for remembrance. Throughout the war, memorial services for the fallen had been held throughout the diocese. Prayers for the dead had been said publicly and frequently for the first time as the nation mourned its dead.¹²⁸ Rolls of honour containing the names of those who were serving their country as well as those who had died in the line of duty were drawn up and, from time to time, added to. In 1916, Bishop Harding unveiled a roll consisting of 1,219 names of Anglicans from St. John's, Moose Jaw, and surrounding district.¹²⁹ At the time, it was reportedly the largest roll of honour in the province if not in western Canada. In churches across the diocese, bronze memorial tablets were mounted, gifts of vestments, bells and communion vessels were donated and stained glass windows were installed in memory of loved ones who had paid the ultimate price. The respected English artist, Miss Irlam Briggs, R.A., who had painted and given "Supper at Emmaus" to the diocese earlier, was working on a large altar

picture honouring Canadian servicemen for placement in the sanctuary of one of the churches.¹³⁰

While visiting England in 1916, Bishop Harding had launched a special appeal inviting friends and relatives to finance the building of a mission church or make a grant to the same in memory of a loved one killed in action.¹³¹ The Church of St. Michael and All Angels' in Regina was erected as a memorial to her husband by Mrs. Greene of Cranleigh, Surrey, in 1917.¹³² To celebrate its 50th Anniversary, All Saints' in Reading raised sufficient money to build a church with the same dedication to meet the spiritual needs of Anglicans at Melville. The Reading congregation noted that "many settlers had gone from among them and the splendid rally of Canadians to the call of Empire had moved its people" to give generously.¹³³ There were other church buildings erected

across the diocese during and after the war as memorials to a fallen soldier or in thanksgiving for Canadian support in time of crisis. Such generosity created further links between the Church of England and its counterpart on the prairies.

The demands of a nation at war also fostered a spirit of co-operation among Christian denominations within the diocese. Anglican clergy often shared a platform or pulpit with their Roman Catholic, Methodist, Presbyterian and Baptist brethren in appealing for recruits, in conducting services for departing troops, in carrying out chaplaincy work or in meetings of newly formed ministerial associations. It became customary for appeals from the King or the Dominion government for a national day of prayer or thanksgiving to be issued to all churches. In some parishes, a union service of prayer was held. At one service held in St. Stephen's, Swift Current, in

January 1918, Bishop Harding spoke enthusiastically of the spirit of unity that currently prevailed among nations and across the land for the sake of humanity. He added that attendance at this service "showed that they were beginning to realize their dependence on God. It is a sample of what this war is doing for us all, it shows that life means giving and service."¹³⁴ Similar thoughts were expressed at services and other ecumenical forums leading up to the war's end and during the immediate postwar period.

More than four years after it started, 'the war to end all wars' ended on 11 November 1918. There were services of thanksgiving held throughout the diocese as war-weary Canadians celebrated victory and paid tribute to the sacrifices made on the battlefield. When the war began, Anglicans in the Diocese of Qu'Appelle were in the midst of missionary expansion; by the time the war

*Bernard Laubach (left) of St. Paul's, Regina enlisted along with his father and brother to serve God and Empire.
SAB R-A21,094*



ended, re-organization and consolidation of mission work was well underway. That May, Bishop Harding had reported to Diocesan Synod that 19 clergy had been or were serving in the Army or Navy of whom 4 had been killed.¹³⁵ Anglicans had contributed greatly to the Canadian war effort in terms of manpower and paid a heavy price in terms of dead and wounded. Those left at home had pulled together and, in most cases, kept the churches and ministry operating on a sound financial footing. New churches in urban centres were opened, while in rural areas more were closed than opened. There were fewer clergy to conduct public worship and pastoral work so the laity had stepped in when it was allowed to do so and filled the gap. Prior to the war, men had dominated church affairs; now women, having received the right to vote in general elections and having played a major role in keeping the missions going, rightly wanted a greater say in church decision-making and ministry participation.

It has been said that Canada came of age as a nation on the battlefields of the Great War. Historian James Pitsula summarized this transformation nicely:

Canada remained British, but not as British as it had been before the war. The soldiers sensed this. They had come from all parts of Canada and had enlisted for various and diverse reasons. But, when they journeyed overseas and fought together as the Canadian Corps, something unusual and unexpected happened. They discovered who they were, and in so

*doing helped other Canadians discover who they were, too.*¹³⁶

That same coming of age cannot be applied to the Church of England in the Diocese of Qu'Appelle. While the door was opened to change, and indeed some changes occurred, still many things remained the same and would take years, if not decades, to change. Towards the end of the war, the Anglican leadership talked about the need for the church to reach an anticipated influx of immigrants from the British Isles during the postwar period and strengthen a depleted Anglican membership base. With the call to arms, many British immigrants had returned to England to join the armed forces or help in the war effort, with many never to return. A second wave of immigrants from the British Isles never fully materialized, so an over-extended Church of England had no choice but to close more churches and amalgamate congregations during the twenties. An attempt would be made to reach a new wave of continental European immigrants, many of whom belonged to the Orthodox faith and had no clergy. However, the lack of Anglican priests who could speak the various languages prevented the church from making real inroads among these newcomers.

It was the continuing reliance on manpower and funding from England that showed that Church of England in the Dominion of Canada was still tied to the Church of England and not ready to take full responsibility for the spiritual needs of all Canadian Anglicans. While there was an acknowledgement that more Canadian-born clergy were required, there was no attempt

by the Qu'Appelle leadership to put its claims for manpower and funding in any vigorous and sustained way before the General Synod and Canadian dioceses. Likewise, there was no serious attempt by the General Synod and Canadian dioceses to seize the opportunity of making the Western Canadian mission field their own, much like the Methodists, Presbyterians and Roman Catholics had done earlier. Some clergy grants came from the Missionary Society of the Canadian Church, but the majority of funding continued to flow from the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, the Qu'Appelle Association, the Shropshire Mission to North-West Canada, and individuals and churches overseas to support priests in the mission field, build or furnish churches or reduce the principal owing on the College Site and Building Fund. This strong link with the Church of England would continue well into the twentieth century. Men and women of the Diocese of Qu'Appelle had made countless sacrifices during four long years of war, but severing their human and financial lifeline to the Church of England once the war was over was a sacrifice that they were not prepared to make.

Trevor Powell is Archivist and Registrar of the Diocese of Qu'Appelle and Archivist of the Ecclesiastical Province of Rupert's Land. Prior to early retirement in 2006, Powell was Provincial Archivist of Saskatchewan and is currently Chair of the Saskatchewan Archives Board. He is the author of several publications and articles relating to Saskatchewan and Anglican Church history.

Endnotes on page 50.

WORDS & PICTURES

*Anti-submarine warship HMCS Saskatchewan at sea, 1963.
SAB R-B3050-1*


Opposite page - Top to bottom:

*J.W. McCaig, Chairman of the Saskatchewan Diamond Jubilee
and Canada Centennial Corporation, presenting a Saskatchewan
Jubilee flag to Commander M.A. Turner of HMCS Saskatchewan.
R-B4383*

*Hon. C.C. Williams, Saskatchewan Minister of Labour, presenting
a collective license plate for use on the ship's jeep, to O.S. William
Stoddard of Moose Jaw, February 16, 1963. R-B3059-2*

*Commander Mark W. Mayo, C.O., being piped aboard for the first
time at the commissioning ceremony of HMCS Saskatchewan,
February 16, 1963.
R-B3057-1*

*Commissioning ceremony - simultaneous lowering of Red Ensign
and hoisting of the navy's White Ensign, February 16, 1963.
R-B3054-1*





HMCS *Saskatchewan*

Named not for the province, but for the river, as was longstanding tradition, HMCS *Saskatchewan* was commissioned in 1963. She was part of a new building program for the navy in the early 1960s when ships were designed for anti-submarine warfare. At the time, Canada's defence policy was to ensure co-operation with its allies and friendly nations, and to maintain unrestricted use of the seas in peace and war.

Construction on the ship began in 1959, and it was launched in 1961. Her rounded lines were meant to counter the formation of ice and make it easier to wash down radioactive contamination. Rather than being built from the keel up, it was constructed in pre-fabricated units that could be positioned together, which allowed for different components of the ship to be constructed at the same time.

The anti-submarine weapons were the most important armament on the ship, and included two 'omni-directional' three-barrel mortar mountings, which could fire high explosive shells with great accuracy. Other weapons included a three-inch, 70-calibre, radar-controlled gun in the forward position and a three-inch, 50-calibre twin gun in the aft position.

Special thanks to SAB archivist Tim Novak. Information about HMCS Saskatchewan is taken from The Commissioning of HMCS Saskatchewan February 16, 1963. Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1963, and also from Macpherson, K.R. Canada's Fighting Ships. Toronto: Samuel Stevens, Hakkert and Company, 1975.

Excitat! The Men of Saskatchewan's First Military Regiment

By Christine Charmbury

The 95th Regiment was the first military unit in the Districts of Assiniboia and Saskatchewan in the North-West Territories, organized just two months before Saskatchewan became a province, on July 3, 1905. Two years later, the unit was formally organized as an infantry regiment, and was officially designated as the 95th Regiment by a General Order of the Canadian Militia on April 2, 1907. There were eight companies raised for the regiment: A and B Companies were based in Moose Jaw, C and D Companies were in Regina, E Company was in Wolseley, F Company was in Saskatoon, and G and H Companies were in Prince Albert.



