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

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Contents

THE CYPRESS HILLS MASSACRE:
A CENTURY'S RETROSPECT .... P. Goldring 81
RELIGIOUS REACTIONS TO THE KU KLUX KLAN IN
SASKATCHEWAN .... William Calderwood 103
BOOK REVIEWS 115

TROPER, *Only Farmers Need Apply:* by D. H. Breen.
ATKIN, *Maintain the Right:* by E. C. Morgan.
TROFIMENKOFF (ED.), *The Twenties in Western Canada:*
by Clinton O. White.

COVER: In honor of the centenary of the founding of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police force in 1873 our cover features a picture of a police lancer taken from a drawing made in 1874 by H. Julien. Photograph courtesy Public Archives of Canada.

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The Cypress Hills Massacre— A Century's Retrospect

A CENTURY AGO last June, an incident took place in the Cypress Hills of southwestern Saskatchewan which stained the region with notoriety, and has teased the skill and imagination of writers ever since. This event was the Cypress Hills Massacre, the killing of an undetermined number of Indians and the dispersal of forty lodges of Assiniboine by a small party of whites. So knotted are the roots of the story that a full account of what took place can never be wholly reconstructed. Anyone who attempts this fascinating task will come away with wry appreciation of a remark by George Shepherd, who was the first man to try seriously to create an accurate historical picture of the massacre. Shepherd wrote in 1935 that "one can put his hand into the hat and produce just whatever kind of massacre fancy chooses."[1]

A relatively few facts are above dispute. A number of Assiniboine were camped, in the spring of 1873, at a place in the Cypress Hills where two traders named Abel Farwell and Moses Solomon had erected trading posts the year before. Tension and mistrust between traders and Indians came to a head while a dozen or more frontier characters from Fort Benton happened to be camped a stone's throw from Fort Farwell. A strayed horse was mistakenly believed to have been stolen, and in the resulting confusion firing broke out which culminated in the complete destruction of the Indian camp and the deaths of twenty or more persons. American and Canadian attempts to bring the perpetrators to justice were thwarted by the climate of opinion in Montana, which was quite ready to condone the massacre whatever its origins, and by the failure of the government witnesses to tell a convincing story in the face of conflicting testimony. Beyond these simple facts, argument reigns: not even the date of the massacre is above confusion.[2] The historian is free to wander through as many different interpretations as time and imagination permit.

For all the wealth of published information on the massacre, few writers have tried to reconstruct the event from a wideranging examination of historical sources. Only three need be named — George Shepherd, Peter Turner, and Paul Sharp. Other writers who have tackled the subject, either as a separate topic or as part of a wider history, have tended to draw the substance of their remarks either from the three authors already mentioned, or from accounts published in the early twentieth century by persons like Isaac Cowie who recorded

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[1] George Shepherd, "Massacre in the Cypress Hills", *Scarlet and Gold* (1935), 19.

[2] Most published sources name May 1, 1873 as the massacre date, but it was actually June 1 of the same year. This is established by a number of contemporary references. See *Public Archives of Canada* (P.A.C.), *RG 7 G 6,* Vol. 24, United States Indian Agent A. J. Simmons to (?), July 12, 1873, copy enclosed in Sir E. Thornton to Lord Dufferin No. 27, August 21, 1873. One of the witnesses at the trial in Winnipeg swore that the massacre occurred on a Sunday — May 1 was a Friday, June 1 a Sunday. See *The Standard,* Winnipeg *(Winnipeg Trial),* examination of Baptiste Champagne on June 21. Key figures in the massacre were still *en route* to Fort Benton from their wintering activities in mid-May. See P.A.C. *J.W. Taylor Papers,* deposition of J. H. Evans, December 20, 1875, from the originals in possession of the Minnesota Historical Society.

hearsay and vague memories, rather than documented facts.[3] Most of these writers, however, have only muddied waters in which they were reluctant to swim, and need not be treated too seriously in assessing the sources for a new approach to the massacre.

There are three other kinds of sources from which useful information may be sought: the first is the work of the few serious writers; second, the three surviving accounts of the massacre given by alleged participants from ten to fifty years later; and third, the wealth of accusations, counter-claims, and objective statements recorded by Canadian and American governments and judicial authorities in the legal proceedings which lasted virtually from the time of the massacre until three participants were tried for murder in Winnipeg in the last week of June, 1876.

The major problems facing the writer may be gleaned from the published accounts of the massacre by Shepherd, Turner and Sharp. The first of these is George Shepherd, whose earliest publications on the subject date to the 1930's; his work is solid, but was hampered apparently by lack of access to the papers of James Wickes Taylor, American consul at Winnipeg during the legal proceedings surrounding the massacre, and by the confined spaces (two brief articles in the annual Royal Canadian Mounted Police veterans' publication, *Scarlet and Gold*) in which he first aired his findings.[4] The second writer who has tried to evoke the truth from original sources is the late J. P. Turner, whose article in the *Mounted Police Quarterly* in 1941 became the basis for a lengthy section of his history of the North-West Mounted Police. Unfortunately, Turner overcame the inconsistencies and gaps in the original sources by drawing unreservedly on the resources of his fertile imagination, and without knowing the sources well it is difficult to know where evidence ends and hypothesis begins.[5] This is to some extent true also of the third major effort to get to the truth of the massacre, Paul Sharp's well-known *Whoop-Up Country,* published in 1955. In some ways this is the most disappointing of the lot, for Sharp brought to his task a familiarity with most of the relevant sources and an abundance of printed space in which to expound on them. The result, however, is a presentation riddled with careless errors, unwarranted judgments, and questionable uses of the available

[3] Cowie was in the Cypress Hills shortly before the massacre as an employee of the Hudson s Bay Company and remained in the vicinity for a number of years; but his account of the massacre was based on hearsay at the time, and colored by his own bad relations with the Assiniboine. See his *Company of Adventurers* (Toronto, 1913). A fair example of a writer who treats the massacre in passing is D. Hill, *The Opening of the Canadian West* (London, 1967), 131-133. Of a different character is the work of Wallace Stegner, who grew up in the area and brings a good deal of feeling for the locale into his narrative, *Wolf Willow* (New York, 1963), 73-80.

[4] Shepherd, *loc. cit.;* a further summary of his findings was published in the same periodical a year later, and the contents of the two articles were condensed into Chapter 2 of his *Brave Heritage* (Regina, 1967), 13-17.

[5] J. P. Turner, *The North-West Mounted Police, 1873-1893,* (Ottawa, 1950), I, 217-252, *passim.*

material. This is all the more unfortunate since accounts of the massacre published since 1955 have tended to lean rather heavily on Sharp.[6]

There are also three specimens of the second type of source, first-hand accounts published long afterwards. First is a story by John C. Duval, a métis and a member of Solomon's trading party. His account is of doubtful value, for it was written with much more bravado than truth, shortly after the Manitoba government dropped the indictments for murder against the massacre party.[7] Duval enormously exaggerates the aggressiveness of the Indians; he is father of the implausible legend uncorroborated by his contemporaries but eagerly gobbled up by successive generations of writers that the Indians made three furious but unsuccessful frontal assaults against the withering fire of the entrenched whites with their repeating rifles. The second first-hand account belongs to Donald Graham, who published his recollections in the *Edmonton Journal* half a century after the massacre.[8] There is no evidence to prove that Graham was a participant in the battle at all, apart from his article and an oblique reference by Isaac Cowie, in this case an unreliable reporter. Graham's account differs considerably from the verifiable facts about the massacre. His story, in short, is probably unauthentic and certainly unreliable. Thus the only really useful first-hand account published long after the affray is that of Eashappie, a boy of twelve at the time of the massacre and an inhabitant of the ill-fated camp. The pathetic simplicity of his account is assisted to some extent by hindsight, but this appears to improve the story without embellishing the facts.[9]

The third and last category of evidence, and by far the most useful, is the first-hand testimony of contemporaries before and during the murder trials. One slender thread of this was woven before the massacre became a cause célèbre — the newspaper account inspired by the participants immediately after they

[6] P. F. Sharp, *Whoop-Up Country* (Minneapolis, 1955), 55-57. The shortcomings of Sharp's narrative stem not so much from obvious bias, as from a tendency to give the events a pace and pattern which, though appealing in a literary way, are frequently unjustified by the evidence. There are also careless errors — a French-Canadian is referred to as an "Anglo-Canadian", and a métis as a French-Canadian; references to a "large settlement of half-breeds" nearby are misleading, for they refer to a winter camp of indeterminate size some 25 miles away; and Sharp has the date of the massacre as May rather than June.

[7] John C. Duval is identified in the testimony of many witnesses at the Winnipeg Trial; his recollections were published in the Helena, Montana *Independent*, as "The Cypress Hills Massacre: A True Account", November 18, 1886. Notwithstanding the title, there is every reason to believe that Duval embroidered his account immensely.

[8] Published in the *Edmonton Journal*, March 29, 1924, reprinted with notes and commentary by H. A. Dempsey in *Montana Magazine of History*, Autumn, 1953, 1-9. Dempsey evades the issue of authenticity except to say that some members of the Benton party have never been identified, and that Isaac Cowie claimed one at least of the party "was an Englishman". But Graham shows no accurate knowledge of the terrain of the massacre ground, and he may well have been indulging in the honorable old-timers' sport of pulling the leg of a gullible editor. In any case, he offers no new information which would be of great use if proven authentic.

[9] D. Kennedy (Ochankugahe), *Recollections of an Assiniboine Chief*, ed. J. R. Stevens (Toronto-/Montreal, 1971), 42-47.



Department of Indian and Northern Affairs.

Farwell Post. View of the palisades of the reconstructed post.

returned to Montana.[10] In the weeks that followed, concerned individuals in Canada and the United States communicated the substance of what had happened to their governments, who agreed to do everything possible to apprehend, try and punish the offenders. This led in the first place to an effort to extradite five of the acknowledged participants from Montana; many valuable records of the extradition hearing have apparently not survived, but the local newspapers are full of shrill statements of support for the defendants, who were not as it turned out, surrendered to Canada.[11] The Canadians, however, had been conducting their own investigations and three more participants who were apprehended in the North-West in the summer of 1875, were committed for trial after preliminary hearings in Fort Macleod and Winnipeg,[12] and were tried and acquitted nine months later. Some of the investigators' notes and the transcripts of proceedings at the hearing and trial, have been preserved in the files of Lieutenant-Governor Morris, and United States Consul Taylor and in the newspapers, of the day.[13] Taken individually the various pieces of testimony are worth little; collectively, they piece together much of the tragic story of the unequal fight between the Assiniboine and the white men one hundred years ago.

Through the extraordinary tangle of evidence the historian must choose a path with care, and conclusions are no better than tentative. Nonetheless, there are reasons for trying again. Material is available which has not been exploited by earlier writers and there are obvious myths to be dispelled. The centennial of the affray invites a renewed interest in its origins and its outcome. These factors seem to warrant this further attempt to plough a field in which so many have already spent their effort.

In the centre of the Cypress Hills, a few miles east of the present boundary between Saskatchewan and Alberta, and forty miles north of the United States, the valley of what we now call Battle Creek cuts a deep trench through uneven terrain. At one point, a mile and a half below the junction of Spring Creek and Battle Creek, where Fort Walsh was built in 1875, the valley widens slightly to form a bowl. A small coulee winds up the bottom of a short but impressively-deep box canyon which angles up to the north-east. A tiny spring flows out of the hillside and empties itself into the creek 400 feet upstream from the mouth of

[10] *Daily Herald*, Helena, "Indians on the Horse Steal, Whites on the War Path", June 11, 1873. This highly imaginative account, reputedly obtained from one of the Benton party, alleges that the Indians were wiped out in cold blood at dawn, after they had challenged the whites, the day before, to a fight.

[11] Brief, and not necessarily reliable excerpts of the testimony, reports of mob activity and a wealth of commentary are expressed in the following newspapers: *Fort Benton Record*, June 26, 1875, July 24, 1875, and July 31, 1875; *Daily Herald*, Helena, June 30, 1875; *Helena Weekly Herald*, July 8, 1875, July 15, 1875, July 22, 1875, and July 29, 1875; *Bozeman Times*, July 6, 1875.

[12] The original transcripts have vanished but a copy of the Winnipeg hearing of George M. Bell was forwarded to the United States State Department by Taylor; see United States National Archives, Diplomatic Branch, Dispatch 219, September 22, 1875 to J. L. Cadwalader. The testimony given at this hearing was largely duplicated at the trial nine months later.

[13] A number of pieces are scattered at random throughout the Provincial Archives of Manitoba, (P.A.M.), collection of *Morris Papers* and are referred to below, *passim;* a hitherto untapped source is the series of five depositions collected in Montana in December, 1875, and two of which were presented as evidence to the trial in Winnipeg by Taylor, June 19. In the transcript of the Winnipeg trial only the witnesses' answers are given, but these were written up in such a way that the original questions may be reconstructed from the replies.

the coulee. It is a most attractive place, remarkable even in the striking scenery of the Cypress Hills, Here, a hundred feet from the creek between the spring and the coulee, Moses Solomon built his trading post in the fall of 1872. It confronted in friendly rivalry the post of Abel Farwell six hundred feet away on the other side of the creek.[14] The posts were well-located for their purpose, for throughout the winter and spring the rising ground which sloped away to the east of the river provided an ideal campsite for a succeşion of Cree and Assiniboine bands, just across the coulee from Solomon's.