Pipe and Drum Band 95th Regt
from Prince Albert Sask. Charmbury



MESS 95th SASK RIFLES. 5



The Regimental headquarters were based in Regina, and the unit was redesignated as the 95th Saskatchewan Rifles on June 1, 1909 to reflect its new role as a rifle regiment. The companies were also reorganized at this time, with E Company moving to Regina and G Company moving to Saskatoon. The 95th Saskatchewan Rifles was again reorganized on April 1, 1912 into two separate regiments: the companies in northern Saskatchewan formed a new regiment named the 105th Saskatoon Fusiliers, and the companies in southern Saskatchewan remained in the 95th Regiment. Later that same year, after the devastation caused by the Regina Cyclone on June 30, 1912, the 95th Regiment was called into active service under the provisions of the Militia Act to patrol the streets and prevent any possible looting.

These photographs of the men of the 95th Regiment were all taken by Prince Albert photographer Theodore Henry James (T.H.J.) Charmbury, and were printed as postcards, a very popular format at the time. Charmbury first came to the Prince Albert settlement in 1901 to work as an apprentice photographer with William James in his photography business. Charmbury worked for James for the duration of his two year contract, after which he opened his own photography studio in Prince Albert. During his early years in Prince Albert,

"Shaving Under Difficulties." A soldier from the 95th Saskatchewan Rifles shaving under less than ideal conditions. SAB S-B11978

Opposite page top: "Pipe and Drum Band, 95th Regiment." Soldiers from the 95th Regiment perform in a pipe and drum band. SAB S-B12039

Opposite page bottom: "Sergeants Mess, 95th Saskatchewan Rifles." Members of the 95th Saskatchewan Rifles pose for a photograph. SAB S-B12012



A soldier is tossed into the air on a blanket by fellow soldiers of the 95th Saskatchewan Rifles Regiment in the camp at Regina.
Charmbury Family Collection (also SAB R-A33194)



Top: "Trenching Fatigue, 95th Saskatchewan Rifles." Two soldiers from the 95th Saskatchewan Rifles Regiment digging a trench around a tent in camp. SAB S-B11956

Bottom: "95th Regiment Striking Camp." Soldiers of the 95th Regiment are shown setting up camp. Charmbury Family Collection (also SAB R-A33174)

Opposite page: "95th Saskatchewan Rifles Signaller." Soldier waves his flag as part of his job for the 95th Saskatchewan Rifles Regiment. SAB S-B12035








"A military Shave"

"A Military Shave." Soldiers in the 95th Regiment shaving outside. SAB S-B12029



95th Regt.

Charibury



"95th Saskatchewan Rifles in Parade Formation." Members of the military band moving to the front of a group of soldiers from the 95th Saskatchewan Rifles Regiment who are in parade formation. Charmbury Family Collection (also SAB R-A33186).

Below: "Officer of the 95th Regiment on Horseback." An officer from the 95th Saskatchewan Rifles is shown on horseback. There is a line of soldiers with rifles shown in the background. Charmbury Family Collection.



Charmbury documented many aspects of life in the settlement and surrounding area, and his photographs include images of settlers, First Nations people, weddings, funerals, harvest scenes, theatrical groups, landscapes, and buildings. Many of his photographs are preserved at the Saskatchewan Archives Board in the Theodore Charmbury Family fonds (SAB BF 25). These postcards of the men of the 95th Regiment have also been preserved by the Charmbury family, along with many other examples of his work.

There are also copies of some of these postcard views of the 95th Regiment that form part of the Frank Ford fonds, housed at the Saskatchewan Archives (SAB F 499). Major Frank Ford was appointed as the first commanding officer of the 95th Regiment on October 7, 1908, at which time he was also the deputy attorney general for the Province of Saskatchewan. In fact, the Ford family motto, 'Excitat,' which means 'I Urge,' was adopted for the regimental badge.

These photographs document various aspects of camp life and training, as experienced by the soldiers and officers of the Regiment. The photos were likely all taken in the Regiment's camp at Regina in 1909, but some of the images may have also been taken in Prince Albert during the same period. Many of these images were given titles and/or numbers by Charmbury, which were handwritten on the front of the images. These photographs provide a unique visual perspective on Saskatchewan's military past and the men who enlisted as soldiers in our province's oldest military unit. Excitat! Here's to the men of the 95th Regiment!

Christine Charmbury is a Reference Archivist at the Saskatoon office of the Saskatchewan Archives Board. Christine is also the great-granddaughter of photographer Theodore Henry James Charmbury, whose photographs of our province's early history inspired her to study Native Studies and History at the University of Saskatchewan.

Note: Information regarding the history of the 95th Regiment is taken from Stewart A.G. Mein's Up the Johns! The Story of the Royal Regina Rifles, Regina: Senate of the Royal Regina Rifles, 1992.

*"A Lesson in Camp Economy." Two soldiers smoking. One soldier is lighting his cigarette from the other's cigarette.
SAB S-B12034*



"A Lesson in Camp Economy."

Ready, aye, ready – or not? Diefenbaker’s response to the Cuban missile crisis

By Lenora Toth



As crowd looks on, John Diefenbaker and John Kennedy walk down street in Ottawa, 16 May 1961. Courtesy University of Saskatchewan Archives. University of Saskatchewan Diefenbaker Archival Collections JGD1400

The successful harnessing of nuclear power in the twentieth century drastically increased the possible price that mankind would pay to wage war. Despite this price, opposing East-West ideologies in the years following World War II kept the world on constant edge, fearing the outbreak of the third, and conceivably final, world war. Perhaps this fear was at no time more pronounced than during the ‘Cuban missile crisis’ of October 1962. Canada was by no means a major player in the events that led up to and eventually resolved the Cuban crisis. Nevertheless, the crisis had a profound effect on the reputation of Canada’s then-prime minister, John Diefenbaker. Canada’s official response to the Americans’ request for support during the crisis was both hesitant and decidedly lukewarm. This response, it has been suggested, was detrimental to Diefenbaker’s reputation, contributing “to widely felt doubts” about his “capacity to give steady leadership in critical times.”¹

However, a survey of five Canadian daily newspapers revealed that while Diefenbaker and his government did attract a certain amount of criticism for their slow response to the Americans during the crisis, this criticism was, in nearly every instance, mild. There were reasons for Diefenbaker’s hesitant response and, for the most part, even if they disagreed, the press recognized these reasons as valid. Press attention in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis focused mainly

on Canada’s defence policy. Whether Canada had jumped to attention at the first snap of American fingers, or, as was the case, delayed response for several days, the situation was the same. Had the Cuban crisis led to war, Canada’s lack of a firm defence policy would have left it unable to fulfil its agreed-upon role in the defence of the North American continent. It was this lack of a clear and unequivocal defence policy that caused the press to severely criticize the Diefenbaker

government and to question Diefenbaker’s ability to provide national leadership.

The general public was first made aware of the impending confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States on 22 October 1962. American president John F. Kennedy, in a televised speech, informed the nation that military surveillance of Cuba had revealed in the past week preparation of a series of offensive missile sites. According to Kennedy, the purpose of the

bases could be “none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the western hemisphere.”² The Soviet government had repeatedly assured the Americans that any arms build-up in Cuba was of a purely defensive character. Given this assurance, the Americans determined that the secretive building of offensive weapons constituted an “explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas.”³

In reaction to this threat, the Americans made a series of unilateral decisions. These included implementing a naval “quarantine” of Cuba that would prevent any ship containing offensive weapons from reaching Cuban shores. As well, the Americans requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council to handle their resolution, calling for the “prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of UN observers.” Kennedy also appealed to the Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, to “halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace,” warning him that any missile launched at any country in the western hemisphere would be seen as an attack on the United States.⁴

The actual Cuban crisis lasted a very short time. The immediate Soviet response was to put their armed forces on alert and to warn the US that if they struck the first blow, the Soviets would respond with “a most powerful answering blow.”⁵ The Russians also appealed to the UN, asking for an immediate convening of the Security Council to discuss the “violation of the United Nations charter and the threat to peace by the United States.”⁶ As the world anxiously waited, the first Soviet ships

neared the American blockade. By midmorning of Wednesday, 24 October, the tension was considerably alleviated. The Soviet vessels had come to a halt just short of the American blockade. The Americans took this to mean that “Khrushchev was desperately signalling a desire to make a deal.”⁷

After several more days of uncertainty, a deal was finally reached. Khrushchev, in a letter received by Kennedy on 26 October, proposed that the missiles would be withdrawn in return for an American promise not to invade Cuba and to end the blockade. The Americans accepted and by 28 October 1962, the crisis was over.⁸

Canada’s role in the crisis, as far as the actual outcome was concerned, was negligible. The Canadian government, although it knew that there was a serious crisis over Cuba, was not made aware of the details until just a few hours before Kennedy’s 22 October television address.⁹ When Kennedy received the intelligence that the Soviets were establishing offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, he was also informed that the missiles would be ready for firing within a ten-day period.¹⁰ As a result of this information Kennedy determined that, in order to minimize the possibility of nuclear war, he must react before the missiles became operable.

The need for swift action convinced Kennedy that he could not risk any delays that might be caused by consultation with members of the western alliance or by presenting the issue to the UN. The US government decided to act unilaterally and, once the decision of a naval quarantine was made, the Americans were determined to follow this course

of action regardless of allied reaction.¹¹ The Americans did, however, decide to at least inform their allies and request official support before the quarantine commenced. Selected for a special briefing were the West German, French, British and Canadian heads of state.¹² Livingston Merchant, the American special envoy chosen to brief Prime Minister Diefenbaker, arrived in Canada on Monday, 22 October.