The central figures of the tragedy are almost silent on the written record. Five of them gave their story to Inspector Irvine in 1875,[15] but the most extensive information on their origins and circumstances came from Eashappie, who survived the massacre. The main part of the Indian camp comprised thirty lodges of North Assiniboines whose chief was Manitupotis, known to the whites as Little Soldier. His band was the remnant of a party which had been driven south by starvation in the early part of the winter seeking the plentiful game and shelter which might be found in the Cypress Hills. The survivors of this desperate trek settled down to recuperate in the valley of Battle Creek, separated from Farwell's post by the fordable stream and from Solomon's by nothing more than the shallow coulee. The spot they had chosen had water, shelter, plenty of wood and the multiple attractions of the two trading posts — blankets, provisions, and the ever-present whisky. The latter item of trade had proved an attraction, yet a menace, to the Indians who had wintered there. It proved an even greater threat to the newcomers of Little Soldier's band, and the small bands which arrived afterwards; a number under Minashinayen, and thirteen lodges of Wood Mountain Assiniboine under Inihan Kinyen, Eashappie's father.[16]

The traders of the two forts were representatives of the commercial penetration of the Canadian north-west by Montana-based traders. On the west bank of the creek, Abel Farwell's irregular-shaped fort, palisaded with rudimentary bastions at two corners, housed the trading activities of Farwell and one or two other whites from Fort Benton. Across the stream Moses Solomon kept a similarly defended establishment.[17] Both men had come to the Cypress Hills from Fort Benton, and both drew supplies from the burgeoning T. C. Power and Brothers wholesale company. Much has been written in condemnation of the frontier Indian traders, but a balance ought to be struck between their own bombastic claims

[14] It has been suggested that Farwell was an agent of the T. C. Power and Brothers Company and that Solomon was an independent trader; the pattern of trade in the valley was not that simple, for Farwell and Solomon were both clients of the big Benton firm. Solomon had a trading partner named George M. Bell and there were at least two other traders, named Marshall and Petersen, living in a house attached to Fort Farwell. There is no evidence in the Power Bros. accounts or in the trial testimony to indicate that Farwell was an employee or an agent of Power. See *Winnipeg Trial,* examination of Abel Farwell, June 19, and cross-examination, June 20.

[15] P.A.M., *Morris Papers,* file 1177. The five are Miskotakikotena (The Man Who Took the Coat), Keeskesan (Cutter), Sitting Blue Horn, Apasteeninchaco, mother-in-law of Little Soldier, and Nakiuskemo (The Woman who eats Grizzly Bear), Little Soldier's wife.

[16] D. Kennedy (Ochankugahe), *op. cit.,* 44-46. He refers to the chief as Hunkajuka, 'Little Chief'. The contemporary usage is retained in this article because it appears in the quotations from all contemporary sources.

[17] For some details of the construction of Solomon's fort, see *Winnipeg Trial,* examination of G. M. Bell, June 21.

that they were an advance guard of civilization, and the abuse which had been heaped upon them by some writers. The frontier no doubt saw a larger and more hardened criminal element than might be met, for instance, in an ordinary Ontario town of the time; it is also true that the whisky traders were all, literally, law-breakers. They plied a trade which had become illegal in the North-West Territories in 1870, just as it was in Montana; but in Montana the law was enforced.[18] So they carted their whisky-barrels across the line to trade with the Indians of the Cypress Hills and the Rocky Mountain foothills, where hitherto the law had not preceded the spread of white settlement.

It is too easy, nonetheless, to exaggerate the wickedness of the frontiersman. The trade in which he engaged was illegal and inherently destructive to the native customer, but it was only the particularly hardened element who would regard extermination of Indians as a positive virtue. The traders did after all, have to maintain some sort of accommodation with the Indians in order to survive. Many of them were ex-soldiers dislocated by the civil war, middle-aged men who had failed to succeed in life in the east, or young men who came west to a more exciting and financially rewarding life than they could foresee in their old homes. So they went into trade and undertook to make money in the simplest and most profitable way, by trading hard liquor for skins.

The men in the forts on Battle Creek were a mixed lot. The bulk of them were Americans, some veterans of the Civil War and at least one a former infantryman with experience in fighting Indians. The trading parties included one or two Indian women, and a few métis — guides or interpreters who had drifted away from their own people into the service of the American commercial adventurers. There were also a number of Canadians;[19] the man who started the whole affair was a French Canadian (and so, probably, was the white man who died in it). The occupants of the trading forts, then, were a variegated collection of men, but had this in common — they were hard traders, principally concerned with their own interests and not always cautious in advancing or protecting them.

The whisky traders were sitting on a powder-keg and it is remarkable that little happened before the middle of April, when a war party passed by, stopped a few days at the winter camp near Solomon's, and then moved on, taking with them three horses belonging to Farwell and his guests. About the same time a white trader was killed by Indians, which must have stirred the traders' impatience to wind up their business and return to Benton with their winter's collection of furs, hides, and robes. It was, no doubt, with some relief that Abel Farwell rode off at the end of May with a friend and a whisky jug for company, to

[18] See S. W. Horrall, "Sir John A. Macdonald and the Mounted Police Force for the Northwest Territories", *Canadian Historical Review* LIII (1972), 185. He cites Sharp, *op. cit.*, 122.

[19] It is impossible to compile complete lists of the occupants of the two forts, but the following are the names of persons who definitely were there: Farwell lived with his wife, his interpreter Alexis Lebombard, and the latter's wife. Associated with them in various ways were the following: George Hammond with his family, Garry Bourke, James Marshall, Petersen, and Kerr. Solomon and his partner George Bell lived, of course, in Fort Solomon, along with Philander Vogle, Antonia G. Amei ('Clubfoot Tony'), John C. Duval, and John MacFarlane. Bell was the Infantry veteran — see his testimony at the Winnipeg trial, June 21.

Department of Indian and Northern Affairs.

Farwell Post. Interior view of the reconstructed post.

visit the métis camp a day's ride away. There he hired transportation to take his season's returns to Benton.[20] He was not, however, to get away without difficulties. His return to Fort Farwell coincided with the arrival of a small band of North Assiniboine, and also with the return of a horse which had been stolen in April. It had been seen by Indians who encountered the war party, learned the horse's history, and stole it back to return it to its owner George Hammond. He rewarded the Indian who brought it back with tobacco, a few trinkets, and two gallons of whisky.[21] The transaction would probably have been forgotten had it not been for the events of the next day.

The first hint of trouble came during the night, when two men slipped into the valley, scouted the Indian camp and then knocked on Farwell's door. Their names were John Evans and Thomas Hardwick; they belonged to the despised fraternity of men who hunted wolves with strychnine and they were probably horse thieves as well.[22] Their unheralded trip to the Cypress Hills stemmed from an incident two weeks before. Hardwick and Evans had been members of a party which wound up its winter activities in the Whoop-Up country and set out for Fort Benton in the middle of May, well-laden with skins and amply supplied with horses. A day's journey out of Benton they relaxed their vigilance overnight, and a band of Crees turned the tables on them by riding off with forty or more of their horses. They quickly stashed their furs in Benton and followed the Cree trail until they lost it in the Cypress Hills. Nearing Farwell's, the main body of about eleven men camped and sent Evans and Hardwick ahead to scout the camp of whatever Indians might be located near the trading posts. The search was fruitless; the camp had less than a dozen horses, and none of these belonged to the party from Benton. Evans and Hardwick, discouraged, dropped into Fort Farwell to complain of their unhappy situation.[23]

From this point on, the events of the Cypress Hills Massacre should no longer be woven into one tale. The trail of writers who have tried is littered with equivocations. The different parties to the affair had divergent interests and could hardly have agreed on a common version. Two distinct pictures, then, can be drawn from the testimony submitted to Canadian and America legal tribunals; a lurid story of wanton slaughter, or a tale of desperate and heroic self-defence culminating in victory, righteously earned. These two stories will be told here uncritically — the prosecution story from the mouths of Abel Farwell, his wife and his interpreter, and the defence story from the Hardwick gang and

[20] *Winnipeg Trial,* examination and cross-examination of Abel Farwell, June 19 and 20.
[21] *Ibid.,* examination of Alexis Lebombard, June 20.
[22] *Winnipeg Trial,* examination, June 19. Farwell stated that "I did not express any sympathy with them in the loss of their horses, with the exception of Hughes, their profession was stealing horses." This is corroborated by more independent testimony of the United States agent to the Crow Indians, Felix Bonnot, who reported that "the general reputation of Evans and Devereaux, two of the leaders of the party, is that of horse thieves and traders in whiskey to the Indians, and that the party was made up of persons of the worst class in the country." Bonnot to (?), August 5, 1873, copy enclosed in Thornton to Dufferin No. 29, August 23, 1873, P.A.C., *RG 7 G 6, loc. cit.* Vol. 24.
[23] See deposition of Trevanion Hale, December 15, 1875, P.A.C. *Taylor Papers,*and of John H. Evans, December 20, 1875, *ibid*. The party was made up of the following men: Hardwick, Evans, Travanion Hale, S. J. Harper, Elijah Jefferson Devereau, S. Vincent, Ed. Legrace (or Grace), Charles Smith, James Hughes, Joseph Lange, Xavier Faillon, and Charles Ladd.

one or two of Solomon's traders. There is a slim possibility that either of these versions could be wholly and literally true. But there is always the third route to follow — the painstaking business of stalking the facts which are concealed in an underbrush of lies, of searching for coincident testimony from antagonistic witnesses, and squeezing two fabrications until the truth jumps out from between them. This is the favorite sport of writers who hunt down the truth about the Cypress Hills Massacre, and there is room to indulge in that sport here.

When Evans and Hardwick knocked on Farwell's door, he invited them in and greeted them with some relief. (So begins the story for the defence.) The Indians, said Farwell, had been creating more and more difficulties for him, and he was afraid to go to the creek for water.[24] Farwell had feared his party might be "cleaned out" before they could leave their winter post. Could Evans and Hardwick help? The latter said they could. About dawn Evans rode back to the remainder of the Benton party and brought them to Farwell's. By eight o'clock they had pitched camp and were cooking breakfast. In the midst of this domestic scene, George Bell waded the creek from Solomon's trousers in hand to see who these newcomers might be. He told the Benton party that "Solomon wanted some of us to go over to his fort, as the Indians were liable to clean him out, and were very hostile."[25] After breakfast, a few members of the party crossed over to Solomon's where they were told further hair-raising accounts of how the Indians were taking shots through the windows of the post and making regular threats to kill all its occupants. After hearing these stories the Benton party returned to its temporary camp to sleep.

About four in the afternoon these innocent slumbers were disrupted by a furious Farwell, gun in hand, who complained that one of his horses had been stolen, and asked the Benton gang to join him in recovering it: "Farwell said that if we would all go the Indians would give up the horse without any trouble." A few demurred, but the bulk of the party followed Farwell across the creek, through the coulee and into the Indian camp. They soon wished they hadn't. The Indians were not going to be impressed by a show of force and made threatening gestures. Although "it appeared that a few of the Indians did not want to fight," others apparently did, and when a threatening shot went through the hat of a Benton man,[26] the remainder hastened to take shelter in the coulee. Farwell tried to talk the Indians out of fighting, then turned and on the pretext of going for his interpreter left the whites to their fate. Fortunately, according to the defence, sober men with repeating rifles were more than a match against the effects of antiquated firearms "and drunken savages."

[24] The main sources for this account are the following: first, depositions of François Desgarlat, Louis Bellegarde, Trevanion Hale, and Laula Doney (John Daunais?), December 15, 1875, and John Evans, December 20, 1875, P.A.C. *Taylor Papers;* second, an account by one of the party printed in the *Fort Benton Record,* June 26, 1875; third, the evidence at the Winnipeg trial, June 21.

[25] Deposition of T. Hale, *loc. cit.*

[26] Deposition of John Evans, *loc. cit.*

The prosecution testimony was marked by a similar story of an unprovoked, murderous attack.[27] In this version, however, Farwell appeared as an honest broker between angry whites and suspicious frightened Indians. When Evans and Hardwick first came to his fort by night, he did not sympathize with them for the horses they had lost, since he suspected they had stolen them in the first place. He did, however, grumblingly suggest that they bring the rest of the men in for something to eat. During the day the party at Fort Farwell paid little attention to the visitors; some were hurrying to finish packing the freighters' carts; others, including Hammond, were drinking. About midday Hammond burst out of the fort complaining loudly that his horse had been stolen again. His vociferous cursing attracted the attention of the Benton party, who agreed with him that they must teach the Indians a lesson by seizing their horses; some of the whites talked menacingly of cleaning out the Assiniboines completely. Farwell scoffed at first — surely this was nothing more than bravado; but he grew concerned, tried to calm Hammond, and assured him that if the Indians had wanted his horse they would never have brought it back the day before. At any rate, Farwell said, he would go to the Indian camp and arrange to take two of the Assiniboine's horses as surety until Hammond's should be found. Farwell set off on this peace-making mission but was followed, after more discussion, by Hammond and the Benton party. One of the lesser Indian chiefs willingly agreed to deliver two of his own horses until Hammond's should be found, but by this time the Benton party had taken up a most menacing position in the coulee. While the Indians demanded in some anxiety what this meant, one of the men in the coulee called out to Farwell to move away, or he would be killed. Farwell ignored this, feeling reasonably safe amongst the Indians, then the men called a third time, "Come out or you'll get killed as we're going to fire." Farwell told the Indians to scatter and hurried back to the coulee, explained the deal he had made with the chief, and told the men to control their tempers until he could get his interpreter to confirm what he had said. Evans promised to hold fire, but as Farwell moved away Hammond began to shoot. Firing became general on both sides; men came out of Solomon's post and appeared on the roof, firing into the camp. The Indians fled into the bushes all around, many of them crossing the creek and sheltering in the thick brush opposite the mouth of the coulee. Men who could fight carried their guns to cover and emerged briefly to shoot at the whites. The firing was over in about half an hour, at the end of which time some of the more degenerate whites sacked the camp, killing the few men they found there and carrying the women off to Solomon's. The head of Little Soldier, the principal chief, was severed from his body and erected on a lodge-pole. Meanwhile, Lebombard's servant brought Hammond's horse into the fort; it had been grazing on the hill behind the fort. Farwell told the whites to let the scattered Indians flee, but Hardwick snapped "No, we've started in, and we'll clean them all out if we can." Then he and four others rode up the hill, around Farwell's post, to drive out some Indians hidden on the hillside. The Indians drove the Hardwick party back down the hill, whereupon

[27] The major source of prosecution testimony is in the examination of Abel Farwell, Alexis Lebombard, and Mary Farwell at the Winnipeg trial.

a few whites left off sacking the camp to support Hardwick. This party unwittingly tried to cross the creek where a few Indians were still hidden; one of these shot the leader of the relief group, Ed Legrace, through the heart. That, as Farwell said, ended the fight.[28] The whites regrouped to bury their dead and the remaining Indians were permitted to slip away into the hills.

Fortunately, these two conflicting stories do not stand alone. They can, in the first place, be contrasted against each other. Where both sides tell the same story they are likely correct; the immediate cause of the massacre, then, was the disappearance of Hammond's horse and the Benton party's decision to join the effort to recover the animal from the Indians. There is also the evidence of a number of witnesses, nominally examined on behalf of one side or the other, who told a relatively unbiased story. Lebombard's testimony should be considered quite reliable, for he refused to perjure himself on important points where his testimony might have confirmed Farwell's and aided the prosecution tremendously — but he refused to say who started the firing and would not positively identify any of the accused. Paul Sharp has already pointed to the importance of the métis witnesses at the Winnipeg trial; but he evidently did not see the statements of the Indian witnesses who told their experiences to Inspector Irvine in 1875. A copy of their testimony is preserved in the Morris Papers in the Provincial Archives of Manitoba.[29] These statements, not surprisingly, contain evidence which helps bring the whole episode into focus.

It was most imprudent of Farwell to invite Evans and Hardwick to bring their friends down to the fort for breakfast. Though Farwell himself had treated the Indians reasonably well and had little to fear from them,[30] their existed a very real danger that the Benton party, enraged as they were against Indians in general, would be embroiled in some dispute with the Assiniboine. The latter had got their hands on a good deal of whisky and were living on the brink of hostilities with Solomon.[31] As the day went on, the festivities at the Indian camp grew noisier and more obvious as the unfortunate natives danced around the camp. Many of their leaders, including Little Soldier and his family, were incapacitated by early afternoon.[32] Where they got the whisky is unclear, but Solomon may well have given it to them to stave off the attack which he feared. As it happened, it was not Solomon's party who brought on the fight but the inhabitants of Farwell's post. When George Hammond [33] came roaring out of Fort Farwell

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[28] *Winnipeg Trial*, examination of Farwell, June 19.

[29] See above, note 15.

[30] Great uncertainty exists as to the reliability of Farwell as a witness, and the extent of his dealings in the illegal whisky trade, which he denied. Nonetheless, he was allowed to pass unmolested into and out of the Assiniboine encampment moments before the fight: this strongly suggests that he was on reasonably good terms with the Indians.

[31] See the Indian depositions, *loc. cit.;* also Eashappie's narrative in D. Kennedy, *loc. cit.*

[32] See deposition of Apasteeninchaco, Little Soldier's mother-in-law; "I was asleep, drunk, on being awakened by my sister and daughter I heard my Son-in-law 'Little Soldier' say, I will die here." Eshappie said that "That morning whiskey flowed like water in the camps and by mid-day the tribesmen were hopelessly drunk." *loc. cit.*, p. 45.

[33] The Benton party claimed that it was Farwell, not Hammond, who elicited help, but this appears to be part of their effort to discredit the former's testimony. One of the more nearly neutral defence witnesses, Baptiste Champagne, said in his testimony at the Winnipeg trial, June 21, that it was Farwell. Lebombard, June 20 said the same.

cursing about a stolen horse, it was only natural for the Benton gang to start sympathizing with him, and to offer to help him retrieve his lost property. There was no hasty rush to the Indian camp, however, for the men gathered their guns — mostly the latest models of Winchester and Henry repeating rifles—[34] and prepared to move across the creek, while Farwell hurried over ahead to try to patch things up before they got there.

Even in this threatening state of affairs, all might have gone well had not one or two of the métis present seen these belligerent preparations and gone to the Indian camp to give the alarm.[35] The Assiniboine were ill-prepared to meet an attack. Many were totally drunk, and the remainder, in varying degrees of sobriety, were sorely divided on what sort of reception they should give the American party.[36] A few, including the chief to whom Farwell spoke, still hoped to smooth things out without recourse to arms; but the unnamed métis, in their own fear, had spread an uncontrollable panic through the camp. Women, children and dogs scattered in all directions; a few Indians, hot-headed or alarmed, started to strip as if for a fight. Two horses which Hammond took hold of were forcibly taken back by an Indian named Bighead, and Hammond rejoined the Benton gang who were now waiting truculently in the coulee for the outcome of Farwell's negotiations. As the talk concluded, some of the Assiniboine men, braver, more intoxicated, or more foolish than the rest, brandished their arms and fired shots at random into the air.[37] The Benton party saw ample cause to take full advantage of the shelter of the coulee and lay a murderous fire through the camp.

[34] *Winnipeg Trial,* examination of Abel Farwell, June 19. There is no adequate report of what arms the Indians had, but only one of the defence witnesses tried to claim that the Assiniboine had repeating rifles. See deposition of Laula Doney, December 15, 1875, P.A.C. *Taylor Papers* . These weapons had been traded by American traders to the Blackfoot, but the latter were enemies of the Assiniboine, so there is no clear evidence that Little Soldier's band had anything better than muzzle-loading muskets.

[35] These unidentified métis do not appear in the secondary literature on the massacre but there is ample evidence to believe they did carry a warning to the Indians very shortly before the fighting broke out. Their role in the massacre is important, even decisive. See the deposition of Miskotakikotena, *loc. cit.,* "A halfbreed came to the camp with an American [i.e. Hammond] who had a revolver in his hand"; deposition of Keeskesan, *loc. cit.,* "There were two (2) half-breeds in a lodge they told me they thought we would not live to 'Sundown' and for 'God's sake' not to go out . . . but to keep down on the ground." This testimony was also confirmed by another Indian who did not make a detailed statement of his own. ("The Sitting Blue Horn", *ibid.)* Nakiuskemo stated, "I was at the camp near Farwell's Fort, after the half-breeds came to warn us of our danger, I ran off with my little boy towards the timber." This was not the first warning the Indians received that day — Eashappie recalled (*op. cit.,* p. 45) that his father had been told, at the trading post, that the Benton party were looking for trouble; but one of his band persuaded the rest not to break camp that day.

[36] Not even the defence insisted that the Indians had prepared a mass attack; see note 26, above, for Evans' remark that "a few of the Indians did not want to fight". Mary Farwell said at the Winnipeg trial (June 20) that while Farwell was talking to the chief an Indian aimed a gun, which was immediately taken from him by another Indian.

[37] Most witnesses apparently did not see Hammond slip around and attempt to escape with two horses, but the incident is described in detail by Mary Farwell (June 20) and in the deposition of Miskotakikotena, *loc. cit.* The métis witnesses at the Winnipeg trial (June 21) are the source for the information that the Indians fired first, but not at the whites; only Farwell swore unequivocally that the first shot was fired by a white, Hammond.

The Indians had obviously not planned to fight that day.[38] They were at a severe disadvantage in terms of leadership, position, and sophistication of weapons. They were probably more intoxicated than their enemy, and even in the moment when their danger appeared greatest they were badly divided over whether to fight or not. It is hardly surprising that the whites were able without a single casualty to drive the Indians out of their encampment and to wreck it completely. It was a fight only in the sense that the Indians probably, unwittingly provoked the slaughter and later from concealment tried to avenge it. The usual description of the affray as a "massacre" is appropriate.

Only when the Indians had scattered did the whites grow careless and suffer a casualty. Many of them swept through the camp, pulling up lodge-pins and shooting or kidnapping (according to sex) the handful of occupants. One of these was Wankantu, an old man, who was clubbed to death and his mutilated body raised as a grim trophy for the conquerors of the band.[39] Hardwick, meanwhile, led a small mounted party across the creek and moved up behind Farwell's fort to clear away a few Indians who were still hiding in the bushes by the stream. Hardwick's incautious gesture led to his repulse, and to the even more foolhardy rescue effort by Legrace, which resulted in his death. The Benton and Solomon men then retreated to Solomon's post to bury their dead, and to spend a riotous night raping the Indian women.[40]

Farwell asked the Benton party to stay one more night; he had not quite finished packing, and he did not want to risk being attacked by any Indians who might be in the hills waiting to wreak revenge on any white man.[41] The next day his cart-train moved off, leaving behind the smouldering ruins of the Indian camp and of the two trading posts, the latter ignited by some unknown hand to prevent the Indians from burning it. Solomon's party abandoned the area about the same time. All but two of the Benton party continued on their fruitless search for their missing horses.[42]

Once the participants and witnesses reached Fort Benton they lost little time in spreading word of the incident. A report of it appeared in the *Helena Daily Herald,* a twisted version gleaned third-hand from one of the Benton party. It bore little resemblance to what actually happened, but did contain the two essential elements — a show of hostility and bravado on the part of the Indians, and a swift retributive assault by the whites. The extent of Indian casualties was grossly, even boastfully exaggerated.[43]

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[38] Farwell said during cross-examination at the Winnipeg trial (June 20) "Nothing in camp appeared to me as though they were preparing for an attack." This is borne out by Eashappie's description of that morning.

[39] The identity of the butchered Indian is unclear, many sources saying that it was Little Soldier himself. The Indian accounts, notably by Eashappie and Miskotakikotena, indicate that it was not the chief but an "old man". Whatever the identity of the victim, this grotesque detail is affirmed by both Farwell and Lebombard in their testimony at the Winnipeg trial (June 19 and 20). The Indian population on the plains had no monopoly on savagery if one may believe even a tenth of the material presented in the recent study by D. Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West* (New York, 1971).

[40] P.A.M., *Morris Papers,* No. 1177. The two women who gave depositions to Major Irvine both claimed to have been taken, with three other women and a baby, to Solomon's. This was corroborated by the Farwells at the Winnipeg trial (June 20).

[41] *Winnipeg Trial,* cross-examination of Farwell, June 20.

[42] *Helena Daily Herald,* June 11, 1873.

[43] *Ibid.*

Far different was the account given by Abel Farwell when he visited a United States Indian agent with Garry Bourke a few weeks after the massacre. Agent A. J. Simmons reported in outraged tones to his superiors that a gang from Fort Benton had entered British territory and there "attacked a camp of 40 lodges of peaceful Assiniboines attached to this agency, who were almost entirely defenceless, and killed 16 of their number, men, women, and children, and mutilated their bodies in a most outrageous and disgusting manner."[44] Since there was no doubt that the incident had taken place on British soil[45] American authorities in Washington declined to investigate the matter but turned over every available piece of information to the British Minister, Sir Edward Thornton.[46] The United States at this time never officially referred to Canada — it was 'British America' or 'those provinces'. This attitude had disappeared before the Cypress Hills case was finally closed.

The investigation got off to a false start in the fall of 1873 when the Canadian government instructed Gilbert McMicken, a distinguished factotum in several Dominion offices at Winnipeg and one of the Dominion Police Commissioners, to go to Fort Benton, investigate the reports of the massacre which had meanwhile reached Lieutenant-Governor Morris, through métis reports which he forwarded to the Department of the Interior, and arrange to extradite any of the guilty parties who could be found. McMicken failed to reach Benton before the Missouri froze over, and was instructed in the spring to turn over his warrants to Commissioner French of the newly-formed Mounted Police.[47] The matter languished in French's hands until 1875, when Major A. G. Irvine of the Dominion Militia was given a commission in the Mounted Police and ordered to help Assistant-Commissioner Macleod take the investigation in hand.[48]

For two years the participants in the Cypress Hills Massacre had gone unpunished, unapprehended, and their whereabouts was no secret. It was relatively easy, therefore, for Irvine to have five of them arrested by American federal authorities and brought before a special tribunal in Helena, Montana, where United States Commissioner W. E. Cullen was to rule on whether or not they should be extradited. The chief prosecution witness was Abel Farwell,

[44] P.A.C., *RG 7 G 6*, Vol. 24. A. J. Simmons to (?) copy enclosed in Thornton to Dufferin No. 27, August 21, 1873.