When he met with Diefenbaker, Merchant noted that Diefenbaker was both disturbed and irritated by the fact that he was being “informed” of the situation by an envoy rather than being personally “consulted” by Kennedy on what course of action should be taken. But by the end of the meeting, Diefenbaker told Merchant that, given the circumstances, the president had no alternative but to take the already-decided upon action and that “Canada would live up to its commitments under NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and NORAD [North American Air Defence Command] in the event of a missile attack from Cuba.”¹³ Merchant reported to Washington that Canada was on side and American officials announced shortly after Kennedy’s television address that the United States had Canada’s full support. However, evidence of this support did not materialize as quickly as the Americans might have hoped.

According to Pierre Sevigny, Canada’s Associate Minister of Defence, the American announcement of Canada’s full support -- before receiving any official word from the Canadian government -- greatly annoyed an already-irritated Diefenbaker.¹⁴ And, while it is well-established that Diefenbaker, throughout his career, was concerned not to

be seen as bowing to American pressure,¹⁵ it is impossible to know how much Diefenbaker's pique at what he perceived to be American arrogance played in his response to the American request for support. Whatever the reason, official Canadian support was withheld for several days and when it was finally announced, it was distinctly lukewarm.¹⁶

On 22 October, after watching Kennedy's television address, Diefenbaker, at the urging of Lester Pearson, Leader of the Opposition, made a statement in the House of Commons on the Cuban situation. Diefenbaker had not planned to make a statement on the crisis until the following morning but Pearson's request, as well as the feeling that Kennedy's broadcast could "give rise to a real war scare in Canada," persuaded Diefenbaker to make a statement without delay. However, he had little time in which to prepare this statement. Using a memo drafted by the Department of External Affairs (and seemingly forgetting that he had already given Merchant cause to believe that the US had Canada's full support) Diefenbaker called the president's speech sombre and challenging, appealed for calm¹⁷ and, in a misguided attempt at peacemaking, suggested "an on-site inspection of Cuba [by] the eight nations comprising the unaligned members of the eighteen-nation disarmament committee ... to ascertain what the facts are."¹⁸ Whether or not it was his intention, Diefenbaker had questioned Kennedy's word on the existence of offensive nuclear weapons on Cuba.

The suggestion that the UN send an inspection team to Cuba was contained in a memo drafted by Howard Green, Minister of External Affairs. However, it was

never intended for Diefenbaker to make this suggestion in the context in which he did. The memo had been written before Merchant's arrival and the subsequent presentation of the Americans' proof that the missiles did in fact exist. As the memo made clear, the suggestion was "intended as the basis of a possible telephone conversation with President Kennedy before...his television broadcast."¹⁹

Whatever the reason behind Diefenbaker's call for an UN inspection - whether it was a deliberate prod at the Americans or, as seems more likely, a failure to carefully read Green's memo combined with an appalling lack of judgement - when viewed in conjunction with Diefenbaker's show of support to Merchant, the statement presents the Prime Minister in a less-than-flattering light. Diefenbaker quickly qualified his statement, however, and the next day, press reports announced that the Prime Minister himself had "no doubts" that Cuba was becoming a missile base; rather his proposal, he had explained, was "intended to allay doubts there may be in other countries."²⁰

Despite this announcement of his faith in the US evidence, Diefenbaker made no further moves during the next two days to indicate publicly Canada's support of the US. On the evening of 22 October, Douglas Harkness, Minister of Defence, received a request from NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs for the Canadian government to put its forces on a 'Defcon 3' alert. NORAD's alert system ranged from Defensive Condition (Defcon) 5, indicating normal conditions to Defcon 0, indicating a nuclear attack was underway.²¹ According to the NORAD

agreement, a state of increased alert could be ordered if the NORAD command felt there was "imminent danger," and the Canadian and US governments were expected to give their approval in the light of this "expert opinion," thus Harkness, along with the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, approved this alert and Diefenbaker, after being briefed by Harkness, also gave tentative approval.²² However, Diefenbaker delayed formal approval, saying he wished to discuss the matter in cabinet the following morning.²³

Notwithstanding Harkness's expectations to the contrary, the cabinet meeting on 23 October did not see approval for Canadian NORAD forces to go on the Defcon 3 alert. Howard Green did not wish for Canada to give too quick of a response to the Americans. Given the Americans' failure to consult with their allies before taking action, Green felt that if Canada were to "go along with the Americans now" they would "be their vassals forever," a view that Diefenbaker supported and thus, in the end, Harkness was instructed not to put the forces on alert.²⁴ Harkness apparently put the forces on informal alert, but officially the Canadian forces were not yet cooperating with their American counterparts.²⁵

In spite of Harkness's insistence that by refusing to put Canadian NORAD forces on alert, the government was not living up to its "responsibilities to the nation," Diefenbaker remained obdurate; it was not until 24 October, when Harkness learned that the American forces had been placed on Defcon 2, that he was finally able to convince Diefenbaker to authorize an increased alert status.²⁶ The following day, Diefenbaker announced in the House of Commons:



JFK addresses Canadian Parliament during his visit in 1961; Diefenbaker is seated, listening, to the right of the photo. SAB R-B8214

*We intend to support the United States and our allies in this situation The Government is seeking to find means by which this dangerous, threatening situation can be settled without recourse to arms. On the other hand, we recognize the fact that the free world as a whole cannot afford to permit its essential security to be endangered by offensive weapons mounted on bases adjacent to North America.*²⁷

The US finally had official Canadian support, but Diefenbaker's statement made it clear that this support was unenthusiastic and lacked any

suggestion of Canadian approval for the methods chosen by the Americans to handle the situation.

There seems little doubt that Canada's hesitant and indecisive response to its American allies during the crisis did not in any way affect the final outcome. Nevertheless, the crisis had serious repercussions as far as Diefenbaker's reputation was concerned, both in the United States and in Canada. The Americans were, naturally enough, angered by Diefenbaker's behaviour during the crisis and to some extent this anger was echoed by Canadians.²⁸ However, an analysis of the reactions of five daily Canadian newspapers, *The Vancouver Sun*; *The Leader Post*

John Diefenbaker and John Kennedy walking outside the White House, Washington, 1961. Courtesy University of Saskatchewan Archives. University of Saskatchewan Diefenbaker Archival Collections JGD2210XB



(Regina); *The Telegram* (Toronto); *The Gazette* (Montreal); and *The Chronicle Herald* (Halifax), indicates that this anger, for the Canadian press at least, did not focus on Diefenbaker's belated response to the American's request for support.

As one might expect, the Cuban crisis, beginning on 22 or 23 October and continuing to at least the end of the month, dominated the front page of nearly every issue of the five papers surveyed. While the frequency of editorial comment varied considerably from paper to paper, they all evaluated both the American handling of the situation, and the Canadian government's response to it, during the crisis. Although, for the most part, these evaluations revealed support for Kennedy and indicated a belief that Canada really had no choice but to support the Americans, they also indicated a certain amount of sympathy for Diefenbaker's failure to immediately jump to the ready.

Initially, editorial comment in *The Leader Post* was rather lacking in substance, saying little more than that the Cuban situation "thoroughly and convincingly" exposed "Soviet double-talk and duplicity."²⁹ However, on Friday, 26 October, the day following Diefenbaker's announcement of support for the US, *The Leader Post* ran an editorial dealing briefly with the question of whether or not Kennedy had acted properly in taking unilateral action. While acknowledging that advance consultation was ideal, the editorial asserted that, "under the extremity of the prevailing circumstance [it could] rightly be argued that what Mr. Kennedy did was courageously face the realities as they existed [and acted] accordingly;" moreover, its subsequent criticism of Diefenbaker's slow response to the Americans was mild: "Most Canadians, surely, will applaud Prime Minister Diefenbaker's rather belated but forthright statement of support." Thus while *The Leader Post* was happy with the degree of support (now that it had finally arrived), it nevertheless asserted that it "could and should have been said sooner."³⁰

Following the announcement on 28 October of the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement, *The Leader Post* carried another editorial supportive of Kennedy's reaction to the Cuban situation. This editorial was much more lavish in its praise for Kennedy, claiming that he had emerged from the crisis as the "saviour of troubled peace."³¹ There was no mention of the official Canadian reaction to the crisis. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, *The Leader Post* evidently did not believe that Diefenbaker's failure to immediately announce Canadian support of the

American actions was of any great concern. Apart from that one comment that Diefenbaker should have indicated full support sooner, *The Leader Post* did not present the delay as indication of Diefenbaker's inability to govern, and seemed content to drop the matter.