[45] The Bentonites tried to argue at the time that the location of the border was in doubt, that American military authorities had encouraged them to try to recover their horses, and that it was therefore most unfair to consider sending them before a foreign court. (*Fort Benton Record*, June 26, 1875). A number of historians (e.g. H. Dempsey, *loc. cit.*, p. 1) have slipped into this trap. In fact, there was no doubt that the Cypress Hills were in British North America — otherwise Farwell, Solomon and their type would have been more cautious about trading there! The *Daily Herald*, Helena, within two weeks of the massacre, reported that it had taken place "within the British borders", and the secretary of the Board of Indian Commissioners in Bozeman, Montana, immediately recognized that the affray had taken place beyond American jurisdiction. T. R. Cox to E. P. Smith, July 26, 1873, enclosed in Thornton to Dufferin No. 27, *loc. cit.*

[46] The Montana dispatches went through the United States Indian Bureau, Justice Department and State Department before they were referred to Sir Edward Thornton, the British Minister. See Thornton to Dufferin No. 27, August 21, 1873, and No. 29, August 23, 1873, *loc. cit.*, and Dufferin to Thornton, September 10, 1873, P.A.C., *RG 7 G 11*, Vol. 2.

[47] A useful if rather tedious memorandum detailing the Canadian government's investigation of the matter was drafted by the Department of Justice in April, 1874, and updated by Justice Minister Fournier a year later. A copy is in the P.A.M., *Morris Papers*, file 997.

[48] J. P. Turner, *History of the North-West Mounted Police* 1873-1893 (Ottawa, 1950), I, 217.



Department of Indian and Northern Affairs.

Farwell Post. Interior view of the reconstructed post.

while the defence consisted primarily of efforts to prove that Farwell was a known liar. Since Indians were held in rather low esteem in Montana and men who could claim to have killed a few were a species of local hero, there was little difficulty in finding a good number of witnesses to swear that Farwell was a notorious swindler and perjurer.[49] The community of Helena was much excited by the affair, and a number of Fenians in the territory, including J. J. Donnelly, leader of the abortive raid on Manitoba in 1871, were prominent amongst the agitators. There was enormous popular acclaim, then, when Commissioner Cullen declared that the case for the prosecution was far from proven. In particular he was not convinced that the slaughter was premeditated by the whites. He refused to permit the extradition, but his words indicate the depth of his disapproval of what the Benton party had done. Although there was some evidence that the Indians fired first and no proof that the white assault was premeditated, "it was sheer folly and wantonness on their [i.e. the whites] part, but if they went for no other purpose than that of intimidation, it amounted to no more than an aggravated trespass, and the killing at most was but manslaughter."[50]

So five participants in the massacre were officially exculpated, in the United States at least, for their role in the killing. Imagine the indignation in Montana, then, when it was learned that the Mounted Police had arrested two members of the Solomon party and one of the Benton gang on Canadian soil, and had conveyed them to Winnipeg to stand trial for murder. The particularly vexing aspect of it was that witnesses who might testify for the defence, namely the rest of the Benton party, could not appear in Winnipeg for fear of being arrested for the same crime. Although they seemed quite confident that their testimony would acquit Vogle, Bell and Hughes, none of the witnesses in Montana cared to risk standing trial with them, being "arrested by the same officers [and] chained in the same den which holds the men whom we can prove innocent."[51] The Canadian government, much to the great irritation of the American government and Sir Edward Thornton, refused to grant these witnesses a safe-conduct to appear at the trial, and quashed all ideas of a rogatory commission to hear admissible evidence on the American side of the frontier. The prisoners were committed

[49] Farwell's honesty no longer appears very important, for a story reasonably close to the one he gave can be constructed from other sources. The question was highly relevant, though, at the trials, It is difficult to assess the value of the testimony which the defence marshalled to 'prove' Farwell was a notorious liar, and had changed his story of the massacre several times. Nonetheless, it is suggestive that between July 1873 and June, 1876, his memory "improved" in regard to names and details of behaviours. Sharp suggests that Farwell's "employer", the T. C. Power Company, might have paid him to cast a slur on the names of Hardwick and Co., who were formerly associated with the rival I. G. Baker concern. This was also, according to Sharp, the view of Consul Taylor. (Sharp, *op. cit.*, 58-59). This does not appear wholly plausible, since anything which drew attention to the bad effects of the whisky-trade was bound, in the relatively short run, to stir the Canadian government to actions prejudicial to all the American traders in the north-west. Moreover, the whole question of Farwell's relation to the Power Co. needs to be clarified by further research. Sharp's other evidence for Farwell's allegedly changed story is the 1874 deposition of John Wells, which on close examination proves a worthless source, gravely inconsistent with other accounts of the massacre; moreover, Wells' claim to have spoken to Farwell a few days after the massacre is, in context, patently untrue.

[50] Cullen's remarks were printed in the *Helena Weekly Herald*, July 29, 1875.

[51] Trevanion Hale to Governor B. F. Potts of Montana, September 28, 1875, printed in *ibid*, October 7, 1875. The Canadian refusal to guarantee safe passage to these witnesses is displayed in a series of correspondence between Sir Edward Thornton and the Canadian Administrator, Lt. Gen. W. O. G. Haly KCB, for which see P.A.C., *RG 7 G 6, loc. cit.*, Vol. 24.

in September for trial at the June assizes. The trial took less than four days and the prosecution's evidence foundered on the same rocks which had upset the extradition attempts. Farwell's evidence was suspect. It was further undermined when Lebombard offered the opinion that Farwell had little command of Indian languages and could not have communicated with the Indian chief while the Benton men were in the coulee. As Farwell's interpreter, Lebombard ought to have known.[52] Only Farwell would positively contradict the defence claim that Hughes had not crossed the creek with his Benton associates or that the men firing from Fort Solomon were definitely Bell and Vogle. Half-breed witnesses brought from the Cypress Hills at government expense were approached before the trial by spokesmen for the defence[53] and instead of giving evidence for the Crown, they testified that the Indians had definitely fired first, though not necessarily at the party in the coulee.

Chief Justice Wood did his best to secure a conviction, reminding the jury that on the specific charge — the murder of Little Soldier — it was necessary only to find that his killing had been murder, and that the prisoners (or any one of them, for they entered separate pleas) had been acting in unison with the group responsible for the murder. There were enough loop-holes that the jury found the three not guilty; premeditation was far from being proved, especially when Farwell admitted under cross-examination that "I do not think there would have been any shooting if the horse had been brought in." Trial on the other two charges was postponed indefinitely, and the men were allowed to leave custody on their own recognizances.[54] Early in 1882, the American consul was able to persuade the provincial attorney-general to enter writs of *nolle prosequi* on all charges.[55] The case was now closed — except for the historians.

One of the most enduring traditions about the massacre concerns its alleged influence on the Dominion government's decision to create the North-West Mounted Police. The tradition exists in many forms, of which the most blunt is that offered by Wallace Stegner.[56] He wrote boldly that the "exaggerated and lurid story" of the massacre reached Ottawa, caused "a fury of public feeling," and made certain that Parliament would pass a bill then before it creating the Mounted Police. This is pure legend; there was no expression of public fury, partly because Canadian political passions were fully engaged in the Pacific Scandal, but chiefly because North-West affairs were of scant interest to most newspapers east of Winnipeg. Even *The Globe,* an old champion of western expansion, made no mention of the massacre when news first reached the east at the end of August. The greater flaw in Stegner's version is that the Mounted Police, though not organized until the end of the summer, had actually been authorized by a Dominion statute, several days *before* massacre took place.

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[52] *Winnipeg Trial, loc. cit.,* examination of Lebombard, June 20.
[53] This is referred to by Sharp, *op. cit.,* 76.
[54] *Winnipeg Trial,* June 21.
[55] J. W. Taylor to J. H. Evans, March 20, 1882, P.A.C., *Taylor Papers.* It is not apparent whether Evans ever paid Taylor the "substantial recognition" for which the consul delicately hints in this letter.
[56] W. Stegner, *op. cit.,* 80.

On the other extreme, S. W. Horrall has recently suggested that Sir John Macdonald had the force constituted by order-in-council at the end of August, but had no immediate plans to act on the order. Then, Horrall continues, reports from Washington brought the massacre to the government's attention early in September, and prompted Macdonald to take steps he might otherwise never have had time to accomplish. Other writers are much less definite. J. P. Turner, for instance, simply remarked that "The massacre . . . had much to do with speeding up the organization of the North-West Mounted Police in that same year."[57]

Turner is vague enough that he may be correct, but the exact sequence of affairs is impossible to reconstruct from the tangled evidence now at hand. On August 27th, 1873, Sir John Macdonald presented to a near-empty Cabinet chamber a draft order-in-council creating the Mounted Police; the next day the government's organ in the capital, the *Ottawa Daily Citizen,* declared that "The Mounted Police Force for Manitoba is to be organized immediately." It was not until the next day that the same paper broke the news of the Cypress Hills Massacre to an audience already saturated with crises; the editorial in which the *Citizen* condemned the massacre is worth noticing:

> If the Republic cannot teach its subjects to respect law it is time that the Dominion should . . . Vigorous action on the part of our government in this direction may save us future trouble not only from the lawless citizens of the neighbouring country, but also from the North West Indians who will not be slow to defend themselves if the Dominion Government should appear to them incapable or unwilling to afford them protection. The organizing of the Mounted Police Force, which, as we announced yesterday, will be commenced at once, may prevent a repetition of the disgraceful scene to which our despatch from Fort Garry refers.

If the newspaper reports accurately reflect the sequence of events, then the government was publicly committed to organizing the force "immediately", even before it knew of the massacre. This is probably true.

On the other hand, mention should be made of evidence which, though not referred to by the writers named above, might be cited in defence of the traditional story. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Territories may have sent news of the massacre to Ottawa by telegraph in time to come to Macdonald's attention some time on August 27. There is no clear confirmation that this telegram was actually received or read at Ottawa on the 26th or 27th; moreover, the Minister of the Interior Alexander Campbell wrote to Morris from Ottawa on the 28th, and made no mention whatever of a telegram or of a massacre. This strongly suggests that the government, or at least the minister responsible for the Territories, had no knowledge of the massacre until after the government was publicly committed to organizing the police.

Perhaps a clue to the true sequence of events may be found in the political climate of the times. Sir John Macdonald had informed Morris, in the spring of 1873, that the force would be in the North-West by the following spring. At the end of May, 1873, Macdonald promised a commission in the force to

[57] S. W. Horrall, *op. cit.,* 192-194; J. P. Turner, *op. cit.,* Vol. I, 227-228.

at least one applicant, J. M. Walsh. During the summer, Morris continued to bombard Macdonald and Campbell with requests for the immediate organization of the police, and with statements of the deteriorating condition of the Territories, especially the "Whoop-Up country." Campbell eventually proposed to Cabinet, early in August, that the government should send a large body of militia to Fort Whoop-Up. This proposal was based on a misreading of one of Morris' long despatches, and it would have been ruinously expensive and of very limited use. It was accordingly turned down by the ministers. It was probably at this time, however, that Macdonald began seriously to plan his order-in-council for the police force. His summer's schedule had been shattered by the proceedings surrounding the Pacific Scandal, but an opportunity to sweep aside a good deal of routine business was presented by the hiatus between the prorogation of Parliament on August 13, and the opening of a Royal Commission inquiry on the scandal on September 2. All these factors should be considered: Macdonald's intention to organize the force before the spring of 1874, the increasing pressure from Morris, and Campbell's own grave appreciation of affairs, all suggest that Macdonald would have prepared the order-in-council towards the end of August regardless of other circumstances.

Moreover, Macdonald presented his recommendation on August 27 to an almost empty Council chamber; it is doubtful that he would have done this if the creation of the police had not been expected and agreed to in principle by the absent ministers.[58] There is no positive evidence that the prime minister was ignorant of the massacre when he launched the police force; but even if he did know, the context of events suggests that the massacre would have been only the last in a series of factors which had already brought the government to the brink of the course which it actually did follow.

The discovery of further primary sources might modify this conclusion, but at present it seems safest to assume that the organization of the Mounted Police proceeded according to a plan worked out in advance, and that the arrival of news of the massacre at about the same time was coincidental.[59] On the basis

[58] See *The Globe,* August 27-29, 1873, "Latest From Ottawa"; by the 28th there were reported to be only two ministers in Ottawa. Since Macdonald considered Morris as something of an alarmist, it is most unlikely that he would have taken unexpected steps on the basis of a single telegram, in the absence of most of his cabinet, without waiting for the full explanations which arrived from Morris early in September.