This failure to find any serious fault with the Canadian government's response to the Americans during the crisis was also evident in *The Gazette*. As with *The Leader Post*, *The Gazette* was rather slow to comment on Canada's official reaction to the Cuban crisis. From its first editorial comment on the crisis, the paper was fairly supportive of Kennedy, suggesting that he really had very few options. *The Gazette* noted that the United States "accepted, and still accepts today, the existence of a Communist regime in Cuba. It accepted, and still accepts, the sending of conventional defensive weapons to the Castro government," however, since Kennedy had announced in September that he would "not accept the setting up of offensive bases," and Premier Khrushchev had chosen to ignore him, *The Gazette* wondered, "what was the President to do?"³²

A week later, *The Gazette* maintained that Kennedy's actions were a direct result of the urgency of the situation, since any delay in American response could have resulted in the Cuban missiles becoming operable, vastly increasing the dangers of the situation. Because "the free world" depended "in the last resort upon American protection," the paper concluded that the US had the "right to considerable freedom of action."³³

One of *The Gazette's* regular columnists, Drummond Burgess,

was also fairly supportive of the United States, claiming that while there was no doubt that the possible consequences of Kennedy's decision could be grave, they were "nothing to the danger that would have arisen if President Kennedy had turned his back on the challenge."³⁴ Another *Gazette* columnist, Maxwell Cohen, also maintained that the US reaction was understandable, writing that it was a matter of "ultimate self-protection." Nevertheless Cohen, also in agreement with Diefenbaker, believed that Canada would be remiss if it did not encourage the US to "explore as rapidly the means of converting show-down into settlement."³⁵

The lack of attention paid to Canada's response to the Cuban crisis suggests that *The Gazette* was not overly concerned that Diefenbaker had taken three days to publicly announce that Canada would support the US. This is supported by the fact that when *The Gazette's* Ottawa columnist, Arthur Blakely, finally got around to commenting on the crisis on 30 October, he proudly announced that nowhere in Canada's response to the US was to be found any relic of the "ready, aye ready position."³⁶ Blakely, at this time, found no fault with the Canadian government's response to the Americans and, in another article on the subject in early November, suggested that despite the success of "Kennedy's massive intervention over the Cuban bases," the lack of consultation was a definite cause for concern.³⁷

As with *The Leader Post*, *The Gazette*, while supportive of the Americans, did not appear to be excessively concerned with the Canadian government's response during the Cuban crisis. A similar show of indifference was also noticeable in the editorial

comment of *The Chronicle Herald*. The Halifax paper maintained that Kennedy took the only "sensible position" open to him and expressed the hope that Kennedy would be strong enough to resist the warmongers who might urge an invasion of Cuba and remember that he was not "merely the leader of the Americans, but of all the free world's peoples."³⁸ Canada, the paper maintained, had no choice but to stand by the United States. Anything less would dishonour Canada's "past, present and future."³⁹

Despite its whole-hearted support of the US, *The Chronicle Herald* did not mention Canada's reaction to the crisis until 7 November. At that time, columnist Robert W. Reford acknowledged that the "Canadian government [had given] the appearance of reluctant partner" in the recent crisis. But Reford also noted that Ottawa did have some genuine grievances concerning the American handling of the situation, since Canada was "informed," not "consulted," on the US action, contrary to the NORAD agreement.⁴⁰

Like the three newspapers already discussed, *The Telegram* was fully supportive of the US. It placed the blame for the crisis firmly on the Soviets and maintained that "Mr. Kennedy's courageous stand [was the] only realistic way in which both peace and freedom [could] be preserved."⁴¹ However, it also acknowledged that the United States may have made mistakes in its handling of the entire situation and that Canada was "neither obligated nor committed to follow the United States blindly."⁴²

The position that the Canadian government was somewhat justified in its hesitant response



John Diefenbaker and John F. Kennedy seated and chatting in the Oval Office, White House, Washington, D.C., 20 February 1961. Courtesy University of Saskatchewan Archives. University of Saskatchewan Diefenbaker Archival Collections JGD1378

to the Americans' request for support was stated most firmly by *The Vancouver Sun*. During the crisis itself, *The Sun* had very little to say in its editorial comment, voicing hesitant support for the United States and noting that Diefenbaker, given the circumstances, had little choice but to support the Americans. The editorial noted with approbation that Diefenbaker had "restrained himself from expressing clear approval of the American action." *The Sun* was evidently not convinced that the Americans handled the situation in the best manner possible, but also believed that the allies must stand by the US during the crisis and reserve their criticism until after the danger had passed.⁴³

The Sun's belief that the Canadian government had been correct to offer only minimal support to the Americans during the crisis was expressed much more forcefully a few months after the crisis had passed. In an editorial on 3 January 1963, *The*

Sun defended Diefenbaker's slow response to the United States during the crisis, noting that the Americans had taken "weeks of close surveillance to make up its mind Cuba was a missile threat and several more days to decide what to do." Therefore, the editorial maintained, the Canadian reaction "looked rather good, since the crisis was dumped on its doorstep without prior consultation or information."⁴⁴ Indeed on more than one occasion, *The Sun's* editorials showed a fairly strong nationalistic inclination and concern that Canada should not be dominated in any way by the United States.⁴⁵ Certainly strong nationalism was in evidence in the 3 January article, when the editors suggested that perhaps Diefenbaker's critics had "managed to convince themselves that Canada [was] already the 51st state and should act accordingly;" nevertheless, *The Sun* was grateful that the Progressive Conservative government had not adopted this belief, suggesting that, in

this matter, the Conservatives represented the thinking of most Canadians.⁴⁶

Whether or not, as *The Sun* maintained, Canadians supported Diefenbaker's treatment of the United States during the crisis, insofar as the five papers examined were concerned, the press acknowledged that Diefenbaker was justified for his response during the Cuban crisis. As Diefenbaker noted shortly after the crisis, "It could never have been intended that either of the Nations [in NORAD] would automatically follow whatever stand the other might take;" indeed, as far as Diefenbaker was concerned, the Cuban crisis "emphasized more than ever before the necessity for there being full consultation before any action is taken or policies executed that might lead to war."⁴⁷ Moreover, the Americans' failure to consult with their allies before deciding how to respond to the Cuban situation was seen as problematic by every paper examined. And,

although Diefenbaker's hesitant and lukewarm response to the Americans hardly received unqualified support from the press, there is little indication that this response was detrimental to his reputation.

Therefore, while Diefenbaker's slow response to the American request does not seem to have excessively harmed his reputation in the long run, there is no doubt that the crisis caused the press to seriously reproach Diefenbaker and the Progressive Conservative government. The focus of the criticism was not the indecisiveness shown during the crisis itself, but rather the prolonged vacillation over the whole question of Canada's defence policy.

The roots of the Diefenbaker government's problems with Canada's defence policy were planted by Diefenbaker himself in the early years of his tenure as Prime Minister of Canada. During this early period, Diefenbaker's forays into the field of foreign affairs caused Canada's defence policy to diverge down two seemingly incompatible paths. On one of these paths, Diefenbaker accepted that Canada would form NORAD with the United States, as a system of "joint operational control...under an integrated headquarters responsible to the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries;" and that NORAD was justified "on the principle that for purposes of air defence and protection of the US strategic deterrent, the two countries and the NATO alliance as a whole could be better served if the air defence forces of the United States and Canada operated as one."⁴⁸

Along with the formation of NORAD (and much-supported by Canada's Department of Defence),

came a number of decisions that saw Canada acquire for her armed forces several weapons systems that required nuclear warheads to be effective. And this is where the paths diverge: these decisions were compromised since Diefenbaker also decided that Canada would give high priority to the crusade for worldwide disarmament.⁴⁹ For many Canadians, including members of Diefenbaker's cabinet, this priority made nuclear weapons for Canadian forces unacceptable.

This belief that the avocation of disarmament ruled out the acceptance of nuclear warheads for Canada's armed forces was especially strong in Howard Green, who became Minister of External Affairs in 1959. Green considered Canada's role in disarmament talks to be of the gravest importance and consistently maintained that Canada's acquisition of nuclear warheads would adversely "affect the credibility of this campaign for disarmament."⁵⁰ Indeed, Green's position brought him into direct conflict with Defence Minister, Douglas Harkness, and the whole question of whether or not Canada would accept nuclear warheads was presented for resolution to the Prime Minister.⁵¹

However, Diefenbaker was seemingly unable to resolve the matter. The nuclear weapons issue was the subject of heated debate both within Diefenbaker's cabinet and among the Canadian population at large. Rather than face the political repercussions that were bound to follow any concrete decisions on the issue, Diefenbaker chose to straddle the fence. On the one hand, he maintained that "in the interests of disarmament, everything must be done to assure success if it can be attained, and the nuclear

family should not be increased so long as there is any possibility of disarmament among the nations of the world."⁵² On the other hand, he also declared that in the event of war, "Canadian armed forces will be in a position to defend with the best defences possible."⁵³

This was the state of Canada's defences at the time of the Cuban crisis. It was a member of NORAD and had agreed to play a specific role in the defence of the North American continent. Canada had also purchased for its NORAD forces 64 supersonic CF-101B fighter planes and 56 Bomarc missiles, all designed for, but not equipped with, nuclear warheads. Acquisition of the warheads would be postponed indefinitely, according to Diefenbaker, unless "grave international tensions indicated the weapons might have to be used."⁵⁴ However, there does not appear to have been any plan to facilitate the movement of these weapons into Canada in the event of a crisis.

The problems inherent in Diefenbaker's attempts to satisfy both the pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear factions were noted by the press even before the Cuban crisis erupted. *The Chronicle Herald* outlined these problems in a succinct, if scathing, editorial that appeared on 19 October, 1962:

As it stands now, we equip ourselves with a wide range of weaponry designed for nuclear purposes. But having made that manly gesture to free world solidarity, we make a bow to what we think is 'good international citizenship' by failing to equip ourselves with the required nuclear ammunition... thus we imagine, we stand pure and undefiled as a peace-loving nation - all the while comforting ourselves with the reservation

that, if nuclear war comes, we will quickly and mysteriously acquire the nuclear warheads, and thus become able, overnight to 'defend' North America, with the very latest in deadly explosives.