[59] This is a brief summary of the major arguments in a highly complicated question. Apart from sources mentioned in the text, there is a considerable amount of material on the events immediately surrounding the birth of the Mounted Police; but none of it provides an unambiguous answer to the questions presented here. *The Globe* provides interesting background but ignores the massacre and the origins of the police force. Two important sets of records are hitherto relatively untouched by historians; one is the 1873 records of the North-West Mounted Police, uncatalogued and filed amongst the records of the Deputy Minister of Justice at the P.A.C., *RG 13.* The other source, P.A.C.: *RG 9 II B 1,* Vols. 520-521, Letterbooks of Acting Adjutant-General Powell of the Dominion militia. Virtually the first duty assigned to Powell in this acting capacity was to assist Hugh Richardson of the Department of Justice in the actual organization of the force. Various memoranda in the police records show that the Department spent some time during the summer of 1873 compiling a list of potential officers of the force, many of whom were subsequently appointed. Major Walsh was promised an appointment on May 28. (Police Records, *loc. cit.,* file 26). The following well-known sources also shed light, sometimes conflicting in tone, on the various aspects of the question: P.A.C.: *Macdonald Papers,* Vol. 523, Macdonald to Morris, May 19, 1873 and to Lord Dufferin September 9, 1873 and September 14, 1873. There is considerable correspondence between Morris and Campbell available either at the P.A.M. or on microfilm at the P.A.C. A very useful collection of Morris' official papers is also available at the P.A.M.

of evidence now in hand the only safe connexion to make between the massacre and the organization of the police concerns the decision on September 24 to send half the force to Manitoba immediately for training. This was prompted by Morris' panic-stricken appeals for help, which at last occasioned Macdonald's famous, cynical remark in one of his regular letters to Dufferin:

> Morris is getting very uneasy. . . . The massacre of the Indians by the Americans has greatly excited the red men. . . . It would not be well for us to take the risk of slighting Morris' repeated and urgent entreaties. If anything went wrong the blame would lie at our door. I shall hurry the men off at once.

A further legend is attached to the massacre which rests on a narrow base but a more solid one than the story concerning the origins of the Mounted Police. This is the tradition that the government's firm handling of the massacre, and its evident intention of treating as murder the killing of any Indian, greatly impressed the natives and facilitated the peaceful settlement of the Canadian plains.[60] Though true, this ought not to be exaggerated. The relatively easy occupation of the Canadian plains, in comparison to the more violent American experience, was due to a number of complex factors of which the massacre was only one. Aside from the Hudson's Bay Company, which depended for its operations on the Indians, the white occupants of the Canadian plains arrived on the scene well behind their United States counterparts; by the 1870's the Americans had more than sufficient cause to consider their own Indian policy a failure, but they had in the meantime bred a frontier population which regarded the punitive military or vigilante expedition as a normal and necessary aspect of a healthy Indian policy.[61] Canada was not wedded to such a notion, and neither were the settlers who entered the plains from eastern Canada. The Dominion approached the Indian question from a position of weakness rather than from a position of assumed power. Canadian settlers came from a society which prided itself, rightfully or not, on a moral superiority to its more materialistic and vulgar southern neighbours. Finally, the experiences of the Hudson's Bay Company over a century's dealings with the plains Indians helped to shape the approach to those natives by the Canadian government, and the regular use of métis as intermediaries, whether one is looking at treaty negotiations, the boundary survey, or the early operations of the Mounted Police, all contributed to a smoother transition from the era of the bison to the age of the railway and the grain elevator.

The wide divergence between the American plains experience and that which the Dominion government hoped to foster is what was really on trial with Hughes and Vogel and Bell in Winnipeg, and it goes a long way to explain the pious remarks which the *Free Press* made about the "murderers."[62] The trial was

[60] G. Shepherd, *Brave Heritage,* 16; Sharp, *op. cit.,* 77.

[61] This viewpoint is clearly expressed in a resolution passed at a meeting reported in the *Bozeman Times,* July 6, 1875; ironically, while the Canadian authorities were concerned about the opinion the Indians would hold of Canadian law enforcement, the Montana frontiersmen had their own feelings on the same issue; they believed that lives and property would no longer be safe from Indian depredations if Hardwick and Company were punished.

[62] The *Manitoba Free Press,* September 20, 1875, alleged that the prisoner Bell "has probably been educated at Benton and thereabouts, to believe that the killing of a few Indians is only what is expected of him, as his mite of assistance towards the march of civilization".

a regular legal proceeding; it was also a propaganda exercise, part of the painstaking process of winning the confidence of the natives. This business had begun in the treaty negotiations at Red River in 1871 and pushed westward in advance of the treaty commissioners and well in advance of the settlers when Commissioner French moved to quell the whisky trade of the Whoop-Up country in 1874 and the Cypress Hills in 1875. The massacre did, as the old tradition urges, play a role in the peaceful settlement of the west. Lieutenant-Governor Morris said as much in his annual message to the North-West Council in 1875:

> You called attention to the necessity of steps being taken to punish the actors in the Cypress Hills tragedy, and your recommendation has been acted upon by the Privy Council, with the best effect, as regards the Indian population.[63]

The Cypress Hills tragedy is unique in the drama of Western Canadian history — the first and last such slaughter of Indians by a party of whites in conditions of complete anarchy. The real significance of the massacre lay, however, not in its uniqueness nor even in the amount of fodder it has delivered to historians and journalists. The government's handling of the massacre proclaimed what the actions of the wolfers seemed to deny, that the law ought to concern itself with persons, not with races.

P. Goldring

[63] P.A.C.: *MG 9 G 1*, 31. Minutes of the Council of the North-West Territories, November 23, 1875.

Religious Reactions to the Ku Klux Klan in Saskatchewan

IN THE TURBULENT YEARS following the first world war, the Ku Klux Klan in the United States decided to extend its "invisible empire" into Canada. Although the Klan originated in the deep south, by 1923 its "center and source of greatest power" was in the older Northwest.[1] In May 1923 a survey of Klan memberships revealed that Indiana claimed 294,000, Ohio 300,000, and Illinois 131,000; while other Midwestern states had memberships ranging from 30,000 to 75,000.[2] It was not surprising therefore that the order should spread its tentacles even farther north — beyond the 49th parallel.

The first attempt to organize in Canada, it seems, began in Montreal in September 1921. "The famous Ku Klux Klan is organizing in Montreal," reported the *Montreal Daily Star,* "A branch of the organization is already in existence, but has not, as yet, become a chartered branch of the mother body of the 'Invisible Empire".[3] Next to be organized was British Columbia in 1922,[4] followed by the Maritimes and Ontario in 1923,[5] and by the end of 1926 the Klan had penetrated Manitoba, Alberta and Saskatchewan.[6]

Although the Klan was organized in most of the provinces in Canada by 1926, feeding on traditions of prejudice that were not new in the nation, it never met with spectacular success. But in the period 1927-1930 Saskatchewan became the scene of the Klan's greatest impact in Canada.[7] The social composition of the province suited well the preaching of Anglo-Saxon superiority by the Klansmen: a large majority of British stock, a French minority campaigning for cultural rights, and enough 'aliens', of whom the majority was ignorant and afraid, to permit the stirring up of prejudice. Politically, the time and place also was right with four political issues — the language question, the sectarian issue, the immigration problem, and the control of the natural resources — currently before the public and each could be associated with a Roman Catholic plot, making ideal conditions for an anti-Catholic campaign.[8] As a heavily agrarian society, Saskatchewan had its full measure of the tendency among rural folk to believe in 'interests' conspiring against them and to crusade for social and moral conformity. Furthermore, economic prosperity prevented energies from being diverted to economic problems alone. Religiously, conditions could not have been better for Klan growth, with an overwhelming majority of people belonging to historic Protestant churches, the members of which are mainly

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[1] Kenneth Earl Harrell, "The Ku Klux Klan in Louisiana, 1920-1930" (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1966), p. 65.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Oct. 1, 1921, p. 3. See also *Victoria Daily Times,* Nov. 21, 1922, p. 9: "So far only one lodge in Canada has been reported . . . at Montreal."

[4] *Victoria Daily Times,* Nov. 21, 22, 28, 30, 1922.

[5] *Sentinel And Orange And Protestant Advocate* (hereafter cited *Sentinel*), Sept. 18, 1923; see also *Papers of the Rt. Hon. James Garfield Gardiner* (hereafter cited G.P.), C. L. Fowler to J. H. Hawkins, Nov. 17, Dec. 1, 1924, pp. 12663, 12668.

[6] *G.P.*, Fowler to Hawkins, Feb. 18, 1925, p. 12727; *Moose Jaw Evening Times,* Oct. 8, 1927; *Edmonton Journal,* Oct. 19, 1929; G.P. pp, 12557-12593.

[7] For a more detailed discussion of the Klan in Canada, see W. Calderwood, "The Rise and Fall of the Ku Klux Klan in Canada" (Unpublished M. A. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Regina, 1968), pp. 1-27.

[8] *Ibid.,* pp. 244-249.

theologically conservative and hence somewhat restive about the growing influence of liberal theology and the social gospel in their denominations.

Into this Saskatchewan context in late 1926 came Lewis A. Scott and Hugh Finlay Emmons, experienced Klan organizers from Indiana. It did not take them long to discover local racial and religious prejudices and to exploit them blatantly. As Emmons later confessed, they simply "fed people 'antis'. Whatever we found that they could be taught to hate and fear, we fed them. We were out to get the dollars and we got them."[9] These methods brought results. Before the autumn of 1927, the Klan had reached out from Regina as far east as Moosomin. Between these two points locals were formed at South Qu'Appelle, Fort Qu'Appelle, Indian Head, Grenfell, Whitewood and Kipling. Directly south of Regina, locals were established at Ceylon and Radville.[10] Before the Ku Klux Klan finally petered out in the depression of the 1930's, there were at least one hundred and twenty-five locals scattered throughout the province. This, in itself, is clear testimony to the success of the Ku Klux Klan in Saskatchewan.

Above all else, the Klan claimed to be a religious organization, and the religious aspect of the order goes a long way in explaining its success in Saskatchewan. "We, the order of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Kanada," began the Ku Klux Kreed, "reverently acknowledge the majesty, goodness and supremacy of Almighty God and recognize his mercy and providence through Jesus Christ our Lord."[11] This statement from the Klan's Kreed set the tone of the whole ideological structure of the organization. Not only did one have to be a white Gentile in order to be a member, but a white Gentile Protestant. This was prima-facie evidence that the organization was religiously oriented. There were other evidences, however, which indicated the strong appeal the order was making to the religious sentiments of the Saskatchewan populace.

For an organization that considered the Roman Catholic Church with its ritualism and symbolism a "dispicable system of priestcraft which rules by superstition and fear,"[12] the Klan employed a good deal of ritualism and symbolism itself. Take, for instance, the Klan's initiation ceremony. This contained numerous references to biblical passages and rites with religious connotations. After the preliminary part of the ceremony, in which questions were asked and answered, candidates approach the Exalted Cyclops (President) and the "sacred altar" and knelt upon the right knee. The Exalted Cyclops then lifted a vessel of dedication fluid from off the altar and addressed the candidates as follows:

> With this transparent, life-giving, powerful, God-given fluid, more precious and far more significant than all the sacred oils of the ancients, I set you . . . apart from the men of your daily association to the great and honorable task you have voluntarily alloted yourselves as citizens of the Invisible Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

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[9] *G.P., Canadian Jewish Review,* June 15, 1928, clipping, p. 13791.

[10] G.P., pp, 12411-12504.

[11] *G.P.,* p. 13088. *Constitution and Laws of the Ku Klux Klan of Kanada.* Hereafter cited *Constitution.* Article 1.

[12] *G.P., Kerrobert Citizen,* May 16, 1928, clipping, p. 13599.

At this point, the following words were sung:

To Thee, oh God I call to thee—
True to my oath, oh, help me be!
I've pledged my love, my blood, my all;
Oh, give me grace that I not fall.

The Exalted Cyclops next sprinkled the fluid on the candidates and dedicated them "in body, in mind, in spirit, and in life, to the holy service of our country, our Klan, our homes, each other and humanity." The Kludd, or minister, terminated the ceremony with the dedicatory prayer:

> God of all, author of all good; You who didst create man and so proposed that man should fill a distinct place and perform a specific work in the economy of Thy good government, Thou has revealed Thyself and Thy purpose to man, and by this revelation we have solemnly dedicated ourselves as Klansmen to that sublime work harmonic with Thy will and purpose in our creation.
>
> Now, oh God! we, through Thy goodness, have here dedicated with Thine own divinely distilled fluid these manly men at the altar kneeling, who have been moved by worthy motives and impelled by noble impulses to turn from selfishness and fraternal alienation and to espouse with body, mind, spirit and life, the holy service of our country, our Klan, our home and each other, — we beseech Thee to dedicate them with the fullness of Thy Spirit, keep them . . . true to their . . . sacred, solemn oath to our noble cause, to the glory of Thy great name. Amen![13]

Similarly, the local meetings of the Klan were opened and closed with religious rites. The meetings began with the singing of the following 'klode':

We meet with cordial greetings,
In this our sacred cave
To pledge anew our compact
With hearts sincere and brave;
A band of faithful Klansmen,
Knights of the K.K.K.
Forever and for aye.