As *The Chronicle Herald* pointed out, the government had to decide if Canada was "for or against the acquisition of nuclear warheads [but not both] for and against [italics in the original]."⁵⁵

Diefenbaker's attempts to be both for and against the acquisition of nuclear weapons, along with the resulting state of unreadiness that this ambiguous stance left Canada's forces in, raised the ire of the Canadian press in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis. As *The Leader Post* noted in its 7 November 1962 editorial, Canada's forces were unprepared for war: the Cuban crisis had put Canada's defence policies to the test. The result of this test had been an ignoble failure, revealing that the "Canadian contribution to the joint defence of this continent was...useless." The editorial called for the government to form a non-partisan committee to "fashion a truly effective defence policy" to end the "present vacillation and muddling and assure...more effective defences."⁵⁶

The belief that the Cuban crisis had shown Canada's desperate need for a rational defence policy was also evident in the editorials of *The Gazette*. Drummond Burgess asserted that Canada's present defence policy was "evasive and inconsistent."⁵⁷ Even Arthur Blakely, who throughout the crisis consistently shed the government in the most flattering light possible, admitted that the "Government's policy with respect to nuclear arms for Canada's armed forces [had] never been a



"You will be advised in Orders of any Alert . . . meantime regular watering at 0800 hours as usual..."

model of clarity," and was forced to conclude that its policy simply invited criticism.⁵⁸ A later *Gazette* editorial was more blunt, charging that the government's defence policy was "impossible to interpret or understand."⁵⁹

Similar sentiments were also expressed in the pages of *The Chronicle Herald*. Robert Reford noted that in the event of war, Canada was woefully unprepared to play her agreed-upon role in the defence of the continent. The Cuban crisis had brought this lack of preparedness painfully home and Reford wondered if Canadians were willing to "take a similar risk in the future."⁶⁰ A few days later, *The Chronicle Herald* ran an editorial that reiterated Reford's concerns, referring to Canada as the "lame duck partner...in the recent emergency," and reminding the Progressive Conservative government that it was their responsibility, regardless of possible criticism, to arrive at a firm and unequivocal defence policy.⁶¹

The Vancouver Sun was unique among the examined papers in that it consistently, both before and after the crisis, supported a non-nuclear role for Canada's forces in both NATO and NORAD.⁶² However, this anti-nuclear stance did not prevent *The Sun* from being sharply critical of Diefenbaker's defence policy. For example, an editorial cartoon (above), carried on the front page of *The Sun* on 24 October, illustrated the absurdity of the entire situation by neatly summing up the state of Canada's defences during the Cuban crisis.

According to *The Sun*, North American defence strategy had, since the formation of NORAD in 1957, depended on Canada to be the first line of defence against an attack by the Soviet Union. The main goal of this defence was to protect the US Strategic Air Command, allowing it to deliver the "counterpunch" that was the "real defence of the Western world."⁶³ That *The Sun* did not believe that this was the



John and Olive Diefenbaker with John F. and Jackie Kennedy on Parliament Hill, 1961. Courtesy University of Saskatchewan Archives. University of Saskatchewan Diefenbaker Archival Collections JGD6587XC

best role for Canada to play in the defence of the continent did not prevent its understanding of the extremely poor position that the “Diefenbaker-Green mugwumping on defence” had left Canada in during the Cuban crisis.⁶⁴ Canada, *Sun* columnist Gerald Waring maintained, had “gambled with America’s security” by agreeing to a specific role in the defence of the continent, and then refusing to accept the weapons that would allow them to fulfil that role.⁶⁵ Further *Sun* editorials made it clear that the government would

be sadly remiss if it allowed this state of affairs to continue.

The Sun believed that it was critical to the country’s safety that Canada adopt a firm defence policy. It did not want this policy to depend on nuclear arms and maintained that it was “not too late to negotiate a new non-nuclear Canadian contribution to Western defence.”⁶⁶ But whether or not the government chose to follow a nuclear or non-nuclear defence policy, it was time that “decisions were reached and

proclaimed.”⁶⁷ *The Sun* asserted that “government itself must find a policy and events of recent years indicate that this will not happen until the Canadian people find a government.”⁶⁸

While all of the surveyed newspapers were critical of the government’s defence policy and clearly expressed dissatisfaction, their reactions were mild when compared with the vehemence and frequency of editorials found in *The Telegram*. Despite the fact that *The Telegram*, like

The Gazette, was a long-time supporter of the Progressive Conservative Party,⁶⁹ its editorials did not hesitate to criticize Diefenbaker's defence policy. Of course, it should be acknowledged that *The Telegram*, like *The Leader Post*, *The Gazette* and *The Chronicle Herald*, strongly advocated that Canada accept nuclear arms, and that its concern for the state of Canada's defences during the Cuban crisis may have been exaggerated to sway the government to its point of view. But whatever its motivation, *The Telegram* was not willing to sit quietly by and let the government continue to vacillate on defence issues.

In fact, unlike the other papers surveyed, *The Telegram* did not wait until the danger of the Cuban crisis had passed to begin criticism of the government's defence policy. Lubor J. Zink, *Telegram* columnist and author of the most persistent attacks on the government's defence strategy, noted on 23 October that Canada's dodging of defence issues might well be seen by the Soviets as a weakness in the Western alliance, and that the crisis made it imperative that the government revise without delay Canada's "toothless defence policies."⁷⁰ As time wore on and no defence policy changes were announced, Zink's exhortations became rather more strident.

Zink accused the government of "general incomprehension" as far as foreign affairs were concerned and maintained that, as a result, Canada was "living in a dream world of parochial isolationism." Its muddled actions, lacking the guidance of a clear cut policy based on a through understanding of world events [had hampered] "those who must wage war" on Canada's behalf.⁷¹ The majority of the blame for Canada's "muddled"

defence policy was placed firmly on the shoulders of Howard Green: Zink called for him to be replaced as Minister of External Affairs several times.⁷²

As far as *The Telegram* was concerned, the Cuban crisis sent a message to Canada, loud and clear. As one editorial maintained, Canada had, "in the defence of North America...been playing the role of moralists, pseudo-neutralists (and) fence sitters," a position that was no longer tenable since "Soviet missiles [would] recognize no 'undefended' borders."⁷³ This position was reiterated by Zink, who insisted that the Cuban missile crisis had brought to light Canada's need to be "militarily and psychologically" prepared to meet another crisis. The Cuban scare, Zink hoped, would "jolt" Canada "into a thorough revision" of its "defence and foreign policies." If this revision led Canada to negotiate a non-nuclear role in the defence of North America, then so be it. But, whatever the choice, it was time for Canada to make up its "national mind."⁷⁴

However, making up its national mind seemed impossible for Canada as long as Diefenbaker was at the helm. Diefenbaker did agree, at the end of October, to open negotiations with the US to discuss some type of stand-by arrangement that would see nuclear warheads moved into Canada if war appeared imminent, but the Americans believed that such a scheme posed too many technical problems and was, in the final analysis, unworkable.⁷⁵ The matter was not resolved and, following established pattern, changes to Canada's defences were once again put on hold. As October gave way to November and then December, with no defence decisions forthcoming,

criticism in *The Telegram* grew more forceful.

Lubor J. Zink proclaimed that the government was out of touch with the Canadian people, who had in turn ceased to expect any "real leadership" and felt "uneasy and insecure" in light of the "constant display of indecision in Ottawa."⁷⁶ He was not alone: Harry Halliwell, another *Telegram* correspondent, tackled the defence issue in December, writing that Canada's defence spending was a "colossal fraud upon the Canadian people and our allies." Halliwell urged the government to make up its mind: either accept nuclear weapons or firmly repudiate them and "renegotiate our NATO and NORAD roles."⁷⁷ *The Telegram* kept up its barrage of criticism throughout November and December, stressing the need for strong leadership in defence matters. However, Diefenbaker did not provide the leadership demanded by the press. Despite the fear of war aroused by the Cuban crisis and the clamouring of the press, Diefenbaker could not, or would not, develop a firm and unambiguous defence policy for Canada; thus in a January 1963 editorial, *The Telegram* sadly announced that "political leadership, adrift in the nuclear age [was] not a very noble sight."⁷⁸

As time went by, editorials in *The Telegram*, as in all the newspapers surveyed, referred less and less to the Cuban crisis. However, the defence dilemma clearly needed resolution: the Cuban crisis had caused the press to take a long, hard look at Canada's defence situation and they were unquestionably dismayed by what they saw. Diefenbaker's vacillation on defence issues had forced Canada to face "the most dangerous East-West confrontation since World

War II⁷⁹ without the weapons that would have enabled her to fulfil her agreed-upon function in the defence of the North American continent. This vacillation, they firmly believed, must not be allowed to continue.

The surveyed newspapers showed a modicum of sympathy for Diefenbaker's slow response to the American request for backing during the Cuban crisis and indicated a certain willingness to blame this response on the American decision to take unilateral action without first consulting her allies. However, they were not inclined to forgive either Diefenbaker or his government for the lack of a firm defence policy. Numerous explanations for Diefenbaker's indecision have been postulated. These include the suggestion

that "he had difficulty being arbitrary,"⁸⁰ that that he was not necessarily indecisive at all but rather a "poor political strategist,"⁸¹ and even that his reluctance to accept personal blame for controversial decisions ran so deep that it was not just political instinct but "something more personal... an absence in his political makeup."⁸²

The reasons for his vacillation on defence issues were of little consequence insofar as the newspapers were concerned: all five, regardless of political affiliation or stance on the nuclear weapons issue, demanded that the Diefenbaker government form a clear and unequivocal defence policy. The possibility of war had been all too real during the Cuban crisis and the press was adamant that Canada's role in any

future conflict be clearly defined. The message to Diefenbaker and the Progressive Conservative government was clear: if they could not define that role, then they were not capable of providing the Canadian people with the leadership they required.

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Endnotes on page 52.

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Pages missing from a life story

*Passing Through Missing Pages:
The Intriguing Story of Annie Garland Foster*

Frances Welwood

Caitlin Press, Halfmoon Bay, BC 2011. 221 pages + endnotes

Francis Welwood's admiration for Annie Garland Foster is evident from the first page of this biography. *Missing Pages* is a mixture of detailed biographical data, information and excerpts from Annie's unpublished memoir *Passing Through*, and provides a wealth of historical context. Calling her subject "a fine figure of a woman who stood out among the women of Nelson," Welwood narrates not only the life of Annie, but also her own journey to learn more about the woman.

Interestingly, the author refers throughout the biography to the ever-changing ways Annie was known throughout her life. Born Anne Harvie Ross in Fredericton, New Brunswick in 1875, she was variously known as Nan Ross to friends at university and a teaching hospital in Massachusetts, and later as Miss Ross to those who knew her as school teacher in Saskatchewan and British Columbia (BC).

The Great War influenced the path of Annie's life as it did the rest of the world. As a new wife, Mrs. Garland Foster followed her enlisted husband William overseas as a nurse. He would not return. Known there as Sister Foster, her experiences impressed upon her a lasting concern for the welfare of veterans, particularly in their "struggle for existence in civilian life" (135). After the War, she became very active in the Great War Veterans' Association, making history by becoming an alderman on their ticket in Nelson, BC in 1920. Alderman Foster's politics were not radical; she did not consider herself a suffragette, but she was a strong, intelligent council member.

Annie's own memoirs often left out details or specific names for people and places in her life. A potential beau is mentioned only as "T" and a town she taught at in Saskatchewan is named only as "near Regina." Welwood does her best to fill in these blanks, but several remain - including one entire part of her life. As the title suggests, the mysterious "missing pages" of Annie's memoirs and the author's speculation of what they might have contained occupy a large portion of this book. Must-haves and "maybes fill the chapters that discuss Annie's interest in (and defence of) Patrick Hanley, a returned soldier accused of murder. Welwood provides the information she found about the case, including a



detailed description of Hanley's trials and Annie's letters that would ultimately help save him from the death penalty. However, Annie's motivations remain vague - her concerns for veterans' health, particularly their mental health, are well-documented, but Welwood is unable to give us more than that. Instead, she continues the narrative as Annie did, "as if nothing untoward had happened" (91). How Annie's later marriage to "Pat" fits into her story is not entirely clear and their life together is not documented in the same detail as his trials.

After a long full life, Annie left behind a trail of accomplishments, many volumes of writings, and a detailed memoir. However, Welwood notes that she remains an enigmatic figure (220). In omitting so much personal detail from her memoirs, one wonders if Annie the writer intended us to be in the dark. Welwood believes "Annie would be 'piqued' to find so many details revealed," (216) which is an uncomfortable thought as an intrigued reader.

Reviewer Kristine Montgomery works at the Western Development Museum in Saskatoon.

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
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Epic 2,000 mile canoe trip in 1912

Bound for the Barrens: Journal of the Ernest Oberholtzer and Billy Magee 2,000-mile Canoe Voyage to Hudson Bay In 1912

Jean Sanford Replinger, editor

Minnesota, Ernest Oberholtzer Foundation, 2011. 248 pp.

I was waked in the morning by a voice shouting 'Wee-chow'; 'Get-up'. When I came out, I found the York boatmen straggling down to the boat with their personal packs, usually in four sacks. Some were washing their faces....the steersman manned his oar; two men shoved with poles; a third on shore put his shoulder to the prow and crawled aboard just as the boat moved off (like a Greek argosy)... As the boat moved out upon the calm lake, her great oars washing like the slow beat of the funeral drum, she was magnificent. We heard the rub of her oars for half an hour afterwards. (p.12-13)

These were the scenes and sounds that Ernest Oberholtzer witnessed and recorded in his journal on July 12, 1912 at Mirond Lake in northern Saskatchewan.

Just days before, Ernest Oberholtzer and his Ojibwe friend, Billy Magee, launched their 18-foot Chestnut Guide Special canoe into the Saskatchewan River in The Pas, Manitoba. They set off on what would become an extraordinary trip of adventure and exploration. It would take them through 2,000 miles of northern wilderness over a grueling 133-day period that left them hungry, weatherworn and exhausted at Gimli, Manitoba on November 5. That these two men survived such an incredible trip is a testament to their canoeing and survival skills -- and their sheer determination.

Ernest Oberholtzer was a young Harvard graduate from Davenport, Iowa. During the winter of 1910-11, he spent many hours in the reading room of the British Museum while working and travelling in England. He began to envision his trip after studying the maps and writings of J. B. Tyrrell of the Geological Survey of Canada, following his explorations of 1893 and 1894. Oberholtzer and Magee, who was from Mine Centre, Ontario, had canoed extensively in the Minnesota/Ontario border area in 1909 and 1910.

When Oberholtzer asked Billy if he would go on such a trip, Billy replied "Guess ready go end of earth." So it was that 24-year old Ernest Oberholtzer and his 51-year old friend, Billy Magee, set off on this incredible trip 100 years ago.

Bound For The Barrens includes the entire journal and field notes that Oberholtzer recorded on this

voyage: a vital record of this incredible canoeing feat. The book publication also realizes the fulfillment of his life-long desire to write the story of this trip. Jean Sanford Replinger has edited the fascinating account, which is richly illustrated with historically significant photographs taken by Oberholtzer during this trip, and includes 53 maps. In addition, retired University of New Brunswick professor Robert Cockburn, an expert on the Old North and its canoeing challenges to whom this book is dedicated, has provided an excellent tribute to this voyage at the conclusion of this book.

Not only did Ernest Oberholtzer keep a detailed daily journal of the events of this trip and the various people they encountered, but he also took hundreds of excellent black and white photographs. These photographs depict a historically significant period of time and portray life as it was in 1912 in a large portion of northern Saskatchewan, Manitoba and the Northwest Territories. The photographs he took of people employed by the Révillon Frères and Hudson's Bay Company in their fur trade business are exceptional. Many photographs also depict the lives and activities of Cree, Métis, Dene and Inuit families along the way. This has allowed descendants in several communities to appreciate images of their ancestors from 100 years ago, many of whom they had never before seen.

Oberholtzer captured some of the last and very rare images of York boats on Mirond Lake as well as at Pelican Narrows in Saskatchewan. These are rare glimpses of these large boats that the Hudson's Bay Company used to transport trade goods and furs throughout their inland travel routes that

stemmed from Cumberland House. The very hardworking people who worked on these York boats were primarily of Cree and Métis descent. Many of their descendants still live in the Saskatchewan communities of Cumberland House, Pelican Narrows, and Southend.

This book captures a glimpse of life in those remote areas in 1912. It also allows us to appreciate the enormous challenges that these two men faced in order to successfully survive such a trip unaided by large groups of canoe brigades as was the practice

of other northern travellers such as J.B. Tyrrell of the Geological Survey of Canada.

Bound For The Barrens represents a superb piece of Saskatchewan history - it's a must-read for anyone who loves the north!

Reviewer Les Oystryk is a retired conservation officer with an avid interest in the history of northern Saskatchewan; he owns and operates a consulting business called Amisk Atik Resource and Environmental Management.




Two canoes of the Révillon Frères Trading Company on the Sturgeon Weir River (north of Cumberland House) on July 4, 1912. Courtesy Ernest Oberholtzer Foundation.