After prayer by the minister, the meeting was then opened for business. The same procedure was followed at the close, ending with the benediction:

> May the blessing of our Lord wait upon thee and the sun of glory shine around thy head; may the gates of plenty, honor, and happiness be always open to thee and thine, so far as they will not rob thee of eternal joys.
>
> May no strife disturb thy days, nor sorrow distress thy nights, and when death shall summon thy departure may the Saviour's blood have washed thee from all impurities, perfected thy initiation, and thus prepared, enter thou into the Empire Invisible and repose thy soul in perpetual peace. Amen![14]

The colour and drama of the Klan ritual might well have attracted many emotionally starved Protestants in Saskatchewan, especially in the quiet, unexciting, vast, and often very dull, rural areas of the province. The puritanical austerity in the worship of most Protestant denominations has not infrequently been blamed

[13] *G.P.*, Kloran of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, pp. 13073-13075.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 13046-13055.

for Protestants turning to secret societies and fraternities with elaborate pageantry and symbolism. While upholding Protestant ideals to the end, the Klan ritual was an evidence of one inadequacy in the Klansmen's own tradition.[15]

One Protestant fraternity which probably contributed more to the Klan's success in Saskatchewan than any other body was the Orange Lodge. By using Klan organizers and spokesmen as guest speakers at their rallies, making available their halls for Klan gatherings, and spreading favourable reports of the Knights in *The Sentinel,* the official publication of the Lodge, the Orangemen helped to establish the hooded society in the province of Saskatchewan.

That the Orange Order was influential in Saskatchewan is beyond doubt. Under the leadership of W. H. G. Armstrong, Grand Organizer of the Lodge in the province, its membership increased from the second lowest to the second highest in Canada by 1925, surpassed only by Ontario. Armstrong alone had initiated 10,454 Saskatchewan Orangemen. On November 11, 1924, *The Sentinel* announced that its circulation had reached 39,000 and, since Saskatchewan was the second strongest province in membership, it is most probable that it absorbed the second largest number of *Sentinel* subscriptions.[16] The Lodge was so influential politically that Conservative candidates were frequently pressed to take out Orange membership in order to obtain their nomination.[17]

As early as 1923, *The Sentinel* had reported approvingly the activities of the hooded order. "This Much-Maligned Organization Claims to Stand for Constitutional Government, Law and Order, the Public School and the Protestant Faith — Is That Why Rome Hates the Movement?"[18] It almost seemed that the periodical conducted a calculated campaign of preparation for the Klan's entrance into Canada. From April to September of 1923, *The Sentinel* carried glowing reports of the American Klan — reports such as the "Object and Principles of the Ku Klux Klan," "Why Rome's Outcry Against Ku Klux Klan?" and "Romanist Persecution Swells the Ranks of the Ku Klux Klan."[19] The September 18th edition carried the headline, which appeared to culminate the series, "Will Start Organization of Ku Klux in Canada."

Articles on the Klan continued to appear in the Orange publication: at least four more from September to December, 1923, thirteen in 1924, six in 1925, three in 1926, four in 1927, sixteen in 1928, two in 1929, and five in 1930. The sudden increase in Klan articles for 1928 was more significant for Saskatchewan than any other province; the Klan was on the move and deeply involved in politics at this time, particularly in the Arm River by-election of October. Accordingly, *The Sentinel* not only reported Klan activities but also carried articles on the main political issues emphasized by the Klan. On January 17, 1928, for example, a reprint from the *Regina Star* asserted that a plan was on foot to

[15] J. M. Mecklin, *The Ku Klux Klan: A Study of the American Mind* (New York: Russell and Russell Inc., 1963), pp. 105-106.
[16] *G.P., The Sentinel,* Aug. 11, 1925. One Klan spokesman claimed that the Orange membership in Saskatchewan was 36,000, *Melville Canadian,* March 28, 1928, clipping, p. 14075.
[17] Interview with Mr. Claude Burrows, of Regina, former Secretary of the provincial Conservative Association and Conservative candidate, Feb. 24, 1968.
[18] April 10, 1923.
[19] *Ibid.;* May 29; Sept. 11.

transport 125,000 French-Canadian families from Quebec to Saskatchewan, which would mean 250,000 votes. "The movement, therefore, would be political, purely and simply. The object is to submerge the British population of the western provinces and to maintain the French-Canadian dominance in the Federal Government." Other articles appeared on the immigration issue: "Gentlemen With Foreign-sounding Names Take Initiative in Attack on the Klan," "Saskatchewan Rapidly Becoming Non-British By the Foreign Influx," and "Discrimination Against Old Country British Must Cease, Says Bishop Lloyd."[20]

The School question was a major issue the Lodge helped keep alive. "School Troubles In Saskatchewan," read the title of an exposé of the Gravelbourg school situation on April 19; "Romanising The Public Schools" and "Education in Saskatchewan in the Hands of the Bishops" on November 8; "Saskatchewan's Public Schools" and "Public School Abuses In Saskatchewan Cited," "Nuns are Public School Principles [sic] Because Law Does Not Define 'Public School' " on November 15. In addition to these, articles on Natural Resources and Roman Catholic influence in the provincial government completed *The Sentinel's* campaign against the Liberal Government of Saskatchewan.[21]

Thus the Orange Lodge and the Ku Klux Klan, naturally akin in their ultra-Protestantism, found further grounds for co-operation in striving to deliver Saskatchewan from the alleged Roman Catholic menace by ousting the Gardiner Government. It was not surprising, therefore, that many members of the Lodge found their way into the Klan — a fact that is well attested in the membership directory of the local Klans.[22] Fifteen of forty-three members of the Kincaid Klan, for instance, belonged to the local lodge, amounting to approximately one-fifth of the total local Orange membership.[23] More important to the Klan's success was the fact that Protestant ministers often served local Orange lodges as Chaplains. This in turn brought many of them into contact with favourable accounts of the Klan, and seems to have channelled many if not into the order, at least into sympathetic attitudes to the order.[24]

Klan membership records and newspaper reports of Klan gatherings reveal the names of ministers of several Protestant denominations. Altogether, at least twenty-six Protestant ministers were either *bona fide* members of the Ku Klux Klan or directly involved in it. The following chart[25] provides a denominational comparison, and figures for total clergy and memberships in Saskatchewan.

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[20] March 1, p. 11, Aug. 23, p. 8, Oct. 25, p. 10.

[21] See June 9, 1927, p. 1, "Papal Policy Controls The West," Aug. 11, 1927, p. 20, and Sept. 15, p. 3, for Natural Resources; March 9, 1926, p. 2, "Why Saskatchewan Is Called Papal State," March 16, 1926, p. 2, "How the Roman Church Rules Saskatchewan," June 28, 1928, p. 2, "A Hot Time in Saskatchewan," and July 5, 1928, p. 2, "Rome Controls Saskatchewan," for charges of Catholic influence.

[22] Compare *G.P.* pp. 12411-12512, and the *Record of Proceedings of the Grand Lodge of Saskatchewan,* Saskatchewan Archives, Regina.

[23] *G.P.,* pp. 12021-12026, 12434. See also Rev. W. H. Morrison, Scribe of Vancouver Klan, to Meighen, n.d., *Meighen Papers,* p. 104153, and *Transcript of Interview with M. J. Coldwell,* June 19, 1963, for reference to Orange-Klan connection.

[24] See *Record of Proceeding of the Grand Orange Lodge of Saskatchewan,* March 3-4, 1926, for locals and their respective chaplains.

[25] The figures for this chart were taken from: *Census of Canada,* 1932, Vol. 2, p. 528; *Record of Proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the United Church,* Regina, May 31 to June 5, 1928, p. 129; *Minutes of the Twenty-third Synod of Saskatchewan of the Presbyterian Church,* Prince Albert, Nov. 6-8, 1928, p. 24; *Year Book of the Church of England in Canada,* 1928.

	Number of Ministers in Klan	Total No. of Ministers in Denomination	Membership
United Church	13	408	243,399
Baptist	4		22,623
Anglican	4	151	126,837
Presbyterian	3	25	67,954
Lutheran	1	27[26]	113,676
Pentecostal	1		4,970

Clearly such figures are incomplete and there is no way of achieving any certainty regarding the pattern of clerical affiliation with the Klan. They remain somewhat suggestive, however. The United Church may have contributed the greater number absolutely, but proportionately, the more conservative and fundamental the church, the greater was the tendency of Clergy to endorse the Klan openly.

Other significant observations can also be made. Although the United Church ministers were in the majority in the ranks of the Klan, all of them were serving small country parishes. The Baptist ministers, however, were all from large centres of population (Moose Jaw, Regina, and Estevan) and three of the four actively promoted the organization. Of the remainder of the clergymen — Anglican, Presbyterian, Lutheran, and Pentecostal — only the Lutheran was listed as a member of a city Klan and only one Anglican resided in a city who expressed sympathy for the order. It appears, then, that the tendency was for small town ministers to join the Klan, with the Baptists being the notable exceptions — probably because they had few churches outside the urban centres.

The most striking aspect of the ministerial response, however, was the silence, and apparently acquiescence, of the majority of Saskatchewan clergymen. But not all Protestant clergy remained silent on the issue. At least six ministers openly denounced the hooded fraternity — all of them within the United Church. Rev. H. D. Ranns, of Biggar, denounced the Klansmen as "bigots and ignorant law breakers."[27] Dr. Charles Endicott, of Saskatoon, stated at a United Church conference that he had no objection to everyone knowing he was "absolutely opposed" to the Klan.[28] Other ministers who openly voiced their opposition to the Klansmen were Reverends E. F. Church of Moose Jaw, W. A. Davis of Birch Hills, and E. R. M. Brecken of Young, a former missionary in West China for fifteen years.[29]

[26] This figure is approximate and was derived from *Canada District, American Lutheran Church, Jubilee Yearbook 1958*, pp. 17-38. There were other branches of the Lutheran Church but Rev. Kupfer, of Moose Jaw, belonged to the above denomination.

[27] *The New Outlook* (National publication of United Church of Canada), Aug. 3, 1927. p. 14.

[28] *Regina Morning Leader*, June 4, 1928.

[29] Opponents were as follows: Reverends H. D. Ranns, Biggar (see Letter to the Editor, *Manitoba Free Press*, Oct. 27, 1928; *G.P.*, Ranns to Gardiner, Aug. 24, 1927, and Feb. 14, 1928, pp. 12038, 12094), E. F. Church, Moose Jaw (see *Moose Jaw Times*, Oct. 6, 1927), Dr. Chas. Endicott, Saskatoon (see *Regina Post*, Oct. 19, 1927), Dr. J. L. Nicol, Rosetown (see *G.P.*, Nicol to Gardiner, Feb. 7, 1928, p. 12085), E. R. M. Brecken, Young (see *G.P.* Letter to Editor, *Young Journal*, March 1, 1928, p. 13460), and W. A. Davis, Birch Hills (see *G.P.*, *Gazette*, April 25, 1928, p. 12189).

As might be expected in the traditional Protestant Churches, the local congregations did not always agree with their ministers on the question of the value of the Klan. Rev. H. D. Ranns probably was the most active opponent of the Klan among the clergy — a fact that resulted in repercussions in his pastoral charge of Biggar and it is said, though difficult to document, in his resignation from the Biggar United Church.[30] In another small town in Saskatchewan, a minister refused a request that J. J. Maloney, a prominent Klan spokesman, be permitted to conduct meetings in his church. Maloney's supporters were persistent, however, and brought the request before the church board — the minister was over-ruled by six votes to two.[31] So strong became the Klan question in some local congregations that one young minister, upon entering a new pastorate, was immediately confronted by, in his words, "some off-scoured members of the church board" who asked him whether he belonged to the Klan: "I hardly knew how to answer the question . . . I was wondering whether I should say "No, but I will join later, [or to say] simply 'No'."[32]

The encounter with the Klan, furthermore, reached beyond the local congregations to the higher courts of the Church. The Saskatoon Presbytery of the United Church, for example, on October 18, 1927, went on record as opposing the order. Dr. Charles Endicott moved and Rev. J. A. Donnell seconded the following resolution:

> Whereas it is being stated that the United Church is backing the Ku Klux Klan and that the people are being asked to join the organization because of that fact. Therefore this Presbytery of Saskatoon desires to place on record: First — That the United Church is not supporting the K.K.K. in any way. Second — That this Presbytery believes that the principles of the K.K.K. are in opposition to the teaching of Jesus and therefore cannot be supported by the United Church of Canada. Third — That a copy of this resolution be sent to the Conference for further action if they see fit, also to the Press.[33]

When the Saskatoon resolution came before the Saskatchewan Conference, however, the Committee on References And Overtures simply recommended "that Conference refrain from making any deliverance on the question." But this same committee, at the same conference, when presenting a resolution from the Presbyteries of Wilkie, Saskatoon, and Assiniboia protesting the use of a French text book in the public schools — an issue the Klan was using to embarrass the Liberal Government — recommended "in view of the serious nature of the situation disclosed by the foregoing communications . . . that Conference appoint a special committee to consider the same and to bring in to present Conference pronouncement upon the issue involved."[34] The question might well be asked why the committee asked the Conference to refrain from discussing the Klan, and in the next breath recommended that the sensitive and controversial political issue of the French textbook be discussed and judged.

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[30] Interview with Dr. R. D. Tannahill, Archivist at St. Andrew's College, Saskatoon, Dec. 20, 1967.
[31] *The Sentinel,* June 14, 1928, p. 9.
[32] File on K.K.K., Glenbow Foundation, Calgary.
[33] Minute Record Book of the Saskatoon Presbytery of the United Church of Canada, June 10, 1925 to May 30, p. 91.
[34] *Record of Proceedings of the Fourth Conference,* Regina, May 31 to June 5, 1928, pp. 65-66.

In reporting the Conference for a Regina newspaper, Rev. H. D. Ranns remarked that 'there was quite a breeze in the conference' when the resolution was presented.

> There was instantly a murmur of interest and an atmosphere of tension. What would happen? It was evident that a large body of ministers and laymen, certainly not because they supported the Klan but in the desire for harmony, wished to shelve the matter. In the end, that desire really prevailed . . .[35]

Not everyone agreed with Rev. Ranns' report of the Saskatchewan Conference. *The Creelman Gazette* editorialized on June 7:

> We have read the report of the United Church Conference at Regina and regret that the narrow views shown and expounded by Dr. Endicott of the Saskatoon Presbytery and by the Rev. H. D. Ranns in his bitter and bigoted article to the press, should convey a possible false impression of the majority of the Christian gentlemen gathered there.

The article went on to refer to the use of the word 'damnable' by the Rev. J. A. Donnell in regard to the Klan, "a society which has thousands of christians and law abiding citizens in its ranks," as the height of "ignorant impudence and arrogant smug self-satisfaction. The mentality of the inquisition still lingers in priestly circles."[36]

The reaction of the Presbytery of Assiniboia to the Klan was quite the reverse of that of the Saskatoon Presbytery. Located in the southwest corner of the province, this Presbytery of the United Church reflected the enthusiasm of the local populace for the Klan. In the period 1926-1927 it had seven ministers who were Klansmen.[37] This Presbytery had been one of the three Presbyteries raising the French text book issue by sending overtures to the Saskatchewan Conference of 1928. There was strong evidence of the activity of Klansmen on the committees of the Presbytery. In February 1930, the Assiniboia Presbytery appointed a committee to investigate the Gravelbourg public school situation and draft another resolution to be presented at the provincial Conference of that year. Two of the three members appointed to the committee were Klansmen, Rev. S. P. Rondeau and R. H. Stinson, a layman from McCord.[38] On another occasion, three members of the Klan were appointed to the Social Service Committee. Their report paid little attention to the more progressive resolutions which frequently marked Social Service pronouncements of the Conference as a whole, but concentrated on the more moralistic issues: it recommended that steps be taken by Presbytery to see that the gambling law would be enforced, that the government be made aware "of the large amount of bootlegging in this Presbytery," that

[35] *Regina Morning Leader*, June 4, 1928; also *Regina Daily Post*, June 4, 1928. See also *The United Church Observer*, Dec. 15, 1965, p. 12, for further comments.

[36] *G.P.*, clipping, p. 13675.

[37] Reverends A. W. Keeton, Mossbank, D. E. Freek, Climax, S. P. Rondeau, Woodrow, W. H. Madill, Kincaid, L. R. Bouchard, Ponteix, T. Musto, Verwood, J. McKnight, La Fleche. See Minutes of the Presbytery of Assiniboia, Archives of St. Andrew's College, Saskatoon; *G.P.*, *Record of Proceedings of the Third Conference*, Moose Jaw, May 26-31, 1927, p. 12411.

[38] See *G.P.*, p. 12443, for membership of McCord Klan; also Minutes of the Presbytery of Assiniboia, Feb. 15-16, 1930, n.p.

ministers inform their congregations that "there is a law which prohibits unnecessary work on the Sabbath Day" and that "posters containing Sabbath Day observance laws be placed in public places."[39]

From the ultra-Protestant Orangemen to the fundamentalists within the traditional Protestant Churches, the Protestant response to the Klan in Saskatchewan was enthusiastic. Although not obtaining the official sanction of any of the denominations, the failure of most Protestant Churches to denounce the order and the affiliation and support of some twenty-six ministers undoubtedly assisted the organizers in recruiting Protestants into The Invisible Empire.

In the midst of this revival of ultra-Protestantism, how did the other religious groups react, especially those attacked by the Klansmen? In 1927, the Roman Catholic population in Saskatchewan was approaching 233,000, a substantial segment of the province's population of approximately 850,000.[40] The Roman Catholic reaction was predictable. *Le Patriote de l'Ouest,* the French-Canadian newspaper, expressed typical Catholic sentiments in 1927: "We regard the tolerance towards the Ku Klux Klan at the present time only as an incident of a systematic campaign against us in which the Government is liable to sacrifice its friends instead of muzzling a band of fanatics."[41] The comments of *L'Action Catholique* were more penetrating and condemnatory in reporting Premier Gardiner's attack on the Klan in the legislature: "Mr. Gardiner has very likely offended the Orangemen in his district . . . for the reason that these . . . imbeciles have nothing but admiration for the Ku Klux Klan's ridiculous or criminal silliness."[42]

As Klan activities expanded, *Le Patriote* became more alarmed.

> They have already started their work. They have attacked the crucifix which they have torn from the walls of one school. The teaching of French and catechism is now being attacked. They will make attempts to drag our trustees in court.[43]

The articles went on to call for a united front by the ethnic communities: "English, Polish, German, Ruthenians, Franco-Canadians, etc., we must all get together" to repulse "the common enemy" and we "have a meeting point which disregards contingencies of nature and countries, viz: the Catholic religion."[44] Again, on June 13, 1928:

> If we are attacked as French-Canadians it must not be forgotten that we are also attacked as Catholics and that consequently it will be necessary to make arrangements with other Catholic groups to organize our common defence. Our adversaries will then realize that we form a force that it would have been better not to challenge.[45]

[39] Minutes of the Presbytery of Assiniboia, Limerick, Feb. 9, 1927, p. 15.
[40] *Census of Canada,* 1931, Vol. 2, p. 529.
[41] *G.P.,* Sept. 21, 1927, p. 12028.
[42] *Ibid.,* Feb. 14, 1928, p. 13405.
[43] *Ibid.,* May 16, 1928, p. 13593.
[44] *Ibid.*
[45] *G.P.,* p. 13676.

The Catholic reaction manifested itself in other forms. The directors of the St. Jean Baptiste society and Franco-Canadian Association of Willow Bunch, for example, sent "a note of thanks to the Prime Minister, the Honorable J. G. Gardiner, for the firm stand taken by him with regard to the Ku Klux Klan, the sworn enemy of our faith."[46] The Knights of Columbus protested the decision of the Regina City Council to rent Maloney the City Hall: "As citizens of this city and taxpayers we feel that the council in future should refuse to rent the City Hall to individuals or organizations whose sole purpose in coming here appears to be to give vent to false and insulting tirades against the Catholic Church."[47] *The Prairie Messenger,* published by the Order of St. Benedict at Muenster, lauded the action of the Government in deporting a Klan organizer, Dr. J. H. Hawkins:

> While we are not interested in the political aspect of the case, we must congratulate the government on this action, and view it as a practical move towards insuring peace at least on the prairies of Saskatchewan. Of course, some will see in this act the covert operations of Rome's political machine in Canada, while one or the other political party may consider it simply as a drastic step towards furthering the interests of the present government. All of this notwithstanding, we believe it a judicious move towards halting the influx of religious bigotry and racial prejudice which has come over our southern border with the past year.[48]

Individual Roman Catholics did not remain quiet either: a St. Boniface priest described Klansman D. C. Grant as a "coward and an unreliable authority" and stated that "the Roman Catholic church would fight [the Klan] to the full extent of its power."[49] Another priest, Father M. Mourey, of Viscount, resorted to the local press in publicly denying Klan statements made at a meeting he had attended:

> Everything went on file while the plans of the Klan were laid bare; its aims revealed and its lofty ideals brought to my notice; especially its retrospect and broadmindedness towards all religions . . . Suddenly the real fighting spirit of the Klan took possession of the speaker . . . in his combatting fervor he lost memory of his previous statements . . . a cat playing gently with you first sometimes forgets and protrudes an offensive claw; that is what happened to the lecturer . . .

When Father Mourey attempted to protest by challenging some of the speaker's statements, "the broadmindedness, the tolerance, the freedom of speech and all such nice things were forgotten and after a few words I was ordered to listen quietly or to leave the room, under the pretence that this was HIS meeting and I was HIS GUEST."[50] Then there was the lawyer who objected to the Premier's 'daily' reference to the Roman Catholic Church in his speeches, and who telegraphed the Minister of Health, Hon. J. M. Uhrich, asking him to inform the Premier that "if he has a fight on with the klan leave us out [stop] we are well able to take care of ourselves and the klan [stop] we love our enemies

[46] *G.P.,* Secretary to Gardiner, Feb. 18, 1928, p. 12126.
[47] *Regina Leader,* Oct. 28, 1927.
[48] *The Prairie Messenger,* July 18, 1928; see also Feb. 13, 1929, for article accusing the Klan of bringing to Saskatoon a "fake" ex-nun.
[49] *Manitoba Free Press,* Oct. 19, 1968.
[50] *G.P., Viscount Sun,* June 8, 1928, clipping, p. 13682.

and get on better for having them [stop] God save us from our apologizing friends."[51]

Although anti-Catholicism overshadowed all other sentiments expressed by the Klan, there were elements of anti-semitism in Klan propaganda. On one occasion, with regard to Jews, Hawkins remarked "it was not the fact that they . . . had different religious beliefs that barred them from the Klan, but the fact that they could not comply with the conditions which were set up for membership."[52] D. C. Grant also stated that the Klan would "willingly" admit to its membership members of any faith if they were prepared to embrace the principles for which the order stood. Referring to the Jewish faith, however, "he admitted that the Jews were Protestants, insofar that they believed in God. They were the people, however, who crucified the Son of God, therefore they did not believe in Him."[53]

For the most part, it appears that the members of the Hebrew religion ignored the Klan; the Jewish press, however, did not fail to hail Mr. Gardiner's denunciation of the hooded order as an act of virtue and courage. "Jimmy Gardiner once more stamps himself as among the more liberal and courageous of Canadian statesmen," praised *The Western Jewish News,* "his attitude toward those of non-British origin in this province is one worthy of emulation by all public officials."[54] The article continued in a vitriolic vein:

> the Ku Klux Klan's purpose in Canada is only that of making money. Its promoters find racial prejudice a fertile field in which to plough for shekels. While the organizers are not serious in their alleged aims, those who become members apparently haven't brains enough to see the paltriness of the organization to which they belong. They take themselves seriously. The most regretable feature of the Ku Klux Klan's advent into Saskatchewan is that it has aroused racial prejudices in a simple type of mind.

One of the numerous letters congratulating Gardiner for his stand against the Klan in the legislature was written by Rabbi Ferdinand M. Isserman, of Toronto, who seems to have taken more than passing interest in the Klan in Saskatchewan.[55] Writing in the *Canadian Jewish Review,* he related interviews he had with Imperial Wizard Rosborough and Hugh Finlay Emmons, the leaders of the Saskatchewan Klan. A half hour of conversation with Rosborough, he commented, "failed to convince me that the Klan was not an organization inimical to Canada's highest interest." After an informative interview with Emmons, he concluded the Klan was "the most colossal swindle put over on the American people in all their history."[56]

Since at this period the Jewish population in Saskatchewan was small, consisting of less than five thousand in a population of almost nine hundred thousand,[57] it is difficult to document the average Jewish layman's reaction to the Ku Klux

[51] *G.P.,* J. D. Brown, Rosthern, to Minister of Health, June 23, 1928, p. 12289.
[52] *G.P., Unity Courier,* June 27, 1928, clipping, p. 13723. See also *G.P.,* Report of Hawkins' speech at Regina on Feb. 16, 1928, p. 12527.
[53] *Manitoba Free Press,* June 8, 1928.
[54] *G.P.,* Feb. 2, 1928, p. 12062.
[55] *G.P.,* p. 12132.
[56] *Ibid.,* June 15, 1928, clipping, p. 13791. See also *Saskatoon Phoenix,* June 4, 1928.
[57] *Census of Canada,* 1931, Vol. 2, p. 529.

Klan. But perhaps the letter written to the editor of *The Western Producer* on September 20, 1928, may provide some indication of Jewish sentiments: "As a Jew I am not asking for mercy, because the British flag will protect me; I am not asking you to pity us; I am not asking praise. What I do ask is justice, broadmindedness and fair play."

Thus the Ku Klux Klan, in addition to and underlying its appeals to racism, patriotism, and moralism, was a religiously oriented organization, violently anti-Catholic in sentiment and strongly fundamentalist in nature. Its anti-semitism alienated the Jew; its pronounced antipathy towards the Roman Catholic Church, the Catholic; and its heavy emphasis on fundamentalism and reactionary attitudes, the liberal churchman. There is little evidence, if any, that strongly conservative Protestants ever denounced the Klan in Saskatchewan; there is an abundance of evidence, however, to show that many conservative Protestants heartily embraced and promoted the principles of the Ku Klux Klan.

William Calderwood

Book Reviews

ONLY FARMERS NEED APPLY. By Harold M. Troper, Toronto: Griffin House, 1972. Pp. 192. Illus. $8.95.

Between the middle 1890's and World War I nearly one million American farmers found their way into the Canadian West. In *Only Farmers Need Apply*, the author attempts to elucidate and evaluate the significance of the Canadian government's carefully orchestrated promotional campaign in motivating this vast northward migration. What emerges is basically a detailed institutional assessment of the organization and activity of the Department of the Interior's immigration branch.