Vernon R. Wishart, author of *What Lies Behind the Picture?*, is pleased to introduce his new book

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The Church on the Home Front: The Church of England in the Diocese of Qu'Appelle and the Great War


- 1 Robert Craig Brown and Ramsey Cook, Canada, 1896-1921: *A Nation Transformed* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1974), 212. For the Church of England's wartime role in English society, see Alan Wilkinson, *The Church of England and the First World War* (London: SPCK, 1978), and for the response of the main-line Regina churches to the war effort, see James M. Pitsula, *For All We Have and Are: Regina and the Experience of the Great War* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2008).
- 2 Pitsula, *For All We Have and Are*, 31. For a general discussion of Canadian Anglican citizenship see "Citizenship, Worship and Mission: Three Sources of Anglican Identity during the National Era," *Seeds Scattered and Sown: Studies in the History of Canadian Anglicanism*, ed. Norman Knowles (Toronto: ABC Publishing, 2008), 114-124.
- 3 "Letter of the Bishop to the Qu'Appelle Association." dated January 9, 1915, *Occasional Paper of the Qu'Appelle Association* No. 116, Winter 1914, 4.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Ibid., 4-5.
- 6 William Simpson (b. 1874): Canadian by birth, Simpson came to the Diocese of Qu'Appelle in 1902 to serve missions sponsored by Wycliffe College, Toronto. In 1908, he became Superintendent of the Colonial and Continental Church Society missions to the north and south along the CPR main line between Caron and Herbert west of Moose Jaw. In 1912, Simpson was appointed rector of the newly formed Parish of St. Mary the Virgin, Regina.
- 7 "Prayers for Safety of Empire and for Restoration of Peace Offered in Regina Churches," *Regina Morning Leader*, August 3, 1914, 4.
- 8 Kramer, Alan, *Dynamics of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 95.
- 9 Wilkinson, *The Church of England and the First World War*, 208-213.
- 10 Malcolm Taylor McAdam Harding (1863-1949): Born the son of a clergyman in Hertfordshire, Harding spent his early ministry in Ontario and Manitoba before becoming Archdeacon of Assiniboia in 1904. He was elected Coadjutor Bishop of Qu'Appelle in 1909 and assumed full responsibility as Bishop of the diocese in 1911. Harding was of the catholic tradition in terms of churchmanship. He resigned as Bishop in 1934 and was elected Archbishop and Metropolitan of Rupert's Land that same year. He resigned that office in 1942.
- 11 "Pastoral Letter Deals with War," *Regina Morning Leader*, August 2, 1915, 3.
- 12 Walter Western (1881-1951): Gifted as an orator, Western grew up in the Presbyterian Church and was known in Scotland as the boy evangelist. Upon coming to Canada, Western attended St. Chad's Theological College, was ordained to priesthood in 1911 and became curate of St. Paul's in 1913. In 1916, Harding appointed him to St. Stephen's, Swift Current.
- 13 "Prayers for the Safety of the Empire Offered in Regina Churches," *Regina Morning Leader*, August 10, 1914, 4.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 "Bishop of Toronto Speaks to 60th Rifles," *Moose Jaw Evening Times*, August 17, 1914, 5.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 John Swalwell (1865 -1920): A Cambridge scholar and author of books on religion and science, Swalwell immigrated to Canada in 1908 and became incumbent of Swift Current two years later. He was rector of that parish until being appointed to Estevan in 1917.
- 19 "27th Light Horse Attended Divine Service at St. Stephen's on Sunday," *Swift Current Sun*, August 18, 1914, 4.
- 20 Francis Cole Cornish (1863-1965): Cornish emigrated from Wales to Canada in 1884 and was ordained priest by the Bishop of Qu'Appelle in 1901. He served the Parish of Wolseley from 1901-1907 before being appointed to the Parish of Yorkton. Cornish was rector there from 1907 to 1918.
- 21 "Canon Cornish Exhorts Volunteers, Impressive Service," *Yorkton Enterprise*, August 20, 1914, 1.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 *Canadian Church Railway Mission Magazine*, Vol. II, No. 10, October 1914, 4.
- 24 "Pastoral Letter Deals with War," *Regina Morning Leader*, August 2, 1915, 3.
- 25 Diocese of Qu'Appelle Archives (DQA), R-705, Gainsborough, Christ Church: Service Register, 1909-1926.
- 26 *Canadian Church Railway Mission Magazine*, Vol. II, No. 10, October 1914, 4.
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Ibid., 2.
- 29 DQA, R-705, Regina, St. Alkmund: Service Register, 1910-1921.
- 30 DQA, R-705, Regina, St. Peter: Service Register, 1913-1918.
- 31 For more information about the role of the English Church Railway Mission, see David J. Carter, "The Archbishops' Western Canada Fund and the Railway Mission," *Saskatchewan History* XXII, 1 (1969), 13-28.
- 32 "Report of the Railway Mission to the Bishop of Qu'Appelle in Synod," *Journal of the Synod of the Diocese of Qu'Appelle (hereinafter cited as Qu'Appelle Synod Journal)*, 1916, 88.
- 33 *Canadian Church Railway Mission Magazine*, Vol. III, No. 2, February 1915, 3.
- 34 DQA, R-705, Broadview, St. Luke the Evangelist: Service Register, 1900-1918.
- 35 *Occasional Paper* No. 117, Spring and Summer 1915, 17.
- 36 Frederick Wells Johnson (1871-1937): A Londoner by birth, Johnson immigrated to Canada in 1884, graduated from St. John's Theological College at Qu'Appelle and was ordained to the priesthood in 1893. Wells Johnson spent most of his ministry at St. John the Baptist, Moose Jaw, 1904-1932, and served as Archdeacon of Moose Jaw, 1910-1935.
- 37 *Occasional Paper* No. 118, Autumn and Winter 1915, 3.
- 38 "Daily Intercession for Success of Allied Arms at St. Paul's," *Regina Morning Leader*, October 1, 1915, 2.
- 39 *50th Jubilee, 1913-1963 St. Peter Anglican Church, Regina* (Regina: Modern Press, 1963), 8.
- 40 DQA, R-705, Regina, St. Peter: Service Register, 1913-1918.
- 41 *Occasional Paper* No. 120, Summer 1916, 21.
- 42 "From Qu'Appelle 4000 Have Enlisted," *Regina Morning Leader*, August 27, 1915, 10.
- 43 *Occasional Paper* No. 120, Summer 1916, 16.
- 44 "Charge of the Bishop," *Qu'Appelle Synod Journal*, 1918, 34.
- 45 "Charge of the Bishop," *Qu'Appelle Synod Journal*, 1916, 27.
- 46 Ibid., 28.
- 47 Ibid.
- 48 "Letter of the Bishop of Qu'Appelle to the Qu'Appelle Association" dated January 9, 1915, *Occasional Paper* No. 116, Winter 1914, 5. Before returning home to join his regiment, Barber organized the Outlook Home Guard. He died of wounds sustained on the battlefield.
- 49 Of the four missionaries mentioned, three died in the line of duty. Oliver Wakefield, a 2nd Lt. in the Imperial Yeomanry, was killed leading his troops into action. Thomas Robert Scott, who left the Ordained ministry and became a stoker in the Royal Navy was drowned when his destroyer was torpedoed in the Mediterranean. As a chaplain, Arnold John Bennett won the Military Cross on the Western Front and entered Jerusalem with General Allenby's troops only to die later in an Egyptian hospital of typhus. Richard E. Young served as a chaplain in France and at Gallipoli.
- 50 "Entire Student Body of St. Chad's Enlists for Active Service," *Regina Morning Leader*, October 20, 1915, 2.
- 51 *The Chadonian*, Vol 1, No. 10, Michaelmas 1933, 6.
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 "Charge of the Bishop," *Qu'Appelle Synod Journal* 1916, 27.
- 54 "Clergy Meet in Session at Regina," *Regina Morning Leader*, May 13, 1915, 10.
- 55 Arthur Edward Burgett (1872-1942): Born in India and raised in England, Burgett immigrated to Canada around 1908 and spent five years in the Diocese of Quebec before leaving for Qu'Appelle. He served as General Missionary, 1913-1923, as Examining Chaplain to Bishop Harding, 1916-1923, and as Archdeacon of Assiniboia, 1917-1923. He transferred to the Diocese of Edmonton where he undertook parochial work until consecrated Bishop in 1932.
- 56 *Bishop's Leaflet*, October 1914, 7.
- 57 Ernest Charles Earp (1882-1959): A Yorkshireman, Earp immigrated to Canada after the turn of the century, attended Wycliffe College, Toronto, and was ordained to the priesthood in 1907. He was curate of St. Paul's, Regina, 1912-1913, before leaving to become Rector of Grace Church. Earp served as Temporary Chaplain to the Forces, 1916-1919.
- 58 "Chaplain to 68th," *Regina Morning Leader*, April 14, 1916, 10.
- 59 DQA, R-705, Outlook, St. Mark: Vestry Minutes, January 4, 1916, 103.
- 60 "Capt. HH East St. Chad's Man Killed in Action," *Regina Morning Leader*, September 8, 1917, 15.
- 61 "Letter from the Bishop of Qu'Appelle to the Qu'Appelle Association" dated January 9, 1915, *Occasional Paper* No. 116, Winter 1914, 5. Hicks was killed in action during 1917.