Troper commences his study with an examination of the structure and personnel of the department's inside service in Ottawa. Here the focus is logically on the officers of the immigration section, but one is nonetheless left with the feeling that a more complete assessment of the larger institutional structure within which the immigration officers operated would have added an essential measure of depth. The other administrative branches of the Department of the Interior in this period, including the Dominion Lands branch, the Surveys branch and some of the various sub-branches, such as the Timber and Grazing branch, also exerted an influence on the formulation of immigration policy. Officials in the Timber and Grazing section for example were often agitated by the encouragement given by immigration officers to American farmers to homestead in the drier regions. Such differences from time to time had to be resolved by the Deputy Minister or Minister and through such adjudication one branch on occasion was able to exercise considerable influence on the policy of another section of the department. Some examination of this kind of debate within the department at large could have added another important dimension to our understanding of the formulation of immigration policy.

The political milieu in which immigration policy was advanced might also have been given more detailed attention. While the "vital organizational work" (p.9) of the man at the top, Clifford Sifton, is acknowledged, there seems to be little real assessment of the philosophy and the political imperatives that guided the Minister's actions. The differences of opinion between Sifton and his successor Frank Oliver are touched upon, but the essence, the extent, and the consequences of the considerable divergence in attitude between the two, is not satisfactorily brought out or evaluated. It seems surprising that the Sifton Papers apparently were not used to provide some further insight in this direction and to assist in measuring the degree to which Sifton's immigration policy was shaped by pressures extant at the time within the western base of the federal Liberal party.

The author seems much more at home in dealing with the outside service. The analysis here is much more complete and this side of his study helps to fill an important gap in western historiography. The activities of the Canadian immigration agents stationed in the United States are carefully probed. For the first time the sub-agent network is examined and is found wanting. Though the author must conclude that the publicity campaign planned and executed by the

immigration branch did not create the tremendous demand for Canadian lands, he argues that the department can be credited with ensuring that Canadian lands were considered a creditable, and even preferable alternative, to the extensive properties that were still being offered for settlement in the United States. In fact, so successful was the promotional programme that in one area it resulted in some embarrassment. Troper's account of the resultant unofficial policy to discourage black American agriculturalists is perhaps the most interesting portion of his study.

In all, it must be said that this study makes an important contribution to western Canadian historiography. The author has certainly accomplished his stated intention of creating an interest and establishing a base from which others — and hopefully Professor Troper — can pursue the study of American immigrants in Canada and Canadian immigration policy in general.

D. H. Breen.

MAINTAIN THE RIGHT. By Ronald Atkin, Toronto: Macmillan, 1973. Pp. 400. Illus. $11.95.

Ronald Atkin, Sports Editor of the London *Observer* and an employee of the Canadian Government Travel Bureau has written an ambitious book. In *Maintain the Right* Mr. Atkin attempts to separate fact from fiction and to preclude the latter from his history of the North-West Mounted Police from 1873 to 1900. His task is made more difficult by the existence of a plethora of undocumented books and articles which have given weight to many stories concerning the force for which good documentary evidence does not appear to exist. Atkin generally shies away from this trap, although he does, on occasion, cite such a dubious source of information as John Peter Turner's *North-West Mounted Police, 1873-1893*.

This book is extensively documented and contains an impressive bibliography. It does not, however, reveal major episodes previously unpublished. Such events and developments as the state of the Canadian Northwest prior to 1874, the debauching of the native population by the whisky traders and wolfers, the force's great march west in 1874, the presence on Canadian soil of Sitting Bull and the Sioux from 1876 to 1881, the North-West Rebellion, the enforcement of the prohibitory liquor laws, the policing problems posed by the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway and the force's role in the Klondike gold rush receive attention. It is a spirited account and contains a wealth of interesting and oft-times humorous anecdotes.

Perhaps the book's major shortcoming is that while it is extensively documented, the author uses a somewhat unsatisfactory method for tabling his sources, and a few rather interesting and important statements are not documented. The reader should be told, for example, the sources which enable Atkin to state that Sir John A. Macdonald had planned "to recruit a section of the police force from among the West's half-breed population" (p 41), that the departure from Dufferin, in July, 1874, was delayed because of the expected appearance across the Manitoba border of Sioux fleeing the American army (p. 58), that "American politicians and generals encouraged the indiscriminate slaughter (of the buffalo), since it would speed the end of the Indian, too" (p. 71), and that Jean Louis

Legaré was paid $8,000 by the American government for his services in connection with Sitting Bull and the Sioux (p. 156).

There are as well some apparent misinterpretations and some factual errors. Certainly, the force was not simply "hurriedly formed to combat the corruption of the Plains Indians by whisky traders" (p. 16), but also to secure the Northwest from American encroachment, to make possible the construction of a transcontinental railway, and to make the area safe for white settlers; Palliser and Dr. Hector criss-crossed the region in the late 1850's rather than during three years in the 1860's (p. 23); the Cypress Hills Massacre was not "the final, deciding factor in the formation of the North West Mounted Police" (p.39) — this action being underway when the news of the Massacre reached Ottawa; French twice called General Parades at Toronto, not at Dufferin, to encourage the faint-hearted to take their leave (p. 57); Dickens' "meek abandonment" of Fort Pitt during the North-West Rebellion could be interpreted as having saved the lives of his men and the civilians at that point and thus proved an intelligent contrast to Crozier's "undoubted bravery" and "equally undoubted stupidity" at Duck Lake (pp. 239-240); Big Bear did not die "within six months", but rather eleven months after being released from prison in 1887 (p. 250).

The dust jacket draws attention to the author's desire to "portray them as they actually were — men of flesh and blood, not just mere cardboard". He has provided convincing evidence that the force was often poorly administered by Ottawa, the Commissioners, and other high-ranking officers. He shows too that it was plagued by primitive barracks' accommodation and medical treatment, desertions, and faulty equipment and clothing, that many legendary acts of bravery were considered by the force as routine, and in some instances were probably so, and that the force had its "share of misfits, incompetents, and drunkards". In a foreword Mr. Atkin emphasizes that "the Mounties have been embarrassed and irritated for many years by the myths which have obscured their arduous, eventful and inspiring story". If this is true, then the force should be pleased with his account.

This book should sell well in this the force's centennial year. It should not be considered a definitive work, but such a book probably cannot be written in view of the destruction by fire in 1897, of many of the early records of the force. It is nevertheless the best-balanced and most readable history of the force's formative years to come to the reviewer's attention.

E. C. Morgan.

The Twenties in Western Canada, Edited and with an introduction by Susan M. Trofimenkoff. Ottawa: National Museum of Man, 1972. Pp. 259. Illus. $2.50.

The Twenties in Western Canada, the collection of papers presented at the fourth Western Canadian Studies Conference held at Calgary early in 1972, throws substantial light on an era which Professor Trofimenkoff calls "an Unknown Decade in Canada's Past." The articles, some urging adoption of new approaches

or further study in certain areas, deal with a variety of topics: the labour, co-operative, and peace movements; minorities; politics; prohibition; the Ku Klux Klan, and Canadian literature. In general, the authors, a professor of English, a political scientist, and eight historians, treat rather specialized subjects and assume some knowledge of Western Canadian developments on the part of readers.

Much has been written concerning labour unrest following World War I, but work on the subject still remains to be done. "Western Labour Radicalism and the One Big Union: Myths and Realities" by David Bercuson includes an appeal to historians to examine anew "the traditions of Canadian labour radicalism and the organizations which it spawned." Bercuson suggests that a major reason for the OBU's failure was its incompatibility with "deeply ingrained traditions of western labour radicals." At its formation workers flocked to its colours only to desert in a rush when they learned it bore little or no similarity to their needs and desires. They discovered they had been shortchanged "organizationally, industrially and ideologically." Among other things, Bercuson urges researchers to cease ignoring the fact that many progressives in the western labour movement opposed the OBU. "It would be a great mistake," he asserts, "to consider the OBU as the sole or indeed the prime representative of the radical mainstream of western Canada." Indeed, by opposing labour parliamentary activity, it sought to reverse "a deeply-running current of western radicalism."

In a somewhat similar vein, Donald Page's, "The Development of a Western Canadian Peace Movement," urges students of international relations to study a sorely neglected area: activities of people at the grassroots level and their effect on the direction of Canadian foreign policy. Page discusses prairie support for the League of Nations Society, pacifist sentiment, and the mobilization of such sentiment behind a positive peace program primarily by Mrs. Violet McNaughton, editor of *The Western Producer's* Women's page. He shows that the movement, though too idealistic and out of touch with international realities to survive long in the 1930's, was able to exert some influence on Ottawa's actions.

Two of the works contained in the volume deal with the farmers' political movement. Thomas Flanagan's "Political Geography and the United Farmers of Alberta" is a study of the components of UFA electoral success. On the basis of an analysis of election returns and census data, Flanagan proposes modifications in C. B. Macpherson's explanation of political support for the UFA. Alberta's population, he contends, was not as homogeneous as Macpherson's *Democracy in Alberta* implies; rather UFA electoral success was built on "fundamental social cleavages . . . caused by physical and human geography." The UFA obtained most support in the "agricultural heartland" where conditions of Macpherson's theory were met, that is where the population consisted largely of grain growers served by small market communities. Elsewhere, it fared less well or did not even field candidates.

The second essay concerning prairie politics, "The Honourable Thomas Alexander Crerar: the Political Career of a Western Liberal Progressive in the 1920's" by Foster Griezic, calls attention to the fact that though the Progressive

movement has been studied extensively the same is not true of Crerar and other agrarian leaders. Conflicting interpretations of his career are outlined, and after tracing his involvement in public affairs to the 1930's, Griezic concludes that Crerar was "a western Progressive," "sympathetic to the Liberal party," whose "reformism" mellowed by 1922 and "was no longer evident" by 1925. The article brings out certain neglected aspects of Crerar's career but suffers stylistically. For example, greater use of pronouns would lead to improvement.

Another movement examined at some depth is the co-operative movement. In "The Co-operative Union of Canada and the Prairies 1919-1929" Ian MacPherson outlines the types of co-ops existing on the prairies in the 1920's and discusses efforts by the Union to draw them together and gain affiliates among them. The Union made substantial progress, but gains did not come easily as prairie co-operators were deeply divided in "a fiercely competitive co-operative movement." The article sheds new light on the significance of the prairies in the growth of co-operatives but is unfortunately marred by a minor misconception. In the first paragraph, the author states that the Saskatchewan Grain Growers' Association was engaged both in the sale of western wheat and the operation of a trading department. Though it did the latter, the former was carried on by the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company.

Laurie Ricou, "From King to Interloper" Man on the Prairies in Canadian Fiction 1920-1929," demonstrates what is described as "the major development in the short history of Canadian prairie fiction." Employing works of R. J. C. Stead and F. P. Grove, the author illustrates how prairie writers, "increasingly freed to consider more objectively man's relationship to the natural world, and, ultimately, the question of man's own nature," turned from romance to realism. During the period man's relationship with the landscape in fiction was transformed. Stead's prairie man, "master of all he surveys, rooted in the soil from which he derives both material and spiritual necessities," becomes Grove's man, "one small element in nature" who "must accommodate himself to the cosmic rhythms." Man, an intruder on the prairie, "is no longer provided for, but must provide for himself." Ricou offers a suggestion as to why this transformation in fictional writing occurred: "It would seem that as the machine makes the task of working the harsh land easier, the pioneer's need for the sustaining myth of an eternally beneficient land becomes less urgent."

The four remaining essays are all classifiable as social history. Raymond Huel's "French Language Education in Saskatchewan" discusses efforts by Franco-Canadians to enhance French language instruction in the province and the setbacks they suffered during the years 1918-30, a period "in which their cultural identity was most severely threatened." Patricia Roy's "The Oriental 'Menace' in British Columbia" in some respects parallels Huel's article. It demonstrates that many British Columbians were every bit as determined to make their province "white man's country" as ultra Protestants were to make Saskatchewan purely Anglo-Saxon domain. In B.C., as in Saskatchewan, propagandists, politicians and others played on people's fears and successfully promoted restrictive legislation. William Calderwood closely examines some of the Saskatchewanians

involved. In "Press, Pulpit and Political Reactions to the Ku Klux Klan in Saskatchewan" he explains how a disreputable organization, initially promoted by a few eastern Canadian and Yankee carpetbaggers, was able to cut a wide swath among the province's Protestants before foundering in the quagmire of the 1930's. The author expresses surprise at the fact that the Knights of the Bedsheet were able to use the natural resources controversy to their advantage. This was to be expected; Manitoba's Coldwell Amendments of 1912 and Mackenzie King's abortive attempt to reach agreement with Alberta on natural resources in 1926 doubtless led many to believe that transfer would involve concessions to the French Catholic minority. Finally, John Thompson in "The Voice of Moderation: the Defeat of Prohibition in Manitoba" details how the Moderation League and veterans' groups succeeded in breaching and ultimately demolishing the porous dam "drys" had reared between thirsty Manitobans and legitimate sources of booze.

All in all, the volume is a very worthwhile addition to the growing body of publications on Western Canada and should spark further research. In short-cutting normal production procedures by reproducing the typewritten manuscripts, the publisher has apologized for mistakes which might result. Apologies were unnecessary; only two minor errors merit mention. The "Toad Land Enterprise" (p. 52) should read the Toad Lane Enterprise, and the *Wadona Herald* (p. 205) should read the *Wadena Herald.* Readers who enjoyed and were stimulated by the published papers of earlier conferences will certainly not be disappointed with this series.

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