- 62 "Churches Rising to the Occasion," *Moose Jaw Evening Times*, August 24, 1914, 5.
- 63 "Confirmation at St. John the Baptist by Bishop Harding," *Moose Jaw Evening Times*, March 29, 1915, 1.
- 64 "Prayers for the Safety of Empire Offered in Regina Churches," *Regina Morning Leader*, August 10, 1914, 4.
- 65 "Regina Clergymen in Rousing Sermons in All City Churches Yesterday Boost Recruiting Campaign by Urging Young Men to Enlist," *Regina Morning Leader*, September 13, 1915, 8.
- 66 "Rev. Walter Western Makes Strong Plea to Young Men to Respond to Call of King and Country," *Regina Morning Leader*, July 19, 1915, 10.
- 67 "Regina Clergymen in Rousing Sermons in All City Churches Yesterday Boost Recruiting Campaign by Urging Young Men to Enlist," *Regina Morning Leader*, September 13, 1915, 8.
- 68 "Rev. Walter Western Makes Strong Plea to Young Men to Respond to Call of King and Country," *Regina Morning Leader*, July 19, 1915, 10.
- 69 "Formal Welcome to Captain Earp by Grace Parish," *Regina Morning Leader*, September 3, 1917, 1.
- 70 "Rev. Walter Western Makes Strong Plea to Young Men to Respond to Call of King and Country," *Regina Morning Leader*, July 19, 1915, 10.
- 71 "Local News and Notes" *Swift Current Sun*, March 12, 1915, 6.
- 72 "Successful Recruiting Meeting Arouses Greatest Enthusiasm," *Yorkton Enterprise*, November 25, 1915, 1.
- 73 *Occasional Paper* No. 123, Winter 1917, 13-14.
- 74 George Charles Hill (1850-1927): Born in England, Hill immigrated to Canada in 1882. He was appointed Rector of St. Paul's Church, Regina, in 1901. His son and stepsons enlisted in the Canadian Army. One of the stepsons, Morgan Cayley Hamilton, was killed in September 1916. Hill resigned his incumbency in 1917 for health reasons.
- 75 "Canon Hill's Stirring Call to the Men of Canada," *Regina Morning Leader*, May 17, 1916, 4.
- 76 *Occasional Paper* No. 117, Spring and Summer 1915, 15.
- 77 *Ibid.*, No. 120, Summer 1916, 20.
- 78 *Ibid.*, No. 117, Spring and Summer, 1915, 12.
- 79 "Report of the Railway Mission to the Bishop of Qu'Appelle in Synod," *Qu'Appelle Synod Journal* 1916, 83.
- 80 "St. Paul's has Record that is Hard to Beat," *Regina Morning Leader*, January 20, 1915, 2.
- 81 *Occasional Paper* No. 119, Spring 1916, 23-24.
- 82 *Ibid.*, No 117, Spring and Summer 1915, 15.
- 83 *Ibid.*
- 84 *Ibid.*, No. 119, Spring 1916, 25.
- 85 DQA, R-705, Outlook, St. Mark: Minutes, Annual Meeting, April 30, 1916, 108.
- 86 "Letter from the Bishop of Qu'Appelle to the Editor of the *Occasional Paper*," dated December 28, 1915, *Occasional Paper* No. 119, Spring 1916, 7.
- 87 *Ibid.*, No. 117, Spring and Summer 1915, 9.
- 88 "Letter from the Bishop of Qu'Appelle to the Editor of the *Occasional Paper*," dated December 28, 1915, *Occasional Paper* No. 119, Spring 1916, 7.
- 89 "Letter from the Bishop of Qu'Appelle to the Qu'Appelle Association," dated December 19, 1917, *Occasional Paper* No. 124, Spring 1918, 3.
- 90 "City and Country," *Regina Morning Leader*, October 23, 1914, 12.
- 91 "Church Notice," *Regina Morning Leader*, March 25, 1916, 2.
- 92 Pinno, Erhard, "Temperance and Prohibition in Saskatchewan." MA thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Regina Campus, 1971, 2. As an example, the evangelical Diocese of Saskatchewan to the north, under the leadership of Bishop Jervois Newnham and the outspoken Principal of Emmanuel College, George Exton Lloyd, was more active and vociferous in the temperance movement and the need to educate the non-British immigrant than its catholic neighbour to the south.
- 93 "Charge of the Bishop," *Qu'Appelle Synod Journal*, 1914, 36.
- 94 *Ibid.*
- 95 Pinno, Erhard, "Temperance and Prohibition," 48.
- 96 *Ibid.* The Reverend Canon George Hill served on the Executive of the 'Ban the Bar' Committee.
- 97 *Qu'Appelle Synod Journal*, 1914, 50.
- 98 DQA, R-705, Regina, St. Paul: Vestry minutes, May 18, 1915.
- 99 "Young People of St. Paul's Organize for Season's Work," *Regina Morning Leader*, October 1, 1915, 2.
- 100 DQA, R-705, Broadview, St. Luke the Evangelist: Minutes, April 16, 1915, 3.
- 101 *Qu'Appelle Synod Journal*, 1916, 60. The amendments to the Canons were eventually approved at the 1920 Diocesan Synod and confirmed at the 1922 Synod.
- 102 *Qu'Appelle Synod Journal*, 1918, 24.
- 103 "Charge of the Bishop," *Qu'Appelle Synod Journal*, 1918, 31.
- 104 *Qu'Appelle Synod Journal*, 1918, 49.
- 105 *Qu'Appelle Synod Journal*, 1920, 36.
- 106 *Ibid.*, 72.
- 107 "Charge of the Bishop," *Qu'Appelle Synod Journal*, 1916, 24.
- 108 *Ibid.*, 25.
- 109 For a detailed discussion of the National Mission of Repentance and Hope in England, see Alan Wilkinson, *The Church of England and the First World War* (London: SPCK, 1978), 70-90.
- 110 *Occasional Paper* No. 122, Spring 1917, 2.
- 111 "A Mission of Repentance and Hope at St. John's," *Moose Jaw Evening Times*, October 30, 1916, 5.
- 112 "Ven. Archdeacon Wells Johnson on Coming Mission," *Moose Jaw Evening Times*, November 27, 1916, 5. Stir-Up Sunday was the colloquial name given to the Sunday before Advent. The Collect for the day in the *Book of Common Prayer* which begins, "Stir up, we beseech thee, O Lord, the wills of thy faithful people," was used in preparation for Advent. In England, the day became associated with the preparation of puddings for Christmas.
- 113 *Ibid.*, 5; "Mission of Repentance and Hope Begins on Sunday," *Regina Morning Leader*, December 2, 1916, 16.
- 114 *Occasional Paper* No. 123, Winter 1917, 11.
- 115 *Ibid.*
- 116 "Rev. EC Earp Welcomed Back to Grace Church," *Regina Morning Leader*, September 3, 1917, 4.
- 117 Pitsula, *For All We Have and Are*, 178.
- 118 DQA, R-705, Swift Current, St. Stephen: "Parish Leaflet," No. 2, December 1917, 2.
- 119 *Occasional Paper* No. 124, Spring 1918, 24.
- 120 *Bishop's Leaflet*, Easter 1915, 8-9.
- 121 *Supplement to Occasional Paper* No. 118, Autumn and Winter 1915.
- 122 Pitsula, *For All We Have and Are*, 253.
- 123 *Occasional Paper* No. 125, Winter 1918, 14.
- 124 *Ibid.*
- 125 "Charge of the Bishop," *Qu'Appelle Synod Journal*, 1918, 33.
- 126 *Ibid.*
- 127 *Occasional Paper* No. 126, Spring 1919, 10.
- 128 Prayers for the dead had been part of the 1549 *Book of Common Prayer*, but had been removed from the 1662 version. Clergy of the catholic tradition had always welcomed the practice whereas those of the evangelical tradition had reservations. However, the overwhelming grief arising from the slaughter on the Western Front caused the Church of England at home and abroad to issue and use Prayers for the Dead publicly. The 1918 Qu'Appelle Synod passed a resolution calling for prayers for the departed to be incorporated into the 1918 Canadian *Book of Common Prayer*.
- 129 *Occasional Paper* No. 123, Winter 1917, 9.
- 130 "Charge of the Bishop," *Qu'Appelle Synod Journal*, 1918, 34.
- 131 DQA, R-705, Board of Rural Deans: Minutes, 1916-1950, 3.
- 132 *Occasional Paper* No. 122, Spring 1917, 5.
- 133 *Ibid.*, No. 120, Summer 1916, 13.
- 134 "Lord Bishop of Qu'Appelle Welcomes the People at Union Prayer Services in St. Stephen's Church," *Swift Current Sun*, January 11, 1918, 1.
- 135 *Occasional Paper* No. 125, Winter 1918, 14.
- 136 Pitsula, *For All We Have and Are*, 168.

Ready, aye, ready - or not? Diefenbaker's response to the Cuban missile crisis

- 1 Basil Robinson, *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs*, (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1989) p.294.
- 2 "Text of President Kennedy's Speech," *The Leader Post*, 23 October 1962. p. 13.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 "Russians Warn U.S.; Army Alert; No Denial," *The Leader Post*, 23 October 1962. p.1.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Knowlton Nash, *Kennedy & Diefenbaker*, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1990) p.198.
- 8 Ibid. pp. 202-203.
- 9 Ibid. p.180.
- 10 Ibid. pp.180-181.
- 11 Ibid. p. 181.
- 12 Ibid. p. 182.
- 13 Ibid. p. 185.
- 14 Peter Strusberg, *Diefenbaker: Leadership Lost 1962-67*, (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1976) p.14.
- 15 Patricia I. McMahon, *Essence of Indecision: Diefenbaker's Nuclear Policy 1957-1963*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009) p.122.
- 16 Diefenbaker's anger at what he believed was typical American arrogance was not unprecedented. According to J.L. Granatstein, there was, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a growing perception in Canada that "the United States was a bully in Canada and around the world. There was also concern about American policy, a feeling the United States was too strong militarily and too ready to use its power to achieve its ends." Many believed that Diefenbaker was the leader of this new attitude. Given this attitude it is small wonder that Diefenbaker, who apparently maintained that Kennedy was a "boastful son of a bitch" – too young, inexperienced, brash, hot-headed and foolish to be trusted in a position as powerful as that of President of the United States, reacted negatively to the Americans unilateral decisions during the Cuban crisis. J. L. Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1986) p. 109 and Nash, op.cit., p.11.
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- 22 Ibid., p.337.
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- 28 Robinson, op.cit., p.294.
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- 43 "Criticism Can Wait," *The Vancouver Sun*, 25 October 1962, p.4.
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- 48 Ibid., p.17.
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
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


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
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


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